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ABSTRACT
This study is a historical examination of the relationship
between the Iranian state and three trans-border ethnic
groups inhabiting Iran, Azaris, Kurds and Baluch. A
comparative analysis demonstrates a difference in the way
the state has approached these groups. The Iranian state
has been accomodating towards the Azaris while "carrot and
stick have been used to deal with other groups. This
differential approach, however, is not a result of the
transformation of the state through time. Indeed a
relative continuity can be observed in the mutual
perceptions and expectations. Such continuity is only
explicable by observing the Iranian state and these groups
in the historical context in which group encounters
originated. As each group has had a different historical
experience vis-a-vis the state, its relationship with the
state has been different by virtue of that particular
experience. Historical precedents, therefore, have had
impacts on the nature of the relationships that have
followed. At the same time as these groups share ethnic
kin on the other side of the borders with the neighbouring
countries, the problem of their incorporation for the
Iranian state has been linked, partly, to the ties of
these communities to their ethnic kin in the neighbouring
state and to its own relationships with those states.
A comparison of the relationships between the Iranian
state and these groups within traditional and modern
socio-political structures also demonstrates that
3modernization cannot be directly linked to ethnic
conflict. It is the state that through implementation of
various policies has been responsible for creation or
resolution of conflict. The state, through utilization of
myriad of policies ranging from coercion to co-optation of
the political elite at the local level [Baluch and Kurds]
and power sharing at the national level [Azaris] has been
able, at times, to put a cap on ethnic aspirations. The
Iranian state, however, due to its unwillingness to
install democratic political institutions has not
succeeded to create national cohesion. This explains the
fact that the state, at different historical junctures,
has resorted to force to bring the centrifugal elements
within its sphere of influence.
This study will also argue that although cultural and
economic grievances are tangile and real, political
factors are the most salient in the creation or resolution
of conflict.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Myron Weiner
Title: Ford International Professor of
Political Science
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7INTRODUCTION
Since time immemorial a mosaic of numerous groups of
distinct racial, linguistic, religious and cultural
backgrounds have inhabited the territory called Iran. At
present, although there are no reliable census data, it is
widely believed that the Persian community who is
politically and socio-economically dominant in Iran,
represents about half of the total population which is
estimated to be around 58 million.1 We call Persian
those segments of the Iranian population who speak Persian
as their mother tongue and mostly inhabit the central
plateau. The Persians are dominant in the bureaucratic,
military and religious institutions and possess a high
percentage of the national wealth.
The non-Persian population mainly inhabits the
peripheral regions of the Iranian territory and speaks a
variety of different languages. The most important of
these groups are: the Azarbaijanis, the Kurds, the Baluch,
the Turkomans, the Arabs, and the Bakhtiari, Lur, Qashqai,
Shahsevan and other smaller tribal groups. Linguistic
differences, however, are not the only markers of
differentiation among these groups. Such communities as
the Kurds, the Baluch and the Turkomans are Sunni Muslims
8and thus sectarian differences together with the
linguistic ones separate them from the Persians.
Among the above-mentioned groups, the most important,
from a political perspective, are Azarbaijanis [15-20% of
the total population], the Kurds [5-7%], and the Baluch
[2%].2 These three ethnic groups are regionally
concentrated and thus have a claim to a territorial
"homeland." They also share kin on the other side of the
borders with the neighbouring countries. The Azarbaijanis
are divided between Iran and the newly independent state
of the Republic of Azarbaijan -a republic of the former
Soviet Union-, the Kurds are divided mostly between the
three states of Iran, Iraq and Turkey with small enclaves
in Syria and several republics of the former Soviet Union,
and the Baluch are divided mainly between Iran and
Pakistan with a smaller number in Afghanistan. The trans-
border nature of these groups, indeed, presents the
Iranian state with potential problems of international
dimensions. In point of fact, for the Iranian state the
problem of incorporating these groups has been linked,
partly, to the ties of these communities to their ethnic
kin in the neighbouring states and to its own
relationships with those states.
This study is an attempt to examine the relationship
0between the Iranian state and the above-mentioned three
groups, i.e., Azaris, Kurds and Baluch, within the
political structure of the last two monarchical dynasties
and the present Islamic regime. The Qajar dynasty [1789-
1925] represents the traditional political structure while
that of the Pahlavi [1925-1979] a modernizing/modern one.
Also, the Islamic Republic and its relationship with these
groups will be examined to understand whether the
revolutionary upheaval and the drastic change of the state
ideology has in any way altered the state's posture vis-a-
vis these groups.
Of particular importance to this study has been the
difference in the relationship between the state and these
groups, i.e., the relationship has not been similar or
equal. The findings of this study suggest that such a
difference is not the result of the transformation of the
state through time. Indeed, it is believed that there has
been a relative continuity in the relationship between
each group and the Iranian state. This continuity can
only be explained by placing these groups and the Iranian
state in the historical context in which these
relationships originated. As each group has had a
different historical experience, its relations with the
state has been different from other groups by virtue of
10
that particular experience. Within such context it can
be observed that historical precedents, to a large extent,
set the stage for the kind of relations that follow.
Indeed the history of group encounters, by and large, has
determined the nature of mutual perceptions and
expectations that have emerged. Another finding of this
study is that although modernization, greatly, contributes
to the emergence of political consciousness among these
groups, it is not, by itself, responsible for group
conflict. It is, indeed, the state that through
implementation of various policies is able to control the
process of conflict-generation or conflict-resolution. It
will also be argued, throughout this study, that the
modern Iranian state has not had a great success in
creating national consensus and cohesion in Iran. This
observation is based on the fact that the state has had to
resort to coercive measures in order to keep such groups
as the Kurds in line since the slightest indication of the
weakness of the central authority reactivates centrifugal
tendencies. At the same time the links between these
groups and their co-ethnics in the neighbouring countries
have been important factors in the process of identity
formation particularly among the Azaris and the Kurds but
less so in the case of the Baluch. The main reason for
11
such discrepancy seems to be the rate of development and
the degree of the political consciousness of the ethnic
kin in the neighbcuring country. Furthermore, it will be
explained that such cultural attributes as language and
religion are not intrinsically important in the creation
of either ethnic consciousness or ethnic conflict. What
makes these cultural markers important is the context in
which they are placed and considered. It will also be
emphasized that political reasons are, indeed, more
salient in the generation or resolution of conflict.
Although economic or cultural factors may be recognized as
tangible reasons for articulating communal grievances, the
results of this analysis demonstrate that it is the
political realm that determines the instability or
stability of group relations .
This study will begin by examining the relations
between the traditional state and the Azaris, Kurds and
Baluch. The traditional Iranian state was characterized
by a segmented political organization in which the
dynastic ruler had absolute power and ruled without
interference. This rule over the periphery, however, was
often intermittent and sporadic; limited to extraction of
some resources in tribute and military levies. Most
ethnic groups inhabiting Iranian territory before the 20th
12
century were thus autonomous and insulated units. The
rulers' "divide and rule" policies as well as their
frequent alliances with the local leaders enabled them to
govern the heterogeneous and diverse population who
inhabited their realm.
This was basically the way the traditional Qajar
Shahs approached the Kurds and the Baluch. Both groups
were tribal with a considerable nomadic population who
would not be easily subdued and both as peripheral groups
were in the "intermittent zones of influence" of the Qajar
rulers. The relationship of the Qajars with the Kurds and
the Baluch was, basically, one of conquest. However, the
Qajars had to utilize non-violent means to deal with these
groups. These ranged from marriage alliances to divide
and rule and appeasement of the local leaders. By and
large, these policies can be summed up as "carrot and
stick."
The Azaris, on the other hand, present us with a
different situation. They were not only Turkish-speaking
and could thus identify with the Turkish-speaking Qajar
rulers, their province, Azarbaijan, was the most
prosperous and strategically important region in Iran.
Azarbaijan, in contrast to the Kurdish and Baluch areas,
was not intermittently ruled, it was a natural extension
13
of the Shah's realm with Tabriz, its capital, as the city
where the Qajar Crown Prince was always stationed. At the
same time, the Azaris mostly a settled population,
demonstrated the same socio-economic characteristics as
the Persians. Azarbaijan, thus, as an integral part of
the Shah's realm not only did not have to be conquered or
subdued, it was an organic continuation of the center or
part of the "core."
In the 20th century, when the "nation-state" became
the most viable and globally relevant form of political
organization, Reza Shah Pahlavi [1925-1941], the founder
of the Pahlavi dynasty, created a modern state in Iran.
The advent of the modern state entailed the emergence of a
nation. The concept of "nation-state" was derived from
the political restructuring of the world system during
19th and 20th centuries. The nation-states of today as
members of the United Nations are all creations of this
system and most of them did not even exist either as names
or as administrative units more than a century or two ago.
Iran, however, was one of those few that not only could
trace a name but a continuous political entity and a rich
culture, in roughly the same geographical location.
However, although the idea of the "state," as a political
entity, was not novel in Iran, the "nation-state" in its
14
modern and Western sense was a new phenomenon that
appeared with the emergence of the present world-system.
It was indeed the modern territorial state that attempted
to forge an integrated "Iranian nation" out of the
heterogeneous population that inhabited the territory.
The modern political entity emerging in Iran, in
order to create the corresponding "nation" had to deal
with problems of cohesion. These problems ranged from
internal disintegration to external aggression. To
precipitate the emergence of the "nation" the state had to
develop and promote a "national" sentiment that would help
the state legitimize its claims and increase the efficacy
of the state administrative policies due to the emerging
uniformities. An ideological framework, thus, had to be
created on the basis of which political integration could
be pursued since after 1914 and the onset of the WWI, Iran
was on the brink of disintegration, motivated, in part, by
actions and interventions of the foreign powers. The
nation-building attempts of the state, therefore, entailed
the promotion of an "official nationalism" as the
ideological foundation of the Pahlavis' modern state. A
sense of national identity was promoted by glorifying
Persian language, history and culture. It can be argued
that initially the main impetus for these policies was the
15
desire to preserve the territorial integrity of Iran and
not much thought was given to the emerging Persian
hegemony over a number of ethno-linguistically diverse
groups. The consequences, however, entailed the emergence
of such hegemony. The Persians dominated the central
authority while showing little interest in the cooptation
and incorporation of the local political leaders.
Military force was used to subdue centrifugal elements
such as the Kurds and the Baluch while political
participation was denied to the population as a whole.
Indeed, the modern state in its zeal to forge a
corresponding nation had begun to use force freely. The
consequence was the emergence of an oppressive political
system in which the group or groups in control eliminated
all possible political rivals in order to maintain power.
This, of course, does not mean that the traditional
political structure was not oppressive or despotic.
Indeed it was. However, there was an important
difference. The traditional political structure lacked
the ability and the resources for the range of control
which the modern state exercised. The result was that
although the modern state was able to consolidate smaller
and diverse communities into the territorially larger unit
of modern government, it did not succeed in replacing
16
local loyalties with allegiance and support of the larger
unit. Moreover, it seems that the modernizing and
centralizing policies of the state helped stimulate the
growth of ethnic identities, thereby replacing the
inactive and static "ethnic categories" with active and
dynamic "ethnic communities." At the same time, unlike
the traditional political structure in which the cultural
or ethnic characters or attributes of different groups
were not significant, in the modern political structure,
as a result of particular policies adopted by the state,
these attributes became increasingly important for the
maintenance of group boundaries.
Initially the demise of the Qajar dynasty and the
advent of the modern state meant displacement and
alienation for the Azaris. Such displacement which had
begun with the occupation of Azarbaijan by the Russians in
1909, was reinforced through the policies implemented by
the modern state. Thus, for the first time since 1800 the
Azaris had lost their particular form of identification
with the "dynastic realm" while they could not readiy
define themselves in the new scheme of things. This
crisis in the case of the Azaris did not last long.
Although Azaris did demonstrate their discontent through
an uprising mostly supported and sponsored by the Soviet
17
Union, they soon found their niche in the new socio-
political structures of Iran. During the rule of the
second Pahlavi Shah, the Azari political elite were
incorporated into the national/state elite while the Azari
rank and file faced no discrimination and were easily
integrated into the civil and military bureaucracies as
well as the economic institutions of the country.
Other groups such as the Kurds and the Baluch were
not so fortunate. Their initial resistance to the
intrusive policies of the modern state was demonstrated in
different forms of tribal unruliness and banditry that
resulted in their military suppression by the state. But
through time as the process of change generated political
consciousness among the newly emerging strata, a
combination of intimidation and appeasement, cooptation
and suppression, i.e., "carrot and stick," were the basic
means through which the state dealt with these groups with
almost no power sharing at the national/state level. The
modern state had indeed followed in the footsteps of its
traditional predecessor.
The Pahlavi state, however, was toppled before it had
time to confront the social forces that itself had helped
create among these communities. It was the Islamic
Republican regime that began where the Pahlavis had left
18
off. Despite the universalist, Islamic pronouncements of
the regime, the Islamic state demonstrated intense
nationalistic sentiments and mostly followed the policies
of the ancien regime in respect to the various ethno-
linguistic groups. Again Azaris were accommodated -even
more so than before- with their elite sharing power at the
national/state level and no discrimination for the rank
and file, while "carrot and stick" -with more emphasis on
the stick- was used to subdue the Kurds, the Baluch or any
other group who had communal demands.
The Azarbaijanis, the Kurds and the Baluch provide
three interesting cases for comparative analysis. While
Iranian Azaris are Shii Muslims as are the Persians, the
Kurds and the Baluch are both Sunni Muslims. On the other
hand, the Azaris as Turkish speakers and thus as "Turks"
are said to belong to an ethnic stock different from the
Persians while the Kurds and the Baluch, by virtue of the
languages they speak, i.e., Kurdish and Baluchi [both
Indo-Iranian languages and thus akin to Persian] as well
as other ethnographic and historical data, are considered
to be of Indo-European stock similar to the Persians.3
Given the fact that the data presented by ethnologists and
anthropologists regarding the ethnic origins of these
groups are valid, it seems that ethnicity as common
19
origins and descent plays no role in binding together such
groups as the Persians, the Kurds and the Baluch and
genetic approach in explaining group relationship is thus
irrelevant. This argument can best be substantiated by
the closeness and comeraderie of the Persians and the
Azaris although the two groups are linguistically and
supposedly ethnically distinct.
To have a better understanding of the evolution of
the three groups' identities, this study has benefited
from a model of evolution of ethnic identity presented by
Paul Brass. Brass places ethnic groups on a "continuum of
growth and decline" of ethnic identity.4 There are three
critical points on this continuum, according to Brass who
designates them as "ethnic categories," "ethnic
communities," and "nationalities" or "nations." Ethnic
categories are those groups who do not attach any
political significance to their ethnic markers that
differentiate them from other groups. An ethnic category
is thus a socio-politically inactive and dormant group.
Ethnic communities, on the other hand, are not only
conscious of their objective differences but pursue socio-
economic and political goals based on such differences.
An ethnic community is, thus, a mobilized ethnic group
whose ethnic characteristics have become a focus of
20
political behavior. Demands for equal individual rights
is one aspect of this behavior. The movement from ethnic
community to nationality, according to Brass, takes place
when the group begins to aspire "corporate recognition"
for the group as a whole, such as self-rule within or
without an existing state.5
Brass's model makes the complex process of identity
formation easier to pinpoint and thus understand. Indeed
when Azaris, Kurds and Baluch are placed in the context of
this model one can recognize the junctures in which each
group has moved ahead and evolved from one point to the
next or more interestingly when one group has moved back
or declined from one point to another. Although it is
almost impossible to see a group decline from the point of
an "ethnic community" to the point of an "ethnic
category," it is easier to see how a group can change its
demands for "corporate recognition" to "equal indiviudal
rights" which is basically a decline from Brass's
"nationality" to "ethnic community." This, indeed, has
been the case with the Iranian Azarbaijanis who have
altered their demands in different historical junctures
depending on how they were perceived and treated by the
state. Based on Brass's model, at this juncture the
Azaris may be considered an "ethnic community" while the
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Kurds who have struggled for autonomy or independence
since the advent of the Islamic Republic fit into the
category of a "nationality." It is, indeed, difficult to
pin point the evolution of the Baluch on this continuum
since the abject poverty and backwardness of Baluchistan
have effectively prevented the growth of political
consciousness based on ethnic identity among the masses of
peasantry and nomadic population. However, things are
changing and as will be explained the Baluch communal
leaders and the small middle and lower middle classes have
articulated demands both for "equal individual rights" and
"corporate recognition" depending on the circumstances.
However, it may be more plausible to consider the Baluch
also a "nationality" not only on the basis of the demands
voiced by their communal leaders but by virtue of the
psychological barriers that exist between them and the
Persians that will not allow for an easy assimilation into
the Persian society.
The recent changes in the international political
arena the most important of which is the demise of the
Soviet Union will require an analysis of the patterns of
relationships that may develop in future due to these
changes. One of the most significant aspects of such
change has been the emergence of an independent Azari
22
state in the former Azarbaijan SSR. Also the Gulf War of
1991 drastically weakened the Iraqi central government
which in turn resulted in the revival of the Kurdish
struggle in Iraq and a de facto autonomy in Iraqi Kurdish
areas. At the same time the disintegration of the Soviet
Union has removed the potential Soviet threat to the
Baluch-inhabited areas both in Iran and Pakistan. Many
Baluch nationalists who were hopeful that the Soviets will
extend helping hands now have to come to terms with the
new realities of global politics. This study will also
provide a forward look analyzing the consequences of the
recent transformations.
The study will begin by an introductory chapter that
will examine the cultural and territorial characteristics
of each group and its homeland. The geographical and
topographical conditions of the homelands and the methods
of adaptations as well as the socio-political and economic
structures and the particular language and religion of
each groups will be described.
The traditional state and the relationship between
the center and the periphery will be studied in the
chapter devoted to the pre-modern state in Iran. In order
to contrast the role of the traditional state with that of
the modern state, each group will be considered in the
23
context of its particular relationship with the state.
This chapter will describe the historical background on
the basis of which future relations are formed.
The Constitutional Revolution of Iran [1905-1911] was
the first of its kind among the Muslim countries of the
Middle East -with the exception of Turkey. Indeed, the
Constitutional Revolution was a turning point in the
political development of modern Iran. Each group and its
relations with the state within the context of this
important political event will be studied. As a natural
extension of the Iranian socio-political forces the Azaris
behaved similar to the Persians, i.e., the community was
divided among those who advocated change [revolutionaries]
and others who remained loyal to the Qajars [royalists].
However, the chaotic conditions of the country and the
weakness of the center as well as the subsequent
occupation of Azarbaijan by Russia severely affected the
ties between Azaris and the Iranian state the legacy of
which can be observed in the following periods. This
chapter will pay particular attention to the linkages and
ties between the Azaris and their co-ethnic in Russia.
These ties, to a large extent, determined the future
evolution of an Azari identity as well as the emergence of
leftist tendencies in Iranian Azarbaijan. The inactivity
24
of the Kurds and the Baluch, in this period, will be
considered as both a reflection of their internal socio-
political structures and lack of meaningful ties with
their co-ethnics.
The centrifugal forces in Iran have usually responded
to the weakening of the central control by uprisings and
struggle for autonomy or independence. The periods of WWI
and WWII are the prime examples. Before WWII, however,
the advent of the modern state and emergence of Reza Shah
Pahlavi was another watershed event. This period will be
analyzed with specific attention paid to each group and
its response to the changing political environment. Of
special importance are the emergence of
nationalist/secessionist uprisings by the Azari and
Kurdish modern segments of the urban population. In this
section the role and intentions of foreign powers -mainly
the Soviet Union- and the significance of foreign
intervention as well as the penetrative power and
homogenizing practices of the modern state in fostering
nationalist/secessionist movements will be examined.
The periods of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the
Islamic Republic, one as the culmination of modernization
and Westernization of Iran and the other as an alternative
to Westernization will be studied with each group
25
considered specifically and separately. The modernization
policies of the Pahlavis created drastic change in the
lives of many Iranians. As the rate of urbanization,
literacy, per capita income, industrialization, etc.,
increased in the ethnic homelands, various modern strata
with a different kind of political consciousness emerged.
This consciousness, however, did not signal the appearance
of communal conflict. Although there were grievances due
to the uneven distribution of resources and cultural
policies, the state was able to put a cap on the communal
demands and thus play an important role in the management
of conflict. The chapter on the Islamic Republic will
examine the continuity of the Islamic state's policies
despite the dramatic change in the socio-political
structures and the state ideology. The last chapter will
present the findings of this study.
26
NOTES
1_ Iran Times XXII. No. 1. Friday, March 20, 1992.
2_ Since data on the ethno-linguistically diverse
population of Iran is lacking, most estimates are based on
conjectures and educated guesses. For different sources
please see the endnotes of the next chapter.
3_ For sources see endnotes of the following chapters.
4- Brass, Paul. 1976. "Ethnicity and Nationality
Formation." Ethnicity 3. P. 226.
5- Ibid.
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TERRITORIAL AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS:
AZARIS. KURDS, BALUCH
Azaris: General Observations:
The ethnic marker that differentiates Azaris from
other Iranians or more specifically from the Persians is
their language, Turki, as it is called by all Iranians and
the Azaris themselves. Azaris who are quite conscious of
this differentiating factor have played a significant role
in the political destiny of Iran. The seemingly curious
phenomenon that has emerged is that while the Azaris
possess a high level of ethnic/national consciousness they
have not ceased to be "Iranian." Indeed, the Azaris of
Iran have demonstrated that they simultaneously possess
and claim an "Iranian" and an "Azari" identity without one
being contradictory to the other.
It is important to note that ethnic boundaries,
although extremely important, are fluid and flexible.
Ethnic boundaries may thus be subjectively drawn or may be
manipulated to serve given ends at a particular place and
time. A group may thus use their identity at different
times to identify or contrast themselves with another
group.2
The extent of boundary change in the case of the
Iranian Azaris is, indeed, remarkable. The Iranian
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Azaris, at certain historical junctures in the 20th
century, have championed the cause of the "Iranian
nationalism" while at other times, depending on the
circumstances, they have acted as Azaris and become
involved in what may be identified as "politics of Azari
nationalism."
Numerically less than one half of the Persians, the
Azaris occupy a privileged position among various ethnic
groups of Iran. Their relations with the Persians,
however, have been at times precarious; usually based upon
a delicate balance of mutual cooperation and tension.
Iranian Azaris, however, have proven that if accommodated
and treated as partners they are more than willing to be
regarded as members of an "Iranian nation."
There are a few factors which may be enumerated to
explain the Azaris' identification with and loyalty to the
Iranian state. Among these the most important are:
1-The overwhelming majority of the Azaris are Shii
Muslims. In a Muslim society where religion is and has
been one of the most important sources of group
identification and ethnic-linguistic and/or national
loyalties are relatively recent phenomena, this factor
seems to be of the utmost significance.
2-Before the Pahlavi era (1925-1979) Iran was mainly
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ruled by dynasties of Turkic origin. Azaris of Iran,
thus, do not have a collective memory of humiliation, and
degredation; a characteristic that is usually exclusive of
oppressed peoples.
3-In respect to social stratification and social
structure, Azarbaijan seems to be an extension of the
Persian inhabited areas of Iran. The region and its
inhabitants have been tightly connected and integrated
with the central authority in the country since the
*Safavid period (16th century). This fact has,
undoubtedly, eased Azari identification with the Iranian
state.
4-The last and by all means the most important factor
has been the willingness of the Persian majority to share
power with the Azaris. Both during the Pahlavi era and at
present the political elite of Azarbaijan have been
readily integrated into the national political elite of
Iran. Indeed, some very powerful and politically
important individuals have come from Azarbaijan. And it
is interesting to note that the Persian rank and file have
never questioned or doubted such power distribution.
Thus, it seems that as long as the Azari political elites
have closed ranks with their Persian counterparts, the
average Azaris have considered themselves as part and
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parcel of one community; that of a Shii Iran.
Geoqrahv
The term Azarbaijan refers to two political units in
today's political discourse. The newly independent state
of Azarbaijan, the capital of which is Baku and was
formerly a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. And
the Iranian Azarbaijan, the capital of which is Tabriz, as
one of the provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iranian Azarbaijan shares frontiers with the Republic
of Azarbaijan and Turkey in the north and west
respectively. To the east it is bound by the the same
republic and Caspian Sea and to the south by the Province
of Kurdistan in Iran. The boundaries of Azarbaijan, it is
believed, have not changed much since the time of the
early Arab geographers.3
Azabaijan is covered by mountain ranges with high
peaks and considerable plains and high plateaux.4 While
in comparison to other Iranian provinces it is considered
a well-watered province, the regions's basic
characteristic is said to be its aridity. 5 Precipitation,
varies in different parts of the province. Western
Azarbaijan, for example, enjoys a relatively sufficient
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rainfall even during the three summer months.6
The climate thus represents the basic features of
Azarbaijan's landscape. Summers are mild in places that
are subjected to the "moderating influence" of the Caspian
Sea7; while in winters the difference between the areas in
the interior of Azarbaijan and those near the Caspian
shore is less pronounced. Sub-zero temperature in winter
is thus common in most of the region.8
According to the administrative division of the
country, Azarbaijan is divided into two provinces of East
and West Azarbaijan. The province of East Azarbaijan
which is the larger part of the two is populated
overwhelmingly by the Azari Turks. The province of West
Azarbaijan, however, contains other elements such as the
Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians. The Kurds are
particularly numerous in the cities of Mahabad and
Urumiyah, the capital of West Azarbaijan.
Azarbaijan probably ranks highest among the Iranian
provinces for wheat and many other agricultural
productions. There are also extensive garden and orchard
cultivations. 9 As a result of favorable and fertile
agricultural conditions, Azarbaijan, particularly the
eastern part, has been inhabited mostly by a settled
population. It should be noted, however, that both in
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East and West Azarbaijan various nomadic peoples such as
the Shahsavans1 0 and some Kurdish tribes lived a migratory
life. Pastoralism has been dominant in the mountains
where natural conditions support a nomadic way of life.
Azarbaijan historically has enjoyed a flourishing
urban life. Such cities as Tabriz and Ardabil were
important caravan stops.11 Tabriz was once one of the most
prosperous and important cities of Iran and at times the
capital of the ruling dynasty. It not only enjoyed
strategic and military significance, it has been an
important commcercial and communication center
particularly with the countries to the north and west of
Iran. The greater growth of Tabriz and its population was
achieved between 1800-1890 when caravans going toward
Trebizond used the city as an important stop. The
construction of the trans-Iranian Railways in the 1920s
made the Persian Gulf a commercially viable route and from
then on the prosperity of Tabriz and its population was on
the decline.1 2
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Ethnic and Historical riains
The territory of present Azarbaijan has been
inhabiated since ancient times. The Medes who founded the
Median state in the early 8th century B.C. ruled
Azarbaijan. It is said that even a century after the rule
of the Medes, Azarbaijan did not have a unified language
and the language of the Medes was a tribal language among
many others. Yet, Azarbaijan was the cultural and
economic center of the Medes.1 3
The Persians who established the Achaemenid Empire
ruled Azarbaijan after the Medes until they were toppled
by Alexander in the early fourth century B.C. From here,
there are different accounts regarding the ancient history
of Azarbaijan. Apparently, at this time in Azarbaijan,
one "Atropates" or "Atropaten" or "Atropate" came to power
and the term Azarbaijan is derived from his name.14 There
are, however, some disagreements about the "ethnic
origins" of "Atropate." Ahmad Kasravi, a prominent
Iranian historian, himself an Azarbaijani yet an "Iranian
nationalist," contends that "Atropate" was a native
Iranian who rose up against Alexander and while keeping
Azarbaijan free from the Greek encroachment, ruled
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independently and his descendants actually governed
Azarbaijan for 300 years without interference.15
Many others also agree that "Atropate" was an Iranian
who actually compromised with Alexander and was appointed
by that ruler as the governor or "satrap" of Azarbaijan.1 6
And, of course, those who write that Atropate was, in
fact, a Greek who became a vassal of Alexander in this
region and the term "Azarbaijan" is derived from
"Atropates" via Arabic and Turkish.1 7 Scholars such as
Kasravi vehemently disagree with this point of view.
Kasravi argues that the name "Atropate" had been a common
name among Iranians and there are innumerable individuals
named "Atropate" in Iranian history;18thus trying to prove
that "Atropate" is an ancient "Iranian" name.
There is, of course, a logical reason for such
debate. By arguing that Azarbaijan from time immemorial
was inhabited by "Iranian" peoples, most Persian/Iranian
writers and historians have made an attempt to prove that
this region and its inhabitants have always been an
inseparable part of Iran. This line of argument was
stressed by Iranian scholars in order to invalidate the
Soviet claims as to the uniqueness and distinct national
identity of the people of Azarbaijan.
Until the Arab invasion of Iran in the mid-seventh
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century, Azarbaijan was ruled by dynasties of Iranian
origins. The Arabs are said to have moved to Azarbaijan
in great numbers; the reasons being first the periodic
insurgency of the inhabitants and second the productivity
of the land and its attraction for the nomadic peoples.19
Arab historians and geographers have stressed the
linguistic and racial heterogeneity of Azarbaijan. 20
However, Azarbaijan seems to have been predominantly
Iranian at this period; the population speaking a
"dialectical form of Persian" (called by Mas'udi, al-
adariya [Azari]) "as well as standard Persian."2 1 The
Arabs seem to have been gradually incorporated into the
indigenous population. 2 2 Arabic, thus, became one of the
languages used by the population of Azarbaijan
particularly urban dwellers.23
The subsequent population movement to Azarbaijan,
however, tended to change the character of the indigenous
population much more drastically than before. This
important movement was carried out by Turkic tribes from
the north. The first group of these peoples consisted of
Oghuz Turks who appeared in the eastern regions of
Azarbaijan as early as the 7th century. The main
movement, however, happened in the 10th and 11th centuries
with the Seljuq-Oghuz invasions. These invasions had long
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lasting effects; gradually changing the ethnic and
linguistic character of the population. The Seljuq's
influence, however, was not one sided. It is said that:
...The Saljukate had begun to use Persian as the
language of the court; the Turkic language was used
among the commoners.24
Another important Turkic onslaught was by the Mongols
who entered the region in the early 13th century and laid
claim to Azarbaijan. An Iranian writer contends that
Qazan Khan Mongol had proclaimed in Tabriz that any one
who spoke Persian and/or Azari would lose his/her tongue.
This way, it is said, hundreds of people had their tongues
cut off because they were not speaking Turkish and
therefore "the rough vernacular of foreign peoples was
forced on the Iranian people of Azarbaijan." 2 5 This, of
course, does not mean that Azarbaijan did not prosper
under these rulers. Tabriz, in particular, became one of
the greatest centers of commerce and economic activity.26
Azarbaijan continued to prosper and be Turkified also
under Timur (another Turkic ruler) who conquered southern
Azarbaijan in 1386, while in the north power passed into
the hands of Shirvanshah of Derbent. After Timur's death
in 1405, the Shirvanshah briefly managed to unite the two
halves, but they were soon divided again, the north
remaining under the Shirvanshahs and the south falling to
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Oghuz-Turkoman tribes, first the Kra-kuyunlu and then the
Ak-kuyunlu.2 7 In 1502 Shah Ismail founded the Safavid
dynasty, took Tabriz, and established Azarbaijan as the
nucleus of his empire. Although himself of a Turkic-
speaking clan, Shah Ismail by declaring Shiism as the
state religion of Iran, laid the foundations of Iran as a
nation-state.
Religion and Languaae:
As was mentioned earlier Iranian Azaris are Shii
Muslims and they speak a language called Azari Turkish.
There is, however, much debate about Azari Turkish and its
origins.
Using the above-mentioned historical accounts, some
Iranian historians have argued that the inhabitants of
Azarbaijan were of Iranian stock who in pre-Islamic and
even Islamic periods spoke a language called "Azari" or
"Azari Pahlavi,"2 8 and that there exist some evidences
that the people of Azarbaijan even during the Safavids
still spoke this language which was one of the Iranian
dialects.29 Yet, the Safavid courtiers and aristocracy
preferred Turkish language due to the fact that most of
their tribal supporters were Turkish speaking. Indeed,
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Turkish was the language of the court and even poetry in
Turkish was encouraged by the Safavids. This as well as
the subsequent rule of the Qajars, themselves of Turkic
stock, helped to strengthen and spread Turkish more and
more in Azarbaijan. Indeed, various dialects of "Azari
Pahlavi" that were being spoken in different towns and
villages withered away by being absorbed into the dominant
language. And thus emerged a language which is a
combination of Turkish, Ghuzi, and dialects of Azari
Pahlavi and is spoken today in Azarbaijan as "Azari
Turkish.",,3 0
Mashkour, an Iranian historian, points out that
although the grammatical principles of Ottoman Turkish and
Azarbaijani language are similar there are great
differences in pronounciation. He maintains that
Azarbaijani Turkish is a middle road between literary
Ottoman Turkish and Turkoman dialect. Also, he argues
that Azari Turkish is grammatically much simpler than
Ottoman Turkish while there are a great many Persian words
in Azari Turkish and more Arabic words in Ottoman
Turkish.3 1 Mashkour, then, enumerates several
characteristics of the Azari Turkish to prove its original
distinction from other Turkic languages and its affinity
with Persian:
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-"Azari Turkish is a mixture of Azari, Persian, Arabic
and Turkish.
-Turkish words comprise only 20-30% of the Azari
Turkish.
-There is no limit in the usage of Persian and Arabic
words and combinations common in Persian language
depending on the level of literacy and culture of the
speaker. These words are mostly used by urban dwellers,
merchants and people of culture and science.
-The terms related to administration and bureaucracy
are the same as the ones prevalent in Persian.
-Many colloquial terms are identical with Persian.
-There are some terms that are considered highly
bookish in Persian and are not in common usage among
average Persians but are used among average Azaris.
-Although some words are considered Iranian they do
not have equivalents in Persian and thus can be considered
remnants of the "Azari Pahlavi" language.
-There are also words with ambiguous roots which are
definitely non-Turkish.
-Azarbaijanis have a peculiar way of pronounciation
which distinguishes their Turkish from other Turkish-
speakers and their Persian from other Persian-speakers.
This peculiarity can still be observed in the remnants of
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the ancient Azari language. Thus it can be argued that it
has been transmitted from Azari Pahlavi to the present
language and although Azarbaijanis speak Turkish they
still preserve their ancient Iranian accent."3 2
As was mentioned, most of the foregoing usually is
argued and heavily documented by Iranian historians; some
Azaris themselves. Most non-Iranian sources just mention
the fact that the language spoken by the people of
Azarbaijan belongs to the South Turkic33 or Southwestern
Turkic34 group and is closely related to Ottoman Turkish
and the language spoken by the Turkomans; in fact some
scholars consider the Turkoman Turkish and Azarbaijani
Turkish as belonging to the same group.35
It should, however, be noted that the Soviet
historians, particularly some intellectuals of the former
Azarbaijan SSR, refuted the argument that the Azaris are
Iranians who were Turkified by force. David Nissman
writes:
In Azarbaijan SSR there has been a recent effort to
establish a Middle Eastern and Caucasian origin for
the Turks and to assert that the Azari language was
formed prior to the Seljuk invasion ...... The
assertion that the recursors to the Azari Turks were
originally from the Transcaucasus and Near East
serves to strengthen a Soviet claim to the land of
Azarbaijan, including that part situated in
Iran ....36
Indeed, in the former Soviet Azarbaijan any reference
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to the Iranian Azarbaijan was objectionable and the phrase
Southern Azarbaijan was utilized in the Azari literary
circles and publications.37 Today the nascent state of
the Rebpulic of Azarbaijan has to deal with different and
numerous problems. However, once consolidated, the above-
mentioned argument may be used by those Azaris with
irredentist claims to southern Azarbaijan.
To counter Soviet claims some Iranian historians
asserted that the lands located north of Aras River (the
present border between Iranian and former Soviet
Azarbaijan) were called Albania and Arran.3 8 Calling those
territories "Northern Azarbaijan," has thus been a
conspiracy, these historians assert, by the Soviet
authorities to detach the "real" Azarbaijan from Iran.3 9
There are, of course, those Azaris who refute these
theories and contend that the lands south and north of
Aras River had been one land; indeed the homeland of a
Turkic-speaking people who were divided in 1828.40
This has been an ongoing debate; its contents usually
depending on the ideological orientation of the
participants. The reality, however, is that at present
there are Turkic-speaking peoples who have lived in the
territories north and south of the Aras River for
centuries and have considered these territories as their
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homeland, "Azarbaijan." These people are overwhelmingly
Shii Muslims. The land on the north of Aras used to be a
constituent part of the former Soviet Union and is now an
independent state while the territory located on the south
of Aras is a political unit of the Islamic Republic of
Iran and is divided into two parts for administrative
purposes; East and West Azarbaijan.
POPULATION
It is difficult to give a precise estimate of the
Azari population of Iran. Prior to 1950s population data
on Iran were not available and if anything the estimates
are mainly guessworks of the foreign travellers and
diplomats. Since 1956 general censuses have been
undertaken every decade; yet they do not break the
population into ethno-linguistic groups. Therefore, to
arrive at an approximate figure for the population of the
Iranian Azarbaijan different sources are consulted and
compared because ethnic origins of the population have not
been documented. The following figures are thus estimates
and conjectures:
1850 2,000,000
1950 5,000,000
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1985 10,000,000-15,000,000.41
Kurds: General Observations:
The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the Middle
East who do not possess a "state." They are mainly
divided between three countries; Iran, Iraq and Turkey.
Small enclaves of Kurds can be found in Syria and the
former Soviet Union. This division has played a
significant role in the development of Kurdish identity.
Since in each country the Kurds have shared certain
historical and cultural experiences with the population of
their host countries, the development and evolution of
their identity have not been uniform. The historical
separation may have accentuated the differences among an
already fragmented Kurdish community. This fragmentation
was, particularly, in evidence throughout the bloody war
between Iran and Iraq with the Kurds caught between the
rock and the hard place. Many Iraqi Kurds fighting with
the Iraqi forces helped Iranian troops and some Iranian
Kurds were recruited by the Iraqis to destabilize the
Iranian government. At the same time in both countries
various Kurdish factions fought each other; contesting
control of certain districts.4 2
Today the Kurds comprise a highly politicized but so
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far politically ineffective ethnic group whose conditions
have deteriorated due to an unstable international
environment. Indeed, international politics, or inter-
state relations, istoarically has been a significant
factor determining the destiny of Kurdish people.
Geography
Originally the Kurds were a mountain people who led a
nomadic or semi-nomadic life before the 20th century. But
most Kurds are now settled agriculturalists who belong to
various Kurdish tribes.
The area where the Kurds have inhabited consists
mostly of the rugged mountains of Zagros range; forming
the frontiers of the three countries of Iran, Iraq and
Turkey. This mountainous area which stretches from south-
eastern Turkey through northwest of Iraq and well into the
eastern Iran is only part of the area inhabited by the
Kurds.4 3 In Iran, for example, the province called
"Kordestan" signifies an administrative division;
representing only a part of the Greater Kurdish area in
Iran. The Kurdish inhabiated areas in Iran are estimated
to be 125,000 kilometers. 44 The Pahlavi regime, however,
divided these areas among three provinces. The Iranian
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Kurds, thus, live in western parts of the province of
Azarbaijan; as well as in the province of Bakhtaran
(former Kermanshahan) and, of course, the Kordestan
province proper. Small Kurdish communities can also be
found in Ilam, Zanjan, Hamadan as well as province of
Khorasan in eastern Iran.4 5 It should, however, be noted
that with possible exception of Kordestan province, other
Kurdish inhabited provinces are heterogeneous areas;
containing various elements such as the Azari Turks,
Persians and others.
In Iranian Kurdistan, the climate together with the
rainfall vary from place to place. The climate is
continental and the annual rainfall, in some areas, rarely
exceeds 400mm, while in the fertile valleys it reaches
2000 to 3000mm. The variation in temperature between the
summer high and the winter low is about 70 Or 80 degree
centigrade.46 Several rivers flow in this region;
therefore the shortage of water is not as acute as some
other parts of Iran.
Parts of Kurdish inhabiated areas of Iran are covered
by forests. Qasemlu contends that the forests are not
very dense because the mountain people, having no other
source of fuel, use a great deal of wood and are thus
exhausting an irreplaceable resource.47
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Some writers argue that Kurdistan, as a whole, is
very rich in natural resources and such minerals as coal,
copper, even gold and silver and allegedly uranium are in
abundance. 4 8 In Iran, Kermanshahan has been an oil
producing province although with a negligible
production.49
The Kurdish areas in Iran are predominantly
agricultural and most of the active population is engaged
in some sort of agricultural activity. Wheat, barley;
tobacco and fruits are produced. Cattle and sheep raising
provide daily products and wool.
Both Iranian Kurdistan and the "Greater Kurdistan"5 0
are noted for their remoteness. Even valleys in this area
are surrounded by high rocky mountains and end in narrow
gorges, so that they are not easily accessible
particularly in winter months when the entire land is
covered with snow. These natural barriers, through time,
have also acted as barriers to the expansion of cultures
surrounding the Kurdish inhabited areas. Indeed, the
distance and inaccessibility of Kurdish mountains from
major urban centers of surrounding empires endowed the
Kurdish people with an independent life in the periphery;
autonomous and with little interference from the central
powers whose interests were occasionally demonstrated by
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taxing and conscription.
Ethnic and Historical Origins:
The Origins of the Kurdish people have been a matter
of debate. Indeed, few scholars agree on any one
explanation. Claiming to be the "heirs of the Medes" 51
the Kurds themselves contend they held a privileged
position in the Persian Acheamenid and Sassanian
dynasties.52
Some sources describe the Kurds as "Iranicized
tribes" who either assimilated in, or displaced, the
original inhabitants and settled in "the heart of
Kurdistan," 5 3 while other sources believe that the Kurds
were indigenous to the area.54 It is, however, more
reasonable to assume that the Kurds are an amalgam "formed
through a fusion of Iranian conquerors with earlier
inhabitants of the moutains."5 5
It is written about the Kurds:
.... [they] participated in the continuous
wars between the Parthians and Sassanians
on the one hand and the Romans and Byzantines
on the other, fighting alternately with the
Persians and the Romans, and sometimes with
both sides at the same time, some tribes
supporting the Persians and others the Romans.56
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It thus seems that playing the role of a "buffer" is
a time-honored practice among the Kurds who have been
manipulated by, or themselves manipulated, the powers
surrounding them since time immemorial.
The Kurds appear to have allied with the Sassanians
agianst the Arab onslaught (637-641) with debilitating
consequences.57 Some Kurdish tribes, however, sporadically
kept rebelling and defying the Arab rule well into the 9th
century.5 8 Yet acceptance of Islam by the Kurds injected a
new cultural element into Kurdish life; and that was the
adoption of Arabic script to help transform Kurdish that
was untill then only an oral language into a literary one.
As Islam reached its zenith and the Arabs ruled over
vast areas and disparate peoples and cultures, the Kurdish
tribes with their chiefs, enjoyed local autonomy.5 9 These
petty chiefs usually enhanced their power and prestige
when the central power was somehow weakened although they
nominally acknowledged the suzerainty of the central
power. From the 9th to the 16th centuries a series of
Kurdish principalities were formed which numbered 30 or 40
by the Middle Ages. 60
From the Arab invasion to the Safavid attempts at the
unification of Iran, the country was mainly fragmented and
hardly resembled a unified kingdom. During this period,
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Iran was subjected to debilitating invasions by Turkic
tribes who were apparently reluctant to infiltrate the
inhospitable mountains where the Kurds lived. It is thus
explained that between the two Turkish-speaking regions of
Azarbaijan and Anatolia, there remains an extensive area
where the Kurds were able to preserve their language,
customs and their autonomous way of life.61
Indeed, thanks to the inaccessibility of their
mountain fastnesses, the Kurds remained basically isolated
and on the fringes of the governments surrounding them.
Difficult terrain made communication difficult even
between Kurdish villages and tribes thus helping increase
fragmentation. It is interesting to note that when one or
two dynasties of Kurdish origins gained prominence, their
Kurdishness was never stressed; they were either Arabized
or Persianized. 62 Salah ud-Din Ayyubi (1138-93) an Iraqi
Kurd, educated in Syria and founder of Ayyubi dynasty who
fought the Crusaders and drove the Christians from almost
all of Palestine is revered and remembered proudly by the
Kurds only today. The fact remains that Salah ud-Din's
Kurdishness, at that time, and its significance was never
stressed by himself or any one else. Indeed, Salah ud-Din
who ruled an Arab state was a symbol of Islamic unity and
greatness rather than a champion of Kurdish aspirations.63
55
The Kurds, indeed, missed many opportunities for
unification due to a lack of group solidarity and absence
of ethnic consciousness. However, an awareness of a
distinct identity existed among them. They usually
demonstrated intense hostility towards their ethnically
diversified neighbours. Minorsky writes that if they (the
Kurds) were not fighting with the Turkomans, they joined
hands with them against the Christians.64
As was mentioned, the invasion of Iran by Turkic
hordes left the Kurds relatively unaffected. Some Kurdish
inhabited areas, however, came under the rule of two
Turkish dynasties. The Kurds, when invaded, did not put
up much resistance and thus were spared the catastrophic
results of ruthless massacres.6 5 However, the Turkic
onslaught brought Turkic-speaking peoples to neighbouring
proximity of the Kurds. This proximity has resulted in
intense hostility between the two ethnic groups.
Nevertheless, at that time, neither group juxtaposition
nor the fragmentation of central powers surrouding them
could induce the Kurds to try to establish an independent
polity based on Kurdish identity since national awareness
on the basis of such identity did not exist.
The advent of the Safavid dynasty (16th century) in
Iran and establishment of Shiism as the official religion
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of the country had an important impact on many Kurds who
chose not to convert and remained faithful to the Sunni
Islam.
The Safavid emergence coincided with the eastward
push of the Ottoman Turks and subsequent struggle of the
two powers for Kurdish inhabited areas. In the ensuing
military campaigns between the Safavids and the Ottomans,
the Sunni Kurds, caught in between, played one power
against the other and switched loyalties. The overall
tendency, however, was to cooperate with the Ottoman
Sultans and this, it is said, enabled the Ottomans to
defeat the Safavids in their many wars.6 6 There is
emphasis on the issue of religion as the reason for this
cooperation. 67
The safavids themselves zealous Shiis, felt no great
sympathy for the Sunni Kurds. Shah Ismail Safavi, for
instance, imprisoned a handful of Kurdish chieftains who
came to pay homage to him at Khoy and appointed governors
from the Turkic Qizil-bash tribes in their place.68 And
Shah Abbass Safavi resettled some Kurdish tribes in the
northeastern Iran to guard the frontiers against the
Turkoman forays. These tribes, mainly Shii Kurds,
gradually have lost much of their Kurdish identity, being
incorporated into the neighbouring groups. Even their
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Kurdish language is undergone significant changes;
borrowing heavily from surrounding groups, i.e., Turks and
Persians.69
In their struggles with the Safavids the Ottomans
utilized the assistance of a talented and able Kurdish
statesman, Mullah Idris Bitlisi, who himself had switched
loyalty from the Persian to the Ottoman ruler. Mullah
Idris Bitlisi helped the Ottoman Sultan woo many Kurdish
chieftains; sent them imperial decrees; proclaiming them
"beylerbeys" of their respective territories in return for
an annual tribute and a fixed number of armed recruits in
case of war. Idris was also able to convince the
"undecided" chieftains that it is in their best interest
to be loyal to the Ottoman Sultan. Through these efforts
Bitlisi succeeded to give Kurdistan a feudal organization
and secure the predominance of the Kurdish nobility.7 0 His
endeavours also helped the Ottomans in the sense that the
loyal Kurds acted as the guardians of the frontiers
against future Persian invasions. The Turks also
dispersed some tribes and encouraged them to emigrate to
some strategic areas where the Armenians lived. One
reason for this was that the Turks thought of Armenians as
historically sympathetic to the Persians.7 1 This
arrangement worked for nearly two centuries although as
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Safrastian contends the long and exhausting wars (1514-
1516, 1534-1565, 1587-1628, 1636-1638, 1724-1732) between
the Persians and the Ottomans also exacted a heavy toll
among the Kurdish youth.72
The most important of Safavid-Ottoman wars, "The
Battle of Chaldiran" marks the division of the Kurdish
inhabited areas between Ottoman and Persian empires. This
battle was not only a blow to the prestige of the Safavid
dynasty, it caused the loss of considerable territory west
of Zagros range for the Iranians.7 3
By the end of the 16th century, most of the Kurdish
inhabited areas were under the Ottoman control. The
treaty of 1639 which was concluded between Shah Abbass
Safavi and Sultan Murad formalized and/or finalized the
partition of Kurdistan, leaving the eastern part to the
Persians.74 Since then the frontiers are little changed.
Safrastian contends that after the distribution of
the Kurds between the two Empires one can more clearly
distinguish between the Kurds who inhabited in Iran and
Turkey and thanks to the works of Bitlisi, it became
easier to recognize the Kurds' "geographical distribution,
their subdivisions and the names of tribal areas and
chiefs.,,7 5
The division also helped consolidate the status and
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position of many Kurdish chiefs in their fiefdoms and
principalities. These principalities or emirates were of
varying size and different organizational sophistication.
Each of these principalities was ruled by a chiefly family
that was granted hereditary rights by the government which
determined the member of the family who could rule as
Amir. And although this meant that every principality had
great autonomy, the central government was able to play an
important role in Kurdish politics due to the conflict and
rivalry prevalent within ruling families.7 6 This fact
notwithstanding, the autonomy of these local rulers was so
extensive that they struck coin and the Friday prayer was
recited in their names. They did not pay tribute; neither
did they provide the Ottoman ruler with conscripts. Their
only duty towards the Turks was not to rise against the
Sultan and not to change the frontiers.77 It is said that
this state of local independence contributed to the
flourishing of civilization, culture, commerce and economy
in the Ottoman Kurdistan.78
This period of prosperity and independence, however,
did not last long. During 19th century the tendency of
the Ottoman rulers was toward more centralization and by
the turn of the century most of the Kurdish principalities
in Ottoman territories had been stripped of their
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independence while the same thing was more or less
happening in Iran.
This transformation, however, was not easily
achieved. Kurdish chieftains who were indignant over the
loss of their power and status embarked on a series of
revolts mostly carried out in Ottoman territories. World
War I and the subsequent disintegration of Ottoman Empire
did not endow the Kurds with the opportunity to establish
a state of their own not only because of the necessities
of the international environment but also due to the
incompetence of Kurdish political elite and historical
tribal rivalry that had kept the Kurds fragmented for
centuries. Now the Kurds were divided between Iran and
the newly created states of Turkey, Iraq and Syria; an
arrangement that has not changed since then.
Religion and Language:
The Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school.
There are, however, Shii Kurds mostly in Iran and some in
Iraq and Turkey. Although the Kurds seem to be
religiously homogeneous, even in this respect they are not
unified. There exist a number of sects and Sufi
brotherhoods among whom Ahl al-Haqq, Yazidis, Alevis and
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the adherents of the two famous brotherhoods of Qadiriyya
and Naqshbandiyya are the most important.
The language of the Kurds is Kurdish. However,
language also has helped further divide the Kurds. There
are three or four major variations of Kurdish to which one
scholar refers as "languages" rather than mere dialects.7 9
These variations all belong to the northwest Iranian
branch of Indo-European languages. However, the
difference between them resembles "the difference between
Spanish and Italian."80
The speakers of these languages and dialects have
great pride in their particular language and culture and
believe that their language could only provide a lingua
franca for all Kurds. It is thus easy to understand the
extent of division that the language issue could create.
Indeed although many dedicated Kurdishl intellectuals have
endeavoured to find a solution to this problem, the
emergence of a Kurdish lingua franca does not seem
probable in near future.
Population:
Population has always been an important issue to the
Kurds. Kurdish nationalists tend to exaggerate and the
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respective governments minimize the Kurdish population.
After consulting and comparing different sources the
following estimates seem pertinent in regards to the
Iranian Kurds:
19th century 800,000
As of 1985 4,000,000-5,000,00081
BALUCH: General Observations:
Baluchistan is a region divided between Iran,
Pakistan and Afghanistan. This region is inhabited by an
ethnic group called Baluch. The Baluch, like the Kurds,
are a mountain people. Yet unlike the Kurds who are
almost all settled, a considerable number of the Baluch
still lead a pastoral, nomadic or semi-nomadic existence.
Baluchistan occupies the southeasern part of the Iranian
plateau to the western borders of Sind and the Punjabs.
The Baluch also live in Sind and Punjab in Pakistan and a
small number in the former Soviet Union.
It should be pointed out from the outset that it has
been the Pakistani Baluch who have taken the lead in the
Baluchi national struggle. The Iranian Baluch, who live
in one of the most backward regions of the country and are
probably the most deprived among the Iranian population,
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have lived a marginal life not only in relation to the
Iranian politico-economic structures but even to the
Baluchi national struggle in Pakistan. It is only after
the overthrow of the Shah that one can observe a nascent
national movement emerging among the Iranian Baluch. This
movement, however, has been subdued since the advent of
the Islamic regime in Iran.
Geography:
Iranian Baluchistan covers 155,000 square
kilometers.82 It is a mountainous region with valleys
ranging from relatively fertile to absolutely sandy and
useless for agriculture.8 3 Although there are rivers
flowing through this region, none is large enough to be of
fertilizing vlaue.84 Baluchistan is thus very arid and
not suitable for large scale agriculture; though in some
areas where there is cultivable soil and sufficient water
supply, small scale irrigated agriculture is possible.85
Due to the large size of the region, the climate
varies from place to place. In the highlands the climate
is continental and on the lowlands tropical. 86 It is
interesting to mention that the terrain is described by
geologists as the closest thing to Mars on earth or 'the
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dump where Allah shot the rubbish of creation' as
described by the Pakistani Pathans.87
Except in the south, Baluchistan is surrounded by
massive mountains which have helped further isolate the
region. These natural barriers not only have made
communication difficult and settlements small, they have
placed limits on agricultural and pastoral activities.
Agriculture has been limited to certain areas endowed with
a more fertile soil. At the same time, although
pastorlism seems to have been a more suitable way of
adaptation to the natural enviornment,
the limits to pastoralism are in terms of overall
productivity. The Baluch have obviously pushed
against these limits and since at least the beginning
of the last century there has been continual
migration in search of more ample resources.88
Iranian Baluchistan possesses a diverse geography.
The area may be divided into five regins. The Sarhad
which constitutes the northern highland region and the
four regions of southern Baluchistan. The ecology of
Sarhad is more suitable for grazing of livestock while in
southern Baluchissatan agriculture as well as pastoralism
is practised. The Baluch who inhabit the Sarhad are
tribally organized usually headed by a sardar (chieftain)
while in the south the political structure is more feudal
like and the head of the community is called hakom
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[governor, ruler].
The sharp contrast between the topography of the
northern Baluchistan and that of the south may thus
explain different modes of adaptation and political
organization among the Baluch. The Sarha. (which is the
northern part and literally means borderland) is a high
plateau of about 5,000 feet (1,500-2000m) above the sea
level. Kuh-e Taftan (Taftan mountain) and Kuh-e Bazman
(Bazman mountain) are two dormant volcanos located in the
Sarhad. 89 The area is mountainous and broken; thus
unsuitable for agriculture. However, attempts have been
made to develop a certain amount of agriculture.9 0 The
plains are quite suitable for pastoralism particularly if
there is sufficient rain in the spring. Thus sheep and
goat pastoralism is pervasive throughout the area.
Ethnic and Historical Origins:
There is much debate about the ethnic origins of the
Baluch. Pottinger who travelled in Baluchistan in 1800s
believed that the Baluch were of Turkoman stock arguing
that "their institutions, habits, religion and, in short,
everything but their language are the same!"91
It is also said that the Baluch pride themselves in
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being of Arab origin, belonging to the clan of the Prophet
himself.92 This claim has far-reaching political
ramifications and is supported by Iraq and some other Arab
states. Many of the Baluch, however, refute this claim
and insist that they belong to the Aryan stock.9 3 There
are also other speculations as to the Rajput and the
Afghan origins of the Baluch.9 4 The idea of the Iranian
origin, however, is the most widely accepted.
Most of these conjectures and suppositions tend to be
based on the physical attributes of the Baluch such as
color of skin, facial and nose bone structure, texture of
hair, etc.95 Dames argues that even if we base our proofs
on similarities of institutions and habits of nomadic
life, "on the whole, the resemblance to the Turkomans
seems the strongest, but that to the true Persian nomads
is strongest of all.,"9 6 Thus according to Dames
anthropological and historical inquiries and the evidence
derived from the "legends and language of the Baluch"
which is classified as a "northwestern Iranian language"
indicate that "they are of Iranian stock."97 It is also
believed that the Baluch's original movement can be traced
from northwest (Caspian Sea area) to southeast Iran
(present-day Kerman) which is another indication of their
Iranian origins.98
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Whatever their origins, the inhabitants of the
territory called Baluchistan seem to have moved to this
area basically as a response to several great conquests
that had affected most of Asia. With each invasion the
Baluch moved further east. Dames writes:
The last movement corresponds in its commencement
with the conquests of Taimur, and in its later
developments with the invasions of India by Babar and
the Arghunso
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The Baluch thus seem to have moved to this "refuge
area" through periodic immigrations.100 And the area as a
"cultural borderland" was constantly exposed to the
influence of economic and political forces in both Iran
and India.101
What comes to us about the Baluch through the
writings of early Muslim writers is their independent
spirit and the inconvenience they caused the
travellers.102 Indeed not much is known about the
political organization of the Baluch in the past. Brian
Spooner, a British/American anthropolgist who has done
extensive field work in Baluchistan, contends:
...The name Baloc (Baluc) appears to have been a name
used by the settled (and especially the urban)
population for a number of outlaw tribal groups over
a very large area.10 3
Spooner, thus, speculates:
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.... The Baluch may have entered the historical
records as the settled writer's generic
nomads..gradually..recognized as the nomads ar
excellence in this particular part of Islamic
world.... 104
Today the Baluch themselves refer to the tent-
dwelling nomadic pastoralists of the region as
"Baluch.,,105
The Baluch identity or what we know of it today thus
may be the product of relatively recent history. Spooner
writes:
Their history may have been a product of the
insecurity of a vast desert area which the
governments of the period did not care to control
despite their need for secure communications across
it.10 6
It is interesting to note that the historical texts
written about the Baluch lack information on the Baluch
who occupied the "intermittent zones of influence" of the
Iranian Shahs, i.e., those Baluch who lived in the
present-day Iranian Baluchistan. What is known, however,
is that during the Safavid period although many Baluch
tribes paid homage and owed allegiance to the Safavid
Shahs, they led an independent life.107 It is also said
that with the Afghan overthrow of the Safavids and
ascendance of Ashraf Afghan to the Persian throne, some
Baluch chiefs cooperated with the foreign invaders.
Indeed Ashraf Afghan dispatched a Baluch chief by the name
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of Muhammad Khan as his envoy to the Ottoman Court. With
the defeat of Ashraf and rise of Nadir Shah to power in
Iran, the same Baluch chief while returning to Iran was
awarded by the Shah.108 Nadir Shah captured Qandahar in
1739 and appointed Nasir Khan who was the Sarawan leader
as the beglerbegi (governor) of Baluchistan. Nasir Khan
like Mir Chakar Rind is upheld as a great national hero.
He came very close to establishing a centralized system,
appointing a prime minister and a vakil in charge of
revenue collection. Since Nadir Shah had assisted his
succession as Khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan paid homage to the
Persian Shah. However, after Nadir Shah was assassinated
in 1747 Nasir Khan rebelled; aspiring independence. In a
dispute between Nasir Khan and Ahmad Shah Durrani who
founded the kingdom of Afghanistan based on Qandahar, a
treaty was signed according to which Nasir Khan retained
his independence but agreed to render military service to
Ahmad Shah.1 09 Kalat thus remained an ally of Afghanistan
till the rule of the British. Roads and mosques were
built. Indeed this was a period of stability and
political unification for those tribes who were willing to
accept Nasir Khan's hegemony. Spooner writes:
For a short period the Khans of Kalat were able to
exploit this situation and extend their hegemony over
most of what is now Pakistani Baluchistan and even
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into parts of what now lies on the Iranian side of
the border. But the chiefs of the small agricultural
settlements scattered throughout the area, and the
nomadic groups, continually rebelled against any
imposition of taxes or other feudal requirements, and
even marriage alliances were not reliable for long.
One chief was played off against another and Qandahar
and Kalat competed for allegiance...1 10
Nasir Khan died in 1795 and his successors proved
unable to hold their own in the face of the British
onslaught. The British commenced their rule of the Indian
sub-Continent in 1764, soon realizing that Afghanistan
would serve as a good buffer region against the
expansionist designs of the Russians. In 1876 the British
finally defeated the Kalat Confederacy and through the
Sandeman System or "Forward Policy" were able to control
the region.111 The boundary between Kalat and Persia was
laid down in 1872 and revised in 1895-6; but it was, for
the most part, disregarded by Baluch tribes.11 2
From then until 1928 when Reza Shah Pahlavi subdued
Baluchistan as part of his overall policy of political
integration of Iran, Baluchistan mostly remained
autonomous and only nominally controlled by the Iranian
state. Complete integration of Baluchistan into the
Iranian political and economic structures, however,
occurred later during Mohammad Reza Shah's era.
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RELIGION AND LANGUAGE:
The Baluch are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School.
They speak Baluchi; an Indo-Iranian language which is
considered one of the oldest living languages. The Baluch
have a rich oral literature that can be traced back to the
15th century.113 Baluchi as a script was developed
relatively recently.11 4 The absence of a written
literature has been considered an important reason
impeding the formation of Baluch national identity.1 15
POPULATION
After consulting different sources, the following
estimates are arrived at:
1850 250,000
1980 1,000,000-1,500,000116
Examining the geographical and environmental
characteristics of the three group's homelands one can
easily recognize that the natural environment has been
partly responsible in shaping the future developments of
each group. For instance, a natural environment more
conducive to urbanization in Azarbaijan is in sharp
/
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contrast to the hostile and difficult terrains of the
Kurdish and Baluchi areas. Such "environmental" factors
have undoubtedly had different ramifications.
The natural environment, for example, has had an
impact on the emergence of various urban strata who could
better articulate communal aspirations in Azarbaijan.
Also the geo-strategic location of Azarbaijan created a
crossroad of cultural and political movements that were
eventually translated into a more developed cultural
environment in contrast to what we may call the "neglected
areas" of Baluchistan which in reality are vast stretches
of desert and mountains not exposed to much
communications. The Kurds, on the other hand, were
"trapped" in a region that, throughout the past several
centuries, was contested between central powers of Iran
and Ottoman Empires, not to mention others. Thus the
constant disruption in the overall process of development
contributed and reinforced the inherent fragmentations of
a tribal society.
It is thus important to note the significance of the
natural environment not only in the evolution of self-
consciousness among these groups but in the type of the
relationship that was developed between these groups and
the Iranian state.
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THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE
AZARIS, KURDS, BALUCH
To analyze the relationship between the traditional
state and the three groups under study here we begin with
the 19th century Qajar period. This chapter will examine
the inherent weakness of the Qajar's socio-political
structures and the subsequent power fragmentation that
made it possible for the ethno-linguistically distinct
groups to lead insulated and autonomous lives. It will
also be explained that even the Qajar's meager attempts at
centralization and modernization did not help bring local
and communal magnates under their full control. However,
analyzing the relations of the Qajar state and the three
groups, we will observe interesting differences. It will
be noted that the Azaris and their home province,
Azarbaijan, were an integral part of the Qajar's socio-
political and economic structures while the other two
groups literally constituted the "periphery." This
chapter will attempt to elaborate these differences on the
basis of which later relationships evolved and it will be
argued that both the historical context in which these
relationships were played out and the institution of
state, even in its traditional and non-modern form were
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important factors in shaping these relationships.
General OBservations:
Before the emergence of the Qajars, Iran was plagued
with chaos and tribal fragmentation. The Qajars were the
first rulers after the Safavids (16th century) who
succeeded to give a semblance of "unity" and "integration"
to an otherwise chaotic and turbulent political scene.
Indeed, the 18th century was a period of intense tribal
warfare, minimal security and stability. During the
decades of warfare and depredations many cities and towns
lost much of their prosperity not to mention their
inhabitants either to the epidemics and famine or to the
tribal onslaught.1
The Qajars attempted to assert the authority of the
central government and succeeded to bring different
autonomous groups under, at least nominal, control. This,
however, does not mean that the Qajar state was a "nation-
state" in its Western and modern sense. Indeed, there are
such scholars as Bernard Lewis who argue that the concept
of "nation-state" should not be utilized for such Muslim
societies as Ottoman or Persian Empires in which religion
was the principal source of loyalty and identification.2
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In a Muslim society the ruler evokes religious symbols in
his claims to power and the subjects' primary identity is
basically derived from the membership in the Islamic
community. The Shah of Iran was thus called "The Shadow
of God on Earth," and although he exercised his authority
in the temporal realm, he used religion and religious
symbolism to legitimize his rule.
Thus, such concepts as "nationalism," "ethnicity" and
"nation-state" seem not to be relevant to the functioning
of a traditional political structure such as that of the
Qajar dynasty. Indeed, neither Qajar Iran was a "nation-
state" nor the people who inhabited the Iranian territory
a "nation." The utilization of such concepts as "nation"
and "nationality" has been a by-product of the modern
socio-political structure of Iran; an attempt by modern
Iranian intelligentsia to define and/or redefine a
heterogeneous society. The term mellat (nation) as was
used in the literature of the Qajar period signified the
community of faithful who inhabiated the Iranian
territory. But the much more contemporary term melliat
(nationlity) connoting those diverse groups inhabiting
Iran other than the Persians was probably unknown and if
used at all it was not so laden with Marxist ideology as
when used by the Iranian intellectuals today.
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In the traditional structure, "ethnic" or "national"
identification was socially irrelevant and people
primarily identified themselves with their religiuos
community. This, of course, does not mean that there were
no minorities. In Iran, for example, minorities usually
consisted of those who adhered to other religions; much
smaller in number and weaker in terms of access to power
and privilege. Most of these people (Christians, Jews and
Zoroastrians) were "theoretically" protected. Those
minorities who were not considered legitimate (such as the
Baha'is in the Qajar and Islamic Republican Iran) were
persecuted.
There is no doubt that awareness of objective
differences existed. There were differences in
physiognomy, languages, life styles and customs. These
differences or awareness of them, however, never became a
politically significant issue in the relations between the
state and various groups or the relations of different
groups with each other. For the same reasons it was not
important to what ethnic group the ruling elite belonged.
As was mentioned before Iran for centuries was ruled by
dynasties of Turkish stock and the ethnic origins of the
ruling dynasty was never a subject of public concern.
Referring to the groups inhabiting Iran in the 19th
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century one can hardly talk about "ethnic communities."
Excluding the Azaris, the relationship between the Qajar
state and most "ethnic categories" occupying Iran was that
of a center and the periphery. The periphery usually
contained centrifugal elements who welcomed any
opportunity for complete independence.
The Qajar Shah as the "King of Kings" and "The Shadow
of God on Earth" had, in theory, absolute power and ruled
without interference. In practice, however, this rule
over the periphery was ften intermittent and sporadic;
limited to tax collection and military conscription. The
Qajar state, thus, only demanded political allegiance from
its subjects and was not concerned with socio-cultural
demands. At the same time, since most of the subjects
were Shii Muslims, the political allegiance and religious
loyalty often coincided. The Sunni Muslims inhabiting
Iran such as the Baluch, the Kurds, and the Turkomans fell
in the category of the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes and
constituted the population of the periphery.3 For most of
these tribal groups there was no need to define identity
on a broad scale. Loyalty to the local and immediate
community was the norm; and political allegiance was
usually given to the local headmen or tribal chieftains.4
The Qajar founder and his successors had to fight
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several campaigns in order to assert their control over
the peripheral areas of Iran. This periphery, indeed, was
a colorful one; composed of many different groups with
their distinct languages and cultures and sometimes
religions. The Qajar state, as was mentioned, only
demanded political loyalty. No one supposed that
uniformity was desirable or that assimilation to a common
style of life or pattern of culture was possible or
normal.
However, the Qajar Shahs, within the traditional
socio-political structure of Iran, were able to devise
policies to deal with diverse groups inhabiting the
country. These "tribal" and/or "provincial" policies were
mostly aimed at increasing the central government's
influence in the peripheral areas and reducing the
possibility of tribal unruliness and rebellion.5
Tribal leaders, undoubtedly, were among the most
important social groups due to the fact that they could
provide military forces when demanded by the Shah. It is
said that in the beginning of the Qajar period, the Shahs
were more inclined to appoint tribal leaders as
administrators of the tribal areas because the consensus
of the community was important to them.6 Thus an ilkhan
or an ilbeg was appointed who was either a tribal chief or
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related to the chiefly family and assumed the
responsibility of collecting taxes and care of the general
affairs of the tribe. The office was usually hereditary.7
However, the Shah had the authority to alter the
succession. This created tension among the family
members; making their manipulation easy by the state and
thus giving the Shah an important hold over the tribes.8
The Qajar Shahs, themselves belonging to Turkic
tribes of Caspian Sea area,9 were acutely aware of
unsettling effects of tribal unruliness. The autonomy of
tribes in their remote regions as well as their forays and
raids into the settled areas was a thorn in the side of
the central authority in Iran. For this reason, Fath Ali
Shah (1797-1834), the second Qajar Shah, set out to strip
the tribes of their powers. Gradually, as the power of
the tribal chiefs declined, Qajar Shahs more and more
appointed royal princes to the provincial governorships.
Indeed, the administrative authority was delegated to the
sons and brothers and cousins of the Shah as well as other
members of the royal family who ruled as governors and
felt only responsible to the Shah himself.1 0 Also later
during the Qajar period, one can find some high ranking
members of the bureaucracy as the governors of the
provinces which was an indication of administrative
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expansion.11
Most official appointments, particularly in the
seccond half of the Qajar period, were sold by the Shahs
to the highest bidders. Shaul Bakhash contends that the
political offices of the Shah's realm were farmed out
among the members of his household whom the Shah selected:
On the basis of his personal confidence in them and
without establishing any consistent limitations on
their authority and obligations.12
This, of course, further weakened the power of the
tribal chiefs who, under smallest pretexts, were either
kept in Tehran as hostages, or executed. The Qajars also
resorted to "divide and rule" as well as "transplantation"
of the tribes in order to control them.13
The tendency of the Qajars was thus towards more
centralization although their efforts in this respect was
very rudimentary. To centralize there was a need for
expansion of the administration and modernization of the
army.1 4 Also this was a period in which the "Great Game"
brought Iran into the arena of the international politics.
The British had an important role in the development of
the means of transportation and communication in Iran.
This development not only affected the Iranian
intelligentsia who became acquinted with the ideas of
Western Enlightenment, but it also induced the Qajar Shahs
9o
to take steps towards modernizing and/or westernizing the
country. However, these policies which ranged from
modernization of the military to the sophistication and
expansion of the bureaucracy, did not prove to be lasting
and effective as a result of several factors the most
important of which was the reluctance and self-
interestedness of the Qajar elite. Nikki Keddie writes:
It is important to note that reform and modernization
in general in Iran have been almost exclusively post-
1905 phenomena. Despite impressive-sounding lists of
attempted reforms under the Qajars, what is really
striking about the Qajar period is the relative lack
of meaningful government-sponsored reform, even of
the self-strengthening variety....l5
Thus it seems that at the same time that the Qajars
were willing to expand the framework of their state, they
were not ready to allow for anything that would interfere
with or endanger the source of their power. As long as
modernization meant any change in the traditional power
structure, the Qajars did not welcome it. But the
corruption and excesses of the Qajar Shahs and their elite
as well as the exploitation of the country by two great
powers eventually created a popular upheaval at the turn
of the century which resulted in the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-1911. This revolution that helped the
phenomenon of "Iranian nationalism" emerge, was perceived
differently by the three groups under study here. But
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before we deal with the Constitutional Revolution we
should observe the evolution of each group throughout 19th
century and within the traditional socio-political
structure of Iran. This will help us understand why these
groups reacted differently to the events of the 20th
century.
a) Azaris:
As was mentioned before, Azarbaijan was always a
prosperous region. Historically it possessed a large
population and during the Qajar period its revenues ranked
highest among Iranian provinces table I]. The Qajars,
indeed, paid particular attention to the province, a fact
that can be explained both in terms of their affinity to
the people and their language and also Azarbaijan's geo-
political significance as a gateway to Turkey and Russia.
An English military officer, Lieut. Colonel Stuart,
who travelled to Iran in mid-19th century, writes about
the sorry conditions of the Iranian army. He, however,
adds that:
...Those only from Azerbaijan were armed and clothed
with any pretension to regularity...1 6
He also mentions that Turkish language,
now that the Court is filled with Azerbaijanis, is
equally useful at Tehran...1 7
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Tabriz, the capital of the province, was the most
important commercial center of Iran during 19th century.
A Russian traveller writes:
...The bazaar of Tabriz deserves attention because of
its extent and the number of its shops ...... The
variety of goods available in it is hardly matched in
any other Persian town except Tehran; as for the
quantity of goods, in this respect Tabriz has
undoubtedly no rival in Persia..18
In addition to Tabriz, Azarbaijan also possessed such
historically significant urban centers as Maragheh,
Ardabil, Urumia and Khoy and boasted a thriving commercial
class that rivalled its Persian counterpart. Also
Azarbaijani social stratification greatly resembled that
of the Persian population of Iran. Like the Persians, the
Azaris possessed a political and economic elite who were
composed of tribal khans, landowners and government
notables; a religious class constituting both ulama and
lower levels of clergy and religious students; artisans
who were usually members of different guilds and the
peasantry.19
The Qajars, indeed, began their modernization
attempts from Azarbaijan. Taqi Zadeh, the famous Iranian
politician, himself an Azari, narrates that Abbas Mirza,
heir-apparent to Fath Ali Shah, in order to modernize the
Iranian army sent some students from Tabriz to England to
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learn new techniques. The first factory for making
weaponry and the first printing press were also
established in Tabriz at this period.20 Indeed the number
of industrial plants and modern schools was highest in
Azarbaijan than in any other province in Iran by the turn
of the century. At the same time Tabriz had become the
exclusive center of Iranian foreign relations since
foreign ambassadors usually came to Tabriz and Iranian
envoys went out of Tabriz. Taqi Zadeh stresses the fact
that during a great part of the reign of the Qajars,
almost nine-tenth of Iranian representatives abroad were
Tabrizis or Azarbaijanis21 which is a clear indication of
the identification of the Azari elite with the Qajar power
structure.
It was, however, during early Qajar period that part
of Azarbaijan was ceded to Tsarist Russia. The Russians
had long standing interests in their southern flank. Not
only the idea of lucrative trade with Iran via Azarbaijan
was attractive but the strategic situation of southern
borders was of utmost importance. The Russians had
started their southward drive as early as 1722 at the time
of Peter the Great. However, the more serious campaigns
began in the first decade of the 19th century when Abbas
Mirza, heir-apparent to Fath Ali Shah (the second Qajar
94
Shah) moved against the Russians in an attempt to stop
them from making protectorates out of various
principalities in northern Azarbaijan.
The first period of Russo-Persian wars ended with the
Treaty of Gulistan (1812) according to which Iran lost
several principalities to the Russians. The second period
of Russo-Persian wars flared up when Fath Ali Shah
attempted to retrieve the lost principalities. The result
was the treaty of Turkomanchai (1828) which not only
confirmed the provisions of the Golistan Treaty but ceded
more territory to the Russians. It was the Treaty of
Turkomanchai that fixed Aras River as the boundary between
the two countries.22 The Treaty of Turkomanchai confirmed
the political and economic presence of Russia in Iran and
gave the Russians the status of "the most favored nation"
which bestowed upon them unprecedented political and
economic privileges.23
The Russians, indeed, took complete political and
economic advantage of the Persian defeat. By the year
1833 the balance of trade was greatly in favor of Russia24
and Russian political pressure could be felt in Tabriz,
the seat of the heir-apparent to the Qajar throne.
With the division a smaller part of Azarbaijan was
annexed by Tsarist Russia together with its 500,000 Azari
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speaking Muslims. It is said that two-third of the Azaris
remained under Persian sovereignty.25 Of those who passed
under Russian control about half were Sunni Muslims.
However, through time and due to migration, Russian
Azarbaijan became mostly the homeland of the Shii
Azaris.2 6
In the short run, the division slowed down the
emergence of an Azarbaijani national identity, which was
to emerge later and first in the Russian Azarbaijan.
Indeed, considering parochial and tribal identifications
and affiliations, the people of Azarbaijan had no reason
to possess national awarness. In Iran, they were subjects
of the "Shah of Islam;" and the over-arching identity of
"Iranian" was not very meaningful even for a Persian.
Also by virtue of the "Turkishness" of the Qajars, the
Azari political elite itself was part of the Qajar ruling
elite. At the same time, the average Azari peasant only
came into contact with the government when taxes were
being collected and soldiers conscripted. Many of these
peasants were greatly oppressed and exploited by their
Azari landlords and the Royal family. But no class or
socio-political consciousness existed either.
In the long run, however, this division had profound
impacts on both Azarbaijans. One of the immediate effects
96
of this division was an increasing Russian encroachment
which subsequently entailed intense Russo-British rivalry
in Iran.2 7 This rivalry was particularly felt in Tabriz
which until 1834 was home to both Russian and British
diplomatic missions.28 Even after the transfer of foreign
political emissaries to Tehran, Tabriz did not lose its
political significance. As the seat of the Crown Prince,
Tabriz remained the focus of Russian penetration and
infiltration.
The increasing commercial activity enlarged the Azari
middle class while the enhanced foreign influence mainly
from Russia's Caucasian provinces and Ottoman Turkey
through cultural exchange exposed Azarbaijan, and
particularly Tabriz, to the penetration of ideas from the
West. Taqizadeh writes:
...Modern civilization came to Azarbaijan primarily
from two sources: through knowledge of the Turkish
language there were intellectual ties first with
Istanbul and Ottoman territories and second with
Russian territories, expecially trans-Caucasia...29
On the other hand,- during the same period in the
Russian Azarbaijan, a new type of imperial relationship
was emerging which greatly resembled a colonial
relationship. This relationship created conditions that
were bound to cause the rise of greater ethnic awareness
and nationalism as a means of resisting the Russians.
4
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Furthermore, the method of Tsarist exploitation of
Azarbaijan brought Russian Azarbaijanis into conflict with
other groups.
The initial consequence of Russian "divide and rule"
policy manifested itself in the split between Azarbaijani
Shiis and Sunnis. The result was the mass migration of
Sunni Azarbaijanis, who had participated in the early
revolts against the Russian rule in Azarbaijan,3 0 to
Ottoman Turkey.
The discovery of oil in Baku (capital of Russian
Azarbaijan) and particularly the oil boom of the 1870s
created socio-economic change of great magnitude in
Russian Azarbaijan. The economic boom caused the influx
of Russians and Armenians into the region. And although
most Azarbaijanis comprised the lower classes a few became
wealthy and a modern intelligentsia also emerged.31
The last decades of the 19th century witnessed a
proliferation of Azarbaijani writers, poets and
journalists as well as an Azari press in the Russian
Azarbaijan. The majority of the Russian Azaris, however,
remained impoverished with a gulf between the masses and
the intelligentsia. Economic development was an uneven
phenomenon and while the oil boom in Baku meant sudden
economic growth for the city, the economy of the
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countryside lagged behind.
The Azari intellectuals in Russian Azarbaijan, at
this juncture, made attempts to bridge the divisions
within their nation by seeking legitimacy for an
Azarbaijani identity through ethnic identification. This,
however, was a difficult task since they could not agree
upon a vision for their nation because they were not yet
comfortable with the cultural identity of that nation.
While education allowed national ideas to be communicated
to broad sectors of society, there was no consensus as to
what those ideas should be. Almost all visions for
Azarbaijan depended upon an outside country for
leadership.
Their impulse to federalized, and with various
partners, was to remain a constant rather than
transitory trait in their political thinking and it
was rooted in the doubts as to the viability of their
existence as a fully independent state....32
Paradoxically, the intellectuals in the Russian
Azarbaijan feared domination by the same countries which
they turned to for security and cultural leadership. The
Shii and pan-Azarbaijani identities were important to most
Azarbaijanis, but the Persian cultural dominance excluded
recognition of their Turkish, ethnic identity and was
resented. Intellectuals such as Ahmed Agaev followed the
teachings of Ernest Renan who defined a nation as a
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"natural group determined by race."33 This racial-
linguistic type of identification, however, a powerful
force, was rejected by mullahs in Azarbaijan who sought a
more universal, pan-Islamic vision for Azarbaijan over the
narrow Turkic association. Pan-Islamism appealed to the
umma, the worldwide community of believers in Islam
irrespective of sectarian affiliations.
Some intellectuals favored a direct federation with
the Ottoman Empire and thus advocated a pan-Turkic
movement that aspired to unite all the Turkic peoples of
the world.34 Most of Azarbaijanis, however, as Shiis had
reservations about a movement that placed emphasis on
Sunni Ottoman Turkey.
Among the intellectuals the towering figure of Mirza
Fath Ali Akhund Zadeh (1812-1878) shines. Akhund Zadeh
who was born near Tabriz and raised in Russian Caucasus,
not only helped revive Azari Turkish but he is considered
as the most important among the few pioneers who attempted
to modernize the Persian prose.35 Indeed, Akhund Zadeh
who described himself as "almost Persian"36 was greatly
influenced by the pre-Islamic heritage of Iran. It is,
however, an irony that as Persian writings of Akhund Zadeh
is said to have "helped form in Iran the ideals of both
nationalism and secularism,"37 his Azari works "led to
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Azerbaijani emancipation from centuries long Persian
cultural domination." 38
The revival of the Azari language in the Russian
Azarbaijan came to a full bloom by the turn of the
century. Soon modern theatre and modern press appeared in
Azari Turkish. Among the press the Baku newspaper Akinchi
(the plowman), the first Turkish publication in Russia,
was crucial in the growth and development of the Azari
literary language. Yet because of its anti-Persian, anti-
Shii pronouncements the paper was not received favorably
among the Shii elements39 and became mostly a forum for
secular intelligentsia. After the demise of Akinchi in
1877 mainly because of its pro-Ottoman sentiments at the
time of the Russo-Ottoman war, other papers began
publication among which Kashkul is the most important.
Swietochowski narrates an imaginary dialogue published in
Kashkul which presents a vivid picture of the identity
crisis prevalent among the Russian Azarbaijanis. The
article written by M. Sultanov presented the problem and a
possible solution for an Azarbaijani Muslim:
"Q: What is your nationality (millat)?
A: I am a Muslim and also a Turk.
Q: Are you an Ottoman?
A: No. I am bijanli (a play of words in which the corrupt
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form of Azarbaijani means 'soulless').
Q: Where is the land of the bijanli?
A: As far as I can tell, on the other side of the Araxes40
live the Azaris -on this side the bijanlis. Together it
makes Azarbaijani. But separately we are bijanlis.
Q: Your language is Turkic so you are a Turk?
A: There is no word to describe my position. I am a Turk,
but a bijanli.
Q: Instead of a bijanli Turk, why don't you solve your
dilemma by calling yourself an Azarbaijani Turk?"
This imaginary and revealing dialogue not only is
indicative of an identity crisis among the Russian Azari
intellectuals but it also demonstrates a nostalgic regret
about the division of Azarbaijan. The dialogue presages
the rise of ethnic awareness beyond simply that of being a
Turk. Indeed the writer rejects an identification with
the Ottoman Turks and refers to a desire for reunification
with the rest of the Azarbaijanis, the Azarbaijani Turks.
This is, indeed, the beginning of a series of literary
works titled the "literature of longing" in the Russian
Azarbaijan which implicitly or explicitly alludes to a
wish for the unification of the two Azarbaijans.41
These developments could not leave the Iranian Azaris
unaffected. Among the population of Iran, the Iranian
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Azaris had a better access to information due to their
proximity to Russia and Ottoman Turkey and throughout the
19th century there was close contacts and some
interdependence between the peoples of the two Azarbaijan.
The Iranian Azaris, by the end of the 19th century,
were greatly affected by economic misrule of the Qajars.
After the Russians had consolidated their power in
Transcaucasia, the economic interaction between northern
provinces of Iran and Russian Azarbaijan was promoted. As
we noted, Tabriz had become the leading trade center in
Iran.42 During the rule of Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-
1906), however, economic policies of the government
favored Tsarist Russia in regards to tariffs and brought
about economic loss and unemployment in Iranian
Azarbaijan.43 This subsequently resulted in the migration
of large numbers of the Iranian Azaris seeking work in
Baku. Baku, as the urban center of oil industry of
Russian Azarbaijan attracted many Iranian Azaris who
worked in the oil fields and factories. Samad Behrangi, a
talented Iranian (Azari) writer, contends that poverty and
unemployment in Iranian Azarbaijan usually prompted the
villagers and urban dwellers alike to travel to the "other
side." Indeed, he mentions that there are many stories in
the Azari literature of that period about the lives and
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times of the Azari or other Iranian migrants in Caucasus
who engaged in trade, smuggling or other activities
between the two countries.44 Nissman writes:
Between 1800-1890 some 30,000 Iranians a year applied
for and received visas...And it has been estimated
that if one took into consideration those entering
Russia without passes, this number would be closer to
100,000. The former Russian Consul in Tabriz noted
that between 30,000-60,000 passes were issued a year
in Tabriz between 1891-1904. As a result of this in-
migration into Russian Azarbaijan, 50 percent of all
Muslim workers in Baku were from Iran during the last
years of the XIXth century and the first years of the
XXth.45
These contacts exposed these workers to the economic
and political struggle in Tsarist Russia and indeed many
of them became the transmitters of information and ideas
to the Iranian Azarbaijanis. Among these people were also
educated groups and merchants who had the capability of
mobilizing urban masses.
It is, however, interesting to note that although the
division and subsequent economic and socio-political
change created fertile grounds for an Azari national
identity to emerge in Russian Azarbaijan, in Iranian
Azarbaijan the propagation and dissemination of the ideas
coming from the north created more political consciousness
on a general level. Iranian Azaris were becoming more
aware of the corruption and misrule of the Qajars. The
educated and middle classes were indignant about Russo-
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British interventions in their country's affairs and held
the Qajar regime responsible for the excesses of the two
powers in Iran. These groups together with their Persian
counterparts believed the rule of law should replace the
Qajar reign of terror.
This, of course, does not mean that impetus for an
Azari identity to emerge was not present. For it was;
particularly among the educated and middle strata. The
basic difference that existed between the politically
aware groups in the two Azarbaijans was that those in the
north were getting rid (or perhaps had already gotten rid)
of their attachment to Iran and Persian culture while this
attachment not only was very strong in Iranian Azarbaijan
at the time, it is still well and alive today.
a) Kurds and Baluch:
Within the traditional socio-political structure of
the 19th century Qajar Iran, the Baluch and the Kurds
lived under similar conditions. As tribal peoples they
lived an independent or autonomous life and their response
to the policies of the Qajar Shahs was alike. This
section, therefore, treat the two groups as one unit of
analysis.
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There does not exist an extensive literature on the
Kurds and the Baluch who inhabited the Iranian territory
during the Qajar period. What we have is mostly memoirs
and travelogues of foreign travellers -some very
interesting accounts by British diplomats and secret
agents- who briefly dealt with the two groups. To a
great extent what is written revolves around two important
themes; the independent spirit of the Kurds and the Baluch
and the extent to which tribal loyalties dominated their
societies.
Independence or autonomy is important to tribal
peoples particularly those whose adaptation involves
nomadic-pastoralism. 4 6 Nomadic pastoralists need to be
mobile. Mobility not only provides them with much needed
grazing pastures, it enables the tribesmen to defend
themselves against the state or other hostile elements.47
Mobility and autonomy thus go hand in hand particularly
because economic stability, even at the subsistence
levels, depends upon such political control. 4 8 This
condition of independence or autonomy makes for an uneasy
and at times problematic relationship between the nomadic
tribes and both traditional and modern states. In a
traditional political structure, however, there seems to
have been more room to manuever by both the state and the
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ethnic group in the periphery. In such a structure, the
tribes who constituted the centrifugal elements in the
periphery paid nominal allegiance and sometimes more -in
the form of taxes and troops- to the center. But,
whenever the center became too weak or its demands became
too excessive, they withheld these resources and rebelled
which was usually manifested in banditry.
Each group was divided into numerous different
tribes. In the case of the Kurds sometimes even the
languages spoken by these tribes were mutually
unintelligible. There existed no feelings of solidarity
and identification among these tribes. Each individual
identified with his/her own tribe, considering the rest as
either enemies or at best strangers. This does not mean
that alliances were non-existent. It is said about the
Kurds that they would gather around a tribal chief as long
as he remains strong. With the slightest sign of
weakness, however, "they pull him down, and give him the
bow-string."49 The Baluch society also suffered from
internal strife and inter-tribal rivalries.50 The
fragmented tribal environment meant that both societies
lacked a political elite with a mandate to represent the
whole group; an elite that could enter into negotiations
and bargaining on behalf of the group. There are, of
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course, instances in both Kurdish and Baluch history that
strong tribal confederacies emerged with the specific aim
of representing diffferent tribes to the state.5 1
However, such unifications were transitory and never
represented ethnic or national solidaries.
The tribal socio-political organization is much
smaller in scale and more limited in regards to the range
of various relationships within the society. Among both
the Kurds and the Baluch the tribal socio-political
organization is a highly diverse phenomenon. The Kurdish
tribal structure, for example, is embedded in a web of
complex relationships which is different from tribe to
tribe and thus it is very difficult to find a common
denominator in socio-political organization of different
Kurdish tribes.5 2 Indeed, during the Qajars and much of
the Pahlavi period, among both the Kurds and the Baluch
diversity ranged from tribally organized nomadic
pastoralists to peasants living under feudal-like
structures.53
The tribal organization of both groups was based on
lineage system, i.e., on patrilineal descent5 4 which
determines political rights and access to resources.
Kinship, which is usually the criterion for membership,
thus becomes important because it is politically
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functional. It is an important basis for peaceful human
discourse and it helps sustain economic cooperation that
is vital for the survival of the tribe.55 Each tribe
usually contained nomadic, semi-nomadic and sedentary
segments. In the case of the Kurds, the non-tribal
settled population of the surrounding areas were usually
controlled by the nomadic tribes.5 6 In the case of the
Baluch the agriculturalist tribes of southern Baluchistan
have possessed a different socio-political organization
resembling more or less a feudal structure.
In both groups the chiefs usually belonged to chiefly
lineages more prestigious and different from the rank and
file. The rigid tribal structure usually created a very
stratified tribal society. The practice of endogamy,
particularly, perpetuated this system. Frederik Barth
writing about southern Kurdistan, maintains:
The general practice of Father's Brother's Daughter
[FaBaDa] marriage and other close family endogamy
makes any rapproachment impossible between conqueror
and conquered and encourages caste separation.... 57
Among the Baluch a very stratified system
predominates the social hierarchy of the agriculturalist
tribes of southern Baluchistan with the ruling [hakomzat]
families usually marrying the ruling families of other
areas and thus creating political alliances. In the
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northern areas of Iranian Baluchistan where the
inhabitants are mostly nomadic pastoralists, the class
structure and hierarchy is somehow mitigated with the
chief [sardar] having more or less the same life style as
the rank and file, with less control over resources.
Endogamy, here, also is the rule.58
Each tribe was also divided into smaller units
[clans] with their own chiefs. The tribal pastures as
well as the agricultural lands were usually owned
communally. However, the tribal rank and file, both in
Kurdish and Baluch system, provided the chieftain with a
certain amount of 'reward' in cash or other forms to
compensate for his services. Also the nomadic tribes, in
one way or the other, were linked with the settled
population in their surroundings.
Considering the importance and relevance of tribe and
tribal structure in the lives of individuals, tribal
identification was thus the most salient form of
identification. For the average Baluch or Kurdish nomad
tribal loyalty was always more meaningful than the
abstract idea of Kurdish or Baluch nationalism. One
writer, a kurds himself, elaborates:
The concept of I' hardly exists in the context of
tribal culture's value system: 'we' (the tribe)
predominates. Individuals define themselves entirely
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in terms of their tribe. They are first the member
of this or that tribe, then a Muslim, a Yezidi, or a
Christian. The sense of being a member of a national
group, a Kurd for instance, comes a very poor third.
Any other tribe whatsoever, even one which is of the
same religion and nationality, is inferior to their
own, and its members will be seen as necessarily
potential and intrepid adversaries or even enemies.59
The tribal ideology, worldview or way of life not
only sets the tribal society apart from the settled
population -with whom the tribesmen usually have an
ambivalent relationship; one of interdependence and
tension- it also creates conditions in which divisions and
political fragmentation are predominant.
In tribal societies where inter-tribal jealousies,
rivalries and conflicts reign supreme, overarching
identifications are difficult to form. Both Kurdish and
Baluch tribes were afflicted with inter-tribal hostilities
before and during 19th century. Rivalries between
different tribal chiefs made Qajar's "divide and rule"
policy pay off. The Kurdish society, particularly, was
plagued by political fragmentation which even today
effectively impedes a unified national struggle. Also the
extent of inter-tribal hostilities not only made
manipulation by external sources of power easier but
induced the players to actively seek such external
interference in order to increase their power and status
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vis-a-vis each other.6 0 The chieftain who was betowed
with titles, robes of honour and stipends, had the support
of the state and thus could overcome his opponents. Such
conditions, indeed, helped Muhammad Shah Qajar (1834-1848)
when he decided to pacify Persian Baluchistan.61
To all this one should add the topography of both
Kurdish and Baluch inhabited areas. The mountainous
nature and difficult terrain of these areas made
settlements sparse and scattered. Indeed the same factors
that kept both groups on the fringes of central powers
around them, also made communication and interaction
difficult between different tribes. And although at
different junctures, the Kurds and the Baluch both did
create tribal confederacies, unlike many other nomadic
groups who throughout history have been able to conquer
settled populations and create states, they were incapable
of expanding their authority and creating viable and
unified political entities.62
Thus topography and rigid tribal structure may be
considered as the two most important factors that
contributed to the persistence of parochial loyalties and
tribal identities which in many ways are still strong
among the members of both ethnic groups. The Qajars and
the traditional framework within which they operated also
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helped keep tribal ideology and way of life intact. Both
Kurdish and Baluch tribes enjoyed a relatively independent
or autonomous existence during the Qajar rule. They were
able to maintain their status by virtue of their military
prowess and capabilities. Both were notorious raiders and
robbers. The targets of these raids were usually
travellers or the settled populations of neighbouring
villages or towns. For example, a British subject who
travelled in Iran in mid-19th century wrote about the
Kurds:
The Kurdish chief of Rewandooz had made an inroad in
the direction of Ooroomiah with some thousand of
excellent irregulars horse and infantry ...... The
Meer after collecting as much plunder as he could
carry away, retired...6 3
Or, it is written about the Baluch:
Politically they have but two feelings: an intense
passion for tribal independence, with all its
murderous accompaniments of blood feuds and border
raids, and an outspoken dislike of the Persians, whom
they call Gajars, the Baluch version of the name of
the reigning dynasty.... 64
Muhammad Sardar Khan, a Baluch himself, confirms
this:
True to their native element, the Baluchis pillaged
the caravans; trade routes became unsafe and the
travellers were so much terrorized that they huddled
together like a herd of panic struck deer.65
It is, however, maintained that at times the Qajars
tacitly approved of a state of "endemic tribal disorder"
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in the frontier areas in order to prevent an incursion by
the neighbouring state.66 The neighbouring state whose
possible incursions worried the Qajars was the Ottoman
Turkey. These worries were allayed in 1847 when with the
mediation of Russia and Great Britain a treaty was signed
between Iran and Ottoman Turkey that resolved certain
territorial disputes over Kurdish areas6 7. Later, one can
observe a series of centralization policies being
initiated in Iran which entailed curtailment and
restriction of tribal leaders including Kurdish and the
Baluch chiefs. Soon Kurdish chiefs were replaced by
administrators appointed by the center. Indeed, the Amir
of the last Kurdish principality, the Prince of Ardeland,
was stripped of his power in 1865.68 Also, it was
Muhammad Shah Qajar (1834-1848) who dispatched a
formidable military force to Baluchistan which "pacified"
most of the Persian Baluchistan. Ibrahim Khan, an able
administrator who is credited with establishing law and
order in the area, was appointed as governor of
Baluchistan.69
However, consolidation of Qajar authority in. Persian
Baluchistan prompted the British to interfere. The
British who were apprehensive about the Persian drive
toward the east which seemed to threaten districts
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belonging to the Khan of Kalat -then in alliance with the
British government- appointed a mixed commission to settle
a frontier to prevent Iran from pushing eastward.7 0 The
British, thus, were able to enforce the division of
Baluchistan between Iran, Afghanistan and British India
(later Pakistan). As we noted, the main division of the
Kurds had happened in the 16th century as a result of the
wars between the Ottoman Sultans and Safavid Shahs.
These divisions failed to create any trauma or
identity crisis among either group. to the pastoralists
who continued to traverse to the "other side" to graze
their animals, the borders had no significant meanings. At
the same time The heterogeneous nature of these societies
and lack of any centripetal force or any unifying
institution perpetuated fragmentation. Indeed, in 19th
century Iran, both groups may be considered as "ethnic
categories" without any ethnic or national consciousness
that could hasten the emergence of over-arching
identifications and loyalties.
Ironically, 19th century was a time when an incipient
national awareness was beginning to emerge among a very
small number of Kurdish and Baluch intelligentsia in the
Ottoman and British controlled territories respectively.
This was a result of the policies implemented by the
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states ruling these territories.
The modernization and later centralization policies
in the Ottoman Turkey directly affected many Kurds who
inhabited Ottoman controlled Kurdish inhabited areas. The
modernization of the military in which many Kurdish youth
were conscripted and served, particularly, left deep
impressions. Indeed, many Kurds served in the new
Hamidiya cavalry, established in 1891 by Sultan Abdul
Hamid II. As auxiliaries to the Turkish army, Kurdish
triabesmen filled the ranks of Hamidiya and were officered
by their own tribal chiefs. Through the assistance of
this tribal cavalry, the Ottomans succeeded to decimate a
great many Armenians whose nationalistic aspirations and
revolutionary activities threatened the security and
stability of the Ottoman Empire.
There were also other policies pursued by the Ottoman
rulers that hastened the emergence of a nascent Kurdish
intelligentsia. On the one hand, a large number of
Kurdish youth were selected and sent to Constantinople to
be educated in special schools.71 Constantinople was the
'center of ferment' of the Empire and the Kurdish youth
became acquinted with the European ideals of nationalism
and self-determination. This small intelligentsia later
became the spearhead of the Kurdish nationalist movement
116
in Turkey. On the other hand, a series of centralization
policies were implemented by the Ottoman rulers which
entailed curtailment of the power of the tribal chiefs and
sometimes their replacement with Turkish governors.7 2
These policie which provoked rebellions and uprisings
among the chieftains that were mostly aimed at retrieving
or reestablishing their power and can hardly be qualified
as "nationally" inspired. It is interesting to note that
the same policies that the Ottoman rulers implemented in
order to curb the authority of the tribal chiefs helped
augment the ranks of the emerging small intelligentsia.
Among these the introduction of private property ownership
was, particularly, important becuase it encouraged
settlement and detribalization.73 Settlement, of course,
has its concomitant economic and socio-political
conditions that require new leaders and new approaches to
economics and politics. At the same time, the political
vacuum left by the eakening tribal chiefs began to be
filled by a new breed of political leaders; the Shaikhs or
men of religion.74
The Kurdish Shaikhs who headed many uprisings and
invoked respect and admiration of the rank and file,
filled the political vacuum among the mostly non-urban
Kurds while the nascent intelligentsia followed the
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example of the Young Turks to stir their co-ethnics into a
nationally inspired struggle. Unfortunately, the
fragmentation inherent in the Kurdish society and the
requirements of the international enviornment made these
and other efforts appear futile. From then on, Kurdish
national struggle in Turkey and later in Iraq followed two
different paths. One led by Shaikhs and tribal leaders
and the other spearheaded by the members of the emerging
urban intelligentsia and Kurdish intellectuals. The
conflict between these two groups has had tragic
consequences for the Kurdish society ever since.
The experience of the Baluch in "Greater Baluchistan"
has, more or less, been similar to that of the Kurds. The
British commenced their rule of the Indian Sub-Continent
in 1764, soon realizing that Afghanistan would serve as a
good buffer not only against the eastward drive of the
Qajar Iran but against the expansionist aspirations of the
Russians. They fought with the Baluch for 40 years to
gain access to the strategic positions of Baluchistan.
Once under the British, Baluchistan would serve as a
military flank and allow the British access into
Afghanistan. In 1876, the British finally defeated the
Kalat Confederacy.75
Under the Sandeman System (Forward Policy) the feudal
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and tribal system of Baluchistan were strengthened. The
Khan of Kalat (the paramount chief of the confederacy) and
the tribal chieftains (sardars) retained their positions.
Indeed, the Viceroy and the Khan resembled feudal lords
while the chiefs vassals.76 The British also took
advantage of the fragmented tribal society in Baluchistan
by instilling rivalry between the sardars as part of their
"divide and rule" policy.7 7 It should be noted that
political rather than economic considerations were the key
factors shaping British interests in Baluchistan.
Therefore, measures that could lead to the socio-economic
change or modernization of the region were hardly
undertaken and the limited transportation and
communication network established was meant to benefit the
British only and in reality these measures only
facilitated British control over Baluchistan and, of
course, India. Change, however, did take place for a very
small minority among the Baluch. These few who belonged
to the chiefly families benefited from educational and
other institutions established by the British. The result
was the emergence of a small group of individuals who
later formed the nucleus of the Baluch national movement
in British India and Pakistan. Like the Kurdish
intellectuals these individuals began publications of
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nationalist journals and newspapers and hoped to create
national awareness among the Baluch rank and file.78
Thus, while the seeds of Kurdish and Baluch national
consciousness were taking roots in the areas under Ottoman
and British control, in Qajar Iran both ethnic groups were
stagnating. Tribal socio-political structures dominated
these societies and there existed no other loyalties above
and beyond that of the tribe. Even at times when the
Qajar Shahs were not strong enough to extend their
political control to the periphery, inter-tribal conflict
perpetuated fragmentation and hindered a unified political
and military strategy. The limited and small-scale
modernization policies of the Qajars in no way affected
the Kurds or the Baluch. Even with the centralization of
the administration and appointment of the local governors
from the center, some members of the indigenous elite
continued to enjoy power and status in order to remain
loyal. Thus, social stratification and socio-political
structurs in both societies remained unchanged.
One difference, however, can be observed in the
relationship between the Qajar state and the two groups.
Notwithstanding the Qajar's seemingly identical treatment
of the Kurds and the Baluch, there seems to have existed a
fundamentally different attitude towards the two groups.
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It seems that the Qajar rulers perceived the Kurds as more
worthy than the Baluch and thus they were more inclined to
utilize political means to deal with them. They even
married Kurdish women. 79 On the contrary, their
encounters with the Baluch were usually manifested in
military expeditions. Their military brutality and the
excesses and corruption of their officials in Baluchistan
had a great influence on the perception of the Baluch
toward the center and the group that dominates it. In
fact some metaphors in Baluchi language depict the
magnitude of Qajar's savagery in Baluchistan. For
example: "he has done me such wrong that even the Qajars
couldn't do!"80 Even today the Persians are known to the
Baluch as the "Gajars."81 This kind of perception is one
that has continued well into the 20th century and
undoubtedly has had an impact on the development of a
relationship between the Baluch and the group or groups
who have dominated the state apparatus in Iran.
The stagnation and backwardness of various ethnic
groups in Iran during 19th century was indeed a reflection
of the overall situation of the country. Iran, herself as
a whole, was in a state of decay and backwardness. It was
the corrupt and despotic rule of the Qajars and the
extortionate policies of Russia and Great Britain that
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eventually stirred the Persian and Azari middle strata to
an uprising. In the following chapter the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-1911 as a critical point in Iranian
history and its impact on the Azaris, Kurds and Baluch
will be analyzed.
* * * *
In this chapter, we noted that the Qajar state,
although structurally weak and unable to exercise full
control over the periphery, was able to devise certain
policies in order to deal with various groups. These
policies were basically different as directed towards the
Azaris and the other two groups. This difference was not
only a reflection of each group's particular socio-
political structure, it was an indication of the state's
capabilities as well as its prioties. The Azarbaijanis,
for reasons that were explained in this chapter, were a
privileged group and should not only be placed in the
category of the "periphery," but considered as part of the
"core." Azarbaijan was an extension of the "dynastic
realm," a natural continuation of the empire while its
people were an integral part of the polity with their
socio-political structures and social stratification
closely resembling those of the Persian population. The
Shah never had to resort to coercion in order to be able
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to rule Azarbaijan. The Turkic character of the state
also helped enhance the identification that existed
between the Qajars and Azaris
The situation of the Kurds and the Baluch, on the
other hand, was different. The rule of the Qajars over
the Kurdish and Baluch areas was precarious and
intermittent. The relationship of the Qajar state with
the Kurds and the Baluch was thus based on a combination
of military force and diplomacy with slight differences.
The Baluch, particularly, were dealt with brutally and
kept under tight control as long as it was possible. At
other times, when the central government was weakened both
groups enjoyed de facto autonomy. Indeed, the Kurdish and
Baluch inhabited areas had to be kept within the Shah's
realm. The tribal socio-political organization among both
groups also precluded loyalty and identification with the
state that was considered an alien and imposing structure.
These aspects of the relationship were to remain important
factors that helped shape future mutual perceptions and
expectations of the two groups and the Iranian state and
to a large extent what followed was a consequence of such
foundations.
External influences are important in this period only
with regards to Azarbaijan because the division of
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Azarbaijan and the twofold influences of Tsarist Empire
and the communication with the co-ethnics on the Russian
side were beginning to lay the foundations of an Azari
distinct identity in Iran. This identity was at the
formative stage at this juncture and the socio-political
environment of Iran at the time did not and could not
precipitate its emergence.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1905-1911
AZARIS, KURDS, BALUCH
General Observations:
In the following pages the Constitutional Revolution
of 1905-1911 and each group's particular reaction to that
important event will be examined. Such factors as
indigenous socio-political structures as well as each
group's marginality vis-a-vis the mainstream political
process played important roles in the different patterns
of political behavior that emerged. In this light, the
difference in the response of the Azaris to the Revolution
and that of the Kurds and the Baluch can better be
explained. Participation of the Azaris in the Revolution
reflected their centrality in the Iranian socio-political
structures and can be contrasted with the behavior of the
Kurds and the Baluch that was an indication of their
marginal position in the Iranian politics. Azari
revolutionaries demonstrated selfless devotion to the
cause of the Revolution that aspired not only to rid Iran
of Qajar's despotic rule, but to put an end to the
destructive Russo-British influence over the Court and the
politicians. Indeed, the Constitutional Revolution of
1905-1911 was the culmination of the popular resentment
133
and grievances of the nascent intelligentsia of Iran -both
Persian and Azari- who with the assistance of some members
of entrepreneurial and religious classes were struggling
for equity and justice. The Revolution aspired not only
to rid Iran of Qajar's despotic rule, but to put an end to
the destructive Russo-British influence over the Court and
the politicians. This struggle also helped the emergence
of the phenomenon of "Iranian nationalism." The idea of
"Iranian nationalism" belonged to a small group of
individuals, i.e., those secular, urban Iranians who were
influenced by the West and whose secularism challenged
traditional ideals and who advocated change vis-a-vis the
defenders of the status quo. Iranian nationalism was also
a direct response to the Russo-British penetration.
This nationalism, however, was by no means an over-
arching phenomenon. It neither reached nor did it attract
masses of the peasantry or nomadic peoples who spoke
different languages and possessed diverse cultures.
Iranian nationalism was advocated by politically
articulate Persian and Azari intellectuals who sincerely
embraced it and contributed much to its development. On
the other hand, the attachment of the Kurds and the Baluch
to the small-scale society or "tribalism" persisted as
they entered the 20th century. Indeed, the Revolution and
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the subsequent period of anarchy and chaos, not to mention
the weakened central control, created conditions in which
both groups could lead more independent lives, free of
government interference and control while occasionlly
raiding the settled population or travellers. Trans-
border influences and foreign intervention in this period
proved particularly significant in the case of the Azaris
whose relations with the Iranian state was seriously
affected by the Russian occupation of Azarbaijan.
The Azaris:
By the turn of the century, many urban Azaris had
begun to demonstrate acute political consciousness. This
consciousness which was mostly manifested in their
attachment to Shiism and Iran, however, was not left
intact. The unprecedented change that Iran experienced in
this period also stirred the emergence of a national
awakening of the sort among the Azaris. Initially the
Azari intellectuals -particularly those who were
influenced by the events in the North- gave expression to
this new awareness. Gradually the urban middle class
together with the Azari intelligentsia and later the urban
rank and file particularly the workers followed suit. It
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should be emphasized that the Azari national awakening
that was, to a large extent, a consequence of contacts and
communication with the Northern Azarbaijan as well as the
subsequent occupation of the Iranian Azarbaijan by the
Russians, evolved and grew together with their attachment
to Iran. This "fluidity of ethnic boundaries"1 explains
certain junctures in history when Iranian Azaris have
championed an "Iranian" cause and other instances when
they have spearheaded Azari communal aspirations. Indeed,
throughout the 20th century, the identification with Iran
was not abandoned by the Iranian Azaris as they became
more conscious of their Azari identity and the growth of
Azari consciousness in no way contradicted Azari
attachment to Iran.
In the previous chapter, we noted that in the last
few decades of the 19th century Iranian Azarbaijan was
influenced by the events in the Russian Azarbaijan. This
was a time when the Azari intellectuals in the Russian
Azarbaijan were striving to define their cultural
identity. Their endeavors mostly were manifested in
artistic expressions and publications of newspapers and
magazines that were also received and appreciated in
Iranian Azarbaij an.
By the turn of the century, both Azarbaijans were in
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revolutionary turmoil. Many of the magazines and
newspapers published in Russian Azarbaijan found their way
into Tabriz the capital of Iranian Azarbaijan].2 Some of
these publications advocated identification and alliance
with the Ottoman Turks and wrote in literary Ottoman
Turkish difficult for the Azari masses to comprehend.3
However, the most popular were those that strove to rouse
political and national awakening on the basis of an Azari
identity.4
In the Russian Azarbaijan, political sentiments
mostly revolved around the struggle against Russian
colonial domination and national awakening. In the
Iranian Azarbaijan also political participation involved
Azari opposition to the existing power structure. At this
time, Russian Azaris were becoming acquinted with such
terms as milliatchilik [nationalism] and Azari
publications had begun to address their readers not merely
as Muslims but more as Turks. 5 Iranian Azaris were,
obviously, not unaware of these developments in the
Russian Azarbaijan. However, at this juncture, they were
more involved in the politics of Iran as a whole. At the
same time, it was evident that the Russian Azaris were
looking beyond Russia for political leadership while the
Iranian Azaris sought change within Iran itself.
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It should be noted that many Russian Azaris were also
involved in the political upheaval in Iran. Mohammad Amin
Rasoulzadeh, a journalist and one of the leaders of a
Marxian party for Muslims called Hemmat (1904), was
closely identified with the revolution in Iran.6
Meanwhile the revolution of 1905 in Russia and the
subsequent Muslim-Armenian wars in the Russian Azarbaijan
drove many Azari intellectuals and political activists who
were in danger of detention into Iranian Azarbaijan.
These individuals, in turn, joined Iranian
Constitutionalists and participated in Iranian politics.
Thus, the ferment was kept alive not one sidedly. There
was intense interaction and communication between "North"
and "South." At this juncture, the politics and political
activists of the two Azarbaijans overlap to such an extent
that at times it is difficult to distinguish Russian
Azaris from those who belonged to Iranian Azarbaijan.
Every political incident and every provocative publication
had its impacts felt on both Azarbaijans.
For the Russian Azari intellectuals and political
activists who had fled the Tsarist repressive measures,
the Constitutional Revolution of Iran presented another
arena in which they could fulfill their otherwise
frustrated asirations. These immigrants assisted Iranian
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Azari merchants, civil servants, journalists, the
Constitutionalist clergy and other members of the
intelligentsia in their struggle against the Qajars.7
There is no doubt that many of these individuals were
under the influence of Persian language and culture. One
of the most influential literary journals, Ganj-e Funun
[Treasury of Arts], published in Tabriz, was in Persian.8
Also many Iranian Azarbaijanis who lived and worked abroad
published newspapers in Persian (such as Akhtar in
Istanbul) while wealthy entrepreneurs of Russian
Azarbaijan subsidized and helped disseminate progressive
newspapers such as Habl al-Matin among religious students
in Najaf [an important Shii centers in Iraq].9
Meanwhile Iranian Azari poets and writers produced
unprecedented amounts of literary work in Azari that
basically dealt with socio-political issues of the day.
Berengian writes that concepts such as "parliamentarism,
constitutional monarchy or a republican form of
government, nation, justice, freedom and ministerial
cabinet, administrative corruption," etc. were
particularly popular. 1 0 It is interesting to note,
however, that most of these works did not contain any
reference to a separate Azari ethnic or national identity
at this time. The expression of attachment to Iran, on
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the other hand, was overwhelmingly present. The concept
of vatan [motherland/fatherland] for example, was
portrayed in Azari poetry as a beautiful "beloved who is
being carried off by a foreigner."11 Even when Azari
socialist journalists tried to use ethnic metaphors to
enhance the impact of their socialistic messages, the
images created did not correspond perfectly to the social
realities of the day. Berengian writes that in the
caricatures of the magazine Azerbaijan, the dialogues
spoken by the cartoon characters were carried out in
different languages. Turkish was spoken by the peasantry
while the landlords or tax-collectors spoke Persian. She
notes, however, that in Azarbaijan most landlords were and
are local.12
Thus the overwhelming thrust of Azari political
activity and intellectual productivity was based on
freeing Iran of foreign domination and putting an end to
the Qajar rule. Indeed such Azari intellectuals as
Abdolrahim Talibof who had travelled extensively in Russia
advocated secularization and centralization of authority
and creation of a unified Iranian nation.1 3 However, it
should be pointed out that proliferation of Azari literary
works during this period eventually helped the development
of an Azari identity. The multitude of newspapers and
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magazine articles written in Azari helped the growth and
evolution of Azari literature and opened the door for the
creation and development of textbooks in Azari.14
Literary and intellectual endeavors were not the only
means through which the Iranian Azaris were involved in
the Constitutional Revolution of Iran. Iranian Azaris
were active through various organizational frameworks the
most important of which were the anjumans. Anjumans were
associations modeled after soviets1 5 that emerged during
and after the Constitutional Revolution and brought like-
minded individuals together and at times helped the
administration of some areas during the chaos of the
Revolution. Indeed these associations were instrumental
in carrying out the day to day business of the government,
particularly in northern provinces of Iran, at a time when
the weakening of the central government had created a
power vacuum in many urban cetners. The first of such
associations appeared in Tabriz in 1906 and from there
spread to Tehran and other cities. In Azarbaijan
different anjumans represented the multitude of forces
active in the province. Azaris were also active in many
anjumans in Tehran where most of the armed volunteers for
the defense of the National Assembly were members of the
Anjuman of Azarbaijanis.16 The most important and radical
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of these anjumans was anjuman-e eyalatiye Azarbaijan [The
State Anjuman of Azarbaijan] that aspired to local
autonomy and was very strong.
In the meantime Hezb-e itemaivyun-e amiyvun [social
Democratic Party] had emerged that was a branch of the
Social Democratic Party of Azarbaijan [Hemmat) founded in
Baku in 1904. This party was established by Iranians in
Baku and advocated centralization and secularization of
Iran and was non-parochial in its approach to politics
and economy. It is important to point out that Iranian
Azaris had great prominence in the party's membership.
Indeed markaz-e aibi the secret center] which was the
executive committee of the party branch in Azarbaijan with
Ali Monsieur at its head, had great influence in the
Azarbaijani anjuman in Tabriz.17 The party also had great
impact on the creation of labor unions in Tehran and
Azarbaijan. 18 These organizations, together with several
others, helped foster the ideas of revolutionary change.19
The basic demand of revolutionaries (both Azari and
Persian). was granting of a Constitution and the
inauguration of a "national assembly." Considering the
fact that this was a period when Iran was still referred
to as the "land of Islam" and the Shah as the "Shah of
Islam," it is interesting to ncte the utilization of such
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concepts as "national assembly" by the revolutionaries.
The introduction of such concepts as "nation of Iran,"
"national assembly" and "constitution" was an innovation
in the political culture of Iran; novel ideas and thoughts
presented by a few secular and Western-educated men who
were either among the leaders of the revolt or provided
inspiration for them. The fact that the Constitution of
1906 was based on Belgian and French Constitutions and was
meart to replace the whimsical rule of the Qajars with a
new and more rational structure is a credit to the efforts
of these men. This was indeed a momentary lapse of the
driving forces of the Shii dogma and the Iranian religious
classes, an innovation that did not endure the test of
time.
As was mentioned before, the influence of the Russian
Azarbaijan in the propagation of these innovative concepts
cannot be overlooked. The involvement of the Russian
Azaris in this upheaval was to such an extent that when
Muzaffar al-Din Shah offered an "Islamic Assembly," a
telegram was sent from the Russian Azarbaijan threatening
to dispatch armed volunteers because the revolutionaries
considered an "Islamic Assembly" unacceptable.20
The Shah eventually capitulated in August 5, 1906.
The representatives who were elected to the Constituent
National Assembly to draft a Constitution belonged to
urban upper strata. Among them 12 Azari delegates formed
the core of the progressive faction and were, indeed, the
cornerstone of the resistance and steadfastness in the
Assembly.21 It seems the requirement of "literacy in
Persian"2 2 was not considered a cause for alarm among
these delegates.
This period in the Iranian history is more important
in regards to the development and evolution of an
"Iranian" identity. Although Iran was still far from
becoming a nation-state in the Western and modern sense,
the fundamental elements for such an evolution were being
introduced. To begin with, for the first time in
centuries the boundaries of the territory called "Iran"
had become fixed. Although this was an imposition by
neighbouring and more powerful states it was the first
step in the direction of the emergence of a modern nation-
state in Iran. Secondly, the Qajars and their rule,
although traditional and weak, had provided Iran with a
pervasive authority at the core that could be equated with
the concept of internal sovereignty. Thirdly, the geo-
political significance of Iran and the rivalry of the two
powers, i.e., the Great Britain and Russia, over Iran, had
also endowed the Qajar state with international
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recognition. These factors, indeed, facilitated Iran's
emergence among the community of the 20th century nation-
states. What remained to be achieved was the creation of
modern structures and their institutionalization as well
as the forging of a "nation," an "Iranian nation" that
would provide a meaningful substance for the newly
emerging state.
The Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 was the
first step in this direction. Although this over-arching
Iranian identity was going to take a much more Persian
form in later years, at this juncture the Iranian Azaris
were as much a part of this process as were the Persians.
The Shah eventually signed the Constitution called
the Fundamental Laws. The Constitution limited the power
of the executive branch while giving the legislature more
responsibility and authority. The person of the Shah
whose power was said to emanate from the people was,
however, given wider authority in the amendments to the
Constitution in the subsequent year. Shi'a Islam and
Persian language were proclaimed as the state religion and
its language. Nothing pertaining the heterogeneous
population of Iran appeared in the Constitution except
that the religious minorities were prohibited to take
cabinet positions. Some religious minorities, however,
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were recognized and given parliamentary seats later.
It was mentioned that together with the Azari
struggle for the achievement of the Constitution an
incipient Azari identity also began to emerge among the
Iranian Azaris; an identity, that later with more
Persianization of Iran, evolved into a full-fledged ethnic
consciousness. The historical juncture when this
incipient identity demonstrated itself was after the
granting of the Constitution and the crowning of Mohammad
Ali Shah, the heir-apparent. It has been said about
Mohammad Ali Shah that he was perhaps "the most perverted,
cowardly and vice-ridden monster that had disgraced the
throne of Persia in many generations."23 The new Shah was
a despot who could not tolerate the limitations the
Constitution was imposing on him and used every possible
means to stifle and intimidate the delegates.
Following the Shah's resistance, riots broke out in
major cities particularly Tabriz. It is important to
point out that Iranian Azaris were being assisted by 800
men from Russian Azarbaijan.24 It was at this juncture
that Iranian Azaris for the first time articulated their
demands in communal terms. Kasravi writes that 20,000
individuals gathered in Tabriz and threatened to separate
Azarbaijan from Iran if the Constitution would not be
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ratified. 2 5 Kasravi contends that in some of their
telegrams the Azaris called themselves mellat-e Azarbaijan
[the nation of Azarbaijan].2 6
In his book about Russian Azarbaijan, Tadeusz
Swietochowsky considers this episode "the first outburst
of 'pan-Azarbaijani sentiment....27 a sentiment that was
strengthened by the presence of many Azari immigrants
fleeing Russian repressive measures. He quotes an
official Russian newspaper:
....Semi-intellectuals from Caucasus, forgetting that
they are Russian subjects, involve themselves eagerly
in the Tabriz disturbances and send there their
volunteers. 28
This was, indeed an interesting point in the history
of national awakening in both Azarbaijans. Tabriz
functioned as a safe haven for the Azari dissidents from
Russia. The Iranian Azaris who were fighting for a
Constitution could not but be affected by national
sentiments of their co-ethnics in Russia. However, the
pan-Azarbaijanism that Swietochowsky writes about was
shared only by a small number of intellectuals and urban
intelligentsia. There are no indications that rural
masses of both Azarbaijans were in any way aware of such
sentiments. Swietochowsky also considers this episode as
one in which Ottoman Turks were considered as a viable
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alternative by the Azarbaijanis. 29 This may be true for
some Russian Azari intellectuals who followed a pan-
Turkish dream and, of course, later were disillusioned.
But the Iranian Azaris still had great attachment to
Shiism and Iranian culture and the use of their ethnic
identity was a means to an end. They were merely
threatening the Qajars as best as they could. What is,
however, important is that for the first time Azaris of
Iran referred to themselves and their homeland as separate
entities. Thus, the Constitutional Revolution, as
important as it was for the creation and growth of an
Iranian identity had a significant bearing on the
emergence of an Azari identity. Subsequent events
functioned as a catalyst which consolidated and solidified
communal awareness among the Iranian Azaris.
The euphoria of the Constitution did not last long.
With the rapid rise of Germany, the British and the
Russians came to new understandings regarding Iran and
thus in 1907 divided Iran into British and Russian spheres
of influence.3 0 This and the success of reactionary
forces in Russia prompted Mohammad Ali Shah, who was
supported by the Russians, to retrieve the power of the
throne. He, with the assistance of Colonel Liakhov, the
Russian commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, launched
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a coup, bombarded the Majles [the parliament] and
reinstituted his absolutist rule. What happened later is
a clear manifestation of the centrality of Azaris in
Iran's constitutional revolt.
The center of revolutionary activity was moved from
Tehran to Tabriz where a bitter civil war ensued between
the Constitutionalists and the Royalists. The
Constitutionalists were mainly comprised of various urban
strara from the lower middle to the aristocracy while the
Royalists were made up of Shahsavan tribes and urban poor,
the pro-regime clergy and the peasantry.3 1 The Shah's
forces, in the meantime, laid seige to Tabriz and
blockaded the city for 9 months.32 There is much written
about this siege both by Iranian and Russian [Azari]
writers depicting the courage, sacrifice and suffering of
the population of Tabriz. 3 3 This courageous resistance,
however, provided a pretext for the Russians to occupy
Azarbaijan (April, 1909); apparently to get food to the
city, open the highways,34 and rescue foreigners entrapped
by the siege.3 5 But this intervention failed to keep
Mohammad Ali Shah in power. The Shah was deposed on July
16, 1909. Yet, the Qajar dynasty retained the throne with
Asad al-Mulk as regent and Constitution restored.
The occupation of Azarbaijan by the Russians
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confronted the Iranian Azaris with a different kind of
struggle. Before they were fighting, along with the
Persians, against the Qajar's tyranny. Now they were left
alone to defend themselves against an alien occupier. The
Russians committed many atrocities in Azarbaijan and the
Azaris, although fought hard, were no match for them. At
the same time the new parliamentary government of Iran,
facing innumerable economic and political problems, was
incapable of extending any assistance.3 6
Azaris' helplessness vis-a-vis the Russians and the
absence of any assistance from the central government
created feelings of isolation and abandonment. This was
indeed a new political environment, one that required new
adaptations. Azarbaijan under the pressure of the Russian
occupation was naturally losing its centrality in the
Iranian power politics. The center although not oblivious
to Azari distress was unable to render any assistance.
The consequence was a psychological rupture that in the
short run not only affected Azari attitudes towards the
Iranian state but helped strengthen Azari self-perception
as distinct from the Persians.
The feeling of sheer desperation and abandonment is
apparent in the telegrams Azari activists sent to Tehran.
Kasravi documents the last of such telegrams to the center
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by the Azari Provincial Society:
With the predicament Tabriz is facing no money has
been sent to the city. All the cash and taxes of
other towns and villages are being extorted by Samad
Khan [the governor who was a Russian lackey]...The
salaries of gendarmes and law officers and armed
guardians of the city are delayed. So far we have
kept them with a lot of promises but gradually they
are putting down their weapons and leaving. With all
these what do you think is going to happen to
Tabriz?37
Kasravi, himself, echoes this sentiment as he writes
that Iranian Azaris while sacrificed a great deal for the
sake of Iran, did not receive solidarity from the rest of
the country; they were forgotten and abandoned.38
Another important impact of the suppression of the
Iranian Azaris by the Russians was the emerging non-
contested Russian rule in the northern Iran. Firuz
Kazemzadeh quotes the British Ambassador to the Court of
the Tsar:
Unforseen events had led to the occupation of certain
districts in north Persia by Russian troops, and
little by little, the whole machinery of the
administration had been placed in the hands of the
Russian Consul-General, and the same might be said of
the governors at Resht, Kazwin and Julfa. They were,
one and all, agents of the Russian government ..... 39
From then on Russian influence reigned supreme in
Iranian Azarbaijan. Many nationalists and political
activists were arrested, tortured and executed by the
Russians who remained in Azarbaijan until 1914 when they
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withdrew after the War only to return in 1915. With the
victory of the Bolsheviks the Russians evacuated Iranian
Azarbaijan by 1918. Their occupation, however, helped the
emergence of several trends in Iran. An initial trend was
the anti-Tsarist feelings and activities of many Azaris
that lasted until 1917. The other was the emergence of
indigenous movements, particularly in the northern Iran,
with nationalistic and leftist overtones, overtly or
covertly influenced and/or encouraged by the Russians.
The last, but the most significant trend, was the fact
that the prolonged occupation of Iranian Azarbaijan by the
Russian forces helped set the stage for future Soviet
encroachment in the Iranian Azarbaijan. However, it
should be emphasized that despite all that had happened to
Azarbaijan, Azari masses still felt a great deal of
attachment to Iran
The Kurds and the Baluch:
As we noted the Constitutional Revolution was a
bourgeois nationalist movement which was urban based and
basically alien to the thousands of nomadic or semi-
nomadic tribal peoples or masses of the peasantry who at
times happened to belong to different ethnic origins and
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in no way identified with the Persian or Azari urban
population and their aspirations.
Most of the Kurdish tribes of Iran, for example,
supported the status quo and demonstrated hostility toward
the Constitutionalists. 40 Some such as the powerful
Kalhor tribe of Kermanshah a Shii tribe] even supported
Mohammad Ali Shah's attempt to overthrow the
constitutional government in Tehran.41
There is no evidence of this kind of collaboration
with the weakening central authority by the Baluch who had
been repressed and brutalized by military expeditions and
extortionate tax officials. After the death of Naser al-
Din Shah (1896) and the weakening of the center a Baluch
revolt led by Husain Khan Narui, the chief of the Narui
tribe, was crushed through a joint operation of the
British and Qajar forces.4 2 However, the Constitutional
Revolution and subsequent chaos allowed a Baluch
chieftain, Bahram Khan of Baranzai tribe, to rise to power
and even manage to defeat the Qajar's expeditionary
forces.4 3 Bahram Khan and his independence proved too
costly for the British who could not tolerate his raids
into Eastern Baluchistan the British zone of influence].
The British eventually defeated Bahram Khan and his tribal
allies.4 4 Subsequently, Bahram Khan's nephew, Doust
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Mohammad Khan, succeeded him. He ruled most of Iranian
Baluchistan until 1928 when Reza Shah's forces ended the
Baluch independent era.
As we noted in the previous chapter, at this
juncture, the Kurds and the Baluch present us with
slightly different situations as to their relationship
with the Qajar state. Indeed, the Kurds were not only in
more interaction with the state, some Kurdish chiefs were
also held in high esteem by the Qajar rulers. The fact
that a considerable number of the Iranian Kurds were Shii
Muslims perhaps made for an easier interaction. This may
also explain the support extended to the falling Qajar
Shah by some of these tribes. The Baluch, on the other
hand, occupied the remotest corner of the Iranian
territory and their contacts with the center may be summed
up either in warlike confrontations or dealings with more
peaceful yet extortionate Qajar officials. This, of
course, does not mean that the Kurds did not experience
the tyranny of the Qajar state. Yet, while the Kurds had
learnt to deal with the state in a myriad of ways -from
hostile confrontation to marriage to the Qajar Court- the
Baluch had no way but to base their perception of the
Qajars or the Persians [as they were synonymous to the
Baluch] on fear and hatred.
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However, more important for the two groups is their
connections with their co-ethnics on the other side of the
borders. Here again the Kurds and the Baluch demonstrate
relatively different experiences. There is no doubt that
both groups were in constant contact with the "other
side." Indeed, at times, the same tribe was divided
between two countries. The difference in experience,
however, has to do with the different nature of society on
the other side.
At the turn of the century the Kurds in the Ottoman
territories lived under different conditions than the
Baluch in the British dominated territories of the south-
west Asia. The Baluch society and its traditional socio-
political structures were left fairly intact by the
British.4 5 The Baluch society remained a traditional
world in which social relationships stayed static and the
socio-political structure was cemented by an established
order. The Imperial power, in this case was content to
leave the traditional rulers more or less in control. The
British, while subdued the rebellious tribal leaders, came
to some sort of understanding with the compliant ones.
This "indirect rule" worked out very well for the British
who although were acutely aware of the "tribal"
resistance, had no reason to fear "nationalis aspirations"
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among the Baluch. Indeed, the growth of ethnic
consciousness and emergence of Baluch nationalism did not
depend upon the resistance of some tribal leaders for
independence. It depended upon the development of a new
social complex: the urban, Westernized Baluch. This
stratum, however, came to its own after the partition of
the British Raj into India and Pakistan.
There are both similarities and differences between
the situation of the Kurds and that of the Baluch during
19th century. Both groups were, of course, dominated by a
so-called alien group. Both enjoyed autonomy; at times in
a feudal structure in which the tribal chiefs had won, in
return for their support and compliance, rights and
privileges.
The Kurds who lived in the Ottoman territories,
however, had begn to feel the tide of change in mid-19th
century. We noted the emergence of a small Kurdish
intelligentsia in the Ottoman territories. This small
intelligentsia, however, was confronted with intense
rivalry and hostility of the tribal leaders who perceived
them as a threat to their power and status.4 6 Many
members of the Kurdish intellignetsia participated in the
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 with great hopes for freedom
and self-determination of the Kurdish community. However,
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subsequent events, particularly the program of forcible
Turkification launched by the Young Turks ended Kurdish
euphoria. The participation of Kurdish urban
intelligentsia in the revol, nontheless, had a great
impact on the growth and development of Kurdish identity.
Thus, during the early decades of the 20th century,
the Kurdish leadership in the Ottoman territories was
embarking on a challenging task while the Kurds who lived
on the Iranian side of the border led a relatively
inactive political life. Tribal loyalties reigned
supreme; there was little urbanization and no articulate
voice among the elite. The overall conditions of the
Kurds reflected the all-encompassing backwardness and
poverty of the country as a whole.
The conditions of the Baluch, in terms of the
articulation of communal consciousness was probably worse.
Iranian Baluch were "freewheeling and a law unto
themselves"47 at this time.
* * * *
In this chapter the background to the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-1911 was briefly discussed.
Subsequently the impacts of the Constitutional Revolution
on each group and their specific reactions to that event
were examined. The Constitutional Revolution was a
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significant event in the Iranian political history. It
was, however, a turning point for political awakening of
the Iranian Azaris. Azarbaijan's proximity to Europe, the
division of its population between Iran and Russia, its
economic prosperity and the centrality of its elite in
Iranian politics had endowed the province and its
population with a pivotal position in Iranian socio-
political structures at the turn of the century. In this
light, the active participation of the Iranian Azaris in
the Constitutional Revolution is not suprising. What is
important is that at this juncture, together with a
general political awareness a communal consciousness also
began to appear. The emergence of this awareness was a
consequence of different factors the most important of
which are: contacts and communications [these included a
significant amount of literary and cultural activity in
Azari Turkish] with the Russian Azarbaijanis who, at this
time, had begun an earnest attempt to define themselves,
occupation of Iranian Azarbaijan by Russian forces, and
the subsequent decline of Azarbaijan's economic
prosperity. These factors all reinforced the
dissatisfactions and disappointments generated by the
despotic rule of the last Qajar Shah. The Russian
occupation of Azarbaijan and the inability of the state to
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defend the Azaris, however, seems to have been the most
important factor that helped emergence of a nascent Azari
identity. As the Iranian state was struggling for
survival, the Iranian Azaris under brutal Russian
domination were searching for a psychological anchor. In
such a situation the Iranian Azaris not only became
available for trans-border influences but they were able
to translate these influences into a new form of identity;
an identity shared with their co-ethnics in the Russian
Azarbaijan. Although this emerging identity never became
contradictory with the Azaris' Iranian identity, the
legacy of the rupture between the Azaris and the Iranian
state at this period was going to be manifested soon in
different movements of communal nature in Azarbaijan.
The situation of the Kurds and the Baluch, again, was
identical at this stage. Since the link between the state
and both groups was basically one of domination and
resistance, the Qajars could only control the Kurds and
the Baluch when the state was sufficiently strong. As the
Constitutional Revolution entailed the weakness of the
state, a situation was created in which both groups
enjoyed complete autonomy. In contrast to the Azaris
there was thus no change in the customary ways in which
relations were perceived or carried on. This aspect of
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the relationship between the state and these groups
essentially continued well into the 20th century.
However, the trans-border influences had some impacts
on the Kurds. The modernization and centralization
policies of the Ottoman Sultans had generated some change
in the Kurdish-inhabited areas of the Ottoman Empire. The
Kurds who lived in the Iranian territory although aware of
this change were little affected by it. The ramifications
of this process of change only became manifest in Iranian
Kurdistan by the end of WWII while in Iranian Baluchistan
the Baluch tribes remained self-contained and static. It
is thus plausible to argue that in the Kurdish case the
process of change on one side of the borders had impacts,
even if slow and gradual, on the other side.
In the following chapters we will analyze the impacts
of the two World Wars on Iran, emergence and evolution of
a strong central authority and each group's particular
response to these developments.
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W.W.I. AND AFTER: AZARIS, KURDS, BALUCH
This chapter will examine the impacts of the War
years on Azari, Kurdish and Baluch communities. The first
section will discuss the Azaris and the emergence of the
first Azari movement with communal overtones in Iranian
Azarbaijan that was a consequence of a break that occurred
in the relationship between the Iranian state and the
Iranian Azaris after the occupation of Iranian Azarbaijan
by Russian forces in 1909. This break was reinforced by
wartime chaos and near absence of central authority in
Iran after the Constitutional Revolution.
The Constitutional Revolution although had succeeded
to topple Mohammad Ali Shah, had done little to alter the
conditions of the masses. There existed no detailed
program for the country and the power structure remained
unchanged. As Ann Lambton comments:
....The underlying intention of the constitutional
movement was ..... that the ruler would be duly warned
and restore 'just' government.1
This may explain the fact that no drastic transfer of
power took place after the success of the Revolution.2
Those who led the movement were from middle and upper-
middle strata of the Iranian society and their victory did
not necessarily mean the emergence of a new power
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structure.
When the second Majles [parliament] convened the
country was subject to political disorder and acute
financial problems. The outlying areas were practically
independent. The Russians were still in occupation of
Azarbaijan while the British exercised a great influence
in the southern part of the country particularly in
Khuzestan where the majority of the inhabitants were of
Arab origins. By the time the W.W.I. broke out, Iran was
almost divided to the Russo-British spheres of influence.
Indeed, these powers wielded such influence that an
attempt to bring in the U.S. into the Iranian political
scene by hiring Morgan Shuster to reform Iranian finances
was defeated under Russian pressure.3
W.W.I. brought new devastation to the country.
Iran's declaration of neutrality was ignored by the
belligerent powers. With the onset of the War and
withdrawal of the Russians, Azarbaijan was occupied by the
Ottoman Turks in the fall of 1914. This chapter will pay
particular attention to Russian and trans-border
influences in Azarbaijan while Azari response to the idea
of pan-Turkism will also be discussed.
The second section of this chapter will examine the
situation of the Kurds and the Baluch during this period.
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Trans-border influences seem to have begun to affect some
Kurdish tribal leaders in Iranian Kurdistan. The movement
of Ismail Aqa Simko was partly affected by such
influences. The War, however, did not create a
significant transformation in Iranian Baluchistan although
both German and British agents were active in the region
and the British, at one point, launched several military
operations in the Sarhad [the northern area of the Iranian
Baluchistan) to secure the area and stop the raidings of
some tribal leaders into the British zone of influence.
THE AZARIS:
As t e events of the War years and after
demonstrated, the Constitutional Revolution and the
Russian occupation had set the stage for emergence of a
political consciousness that was specifically Azari. This
form of consciousness was also a consequence of trans-
border influences which continued throughout the War
years.
Following the fall of Tabriz, Azarbaijani
intellectuals, particularly those of the Russian
Azarbaijan, began to increase their attempts to spread
pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. The pan-Turkists addressed
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themselves to the Young Turks movement in Turkey. The
goal was the achievement of Turan, the greater nation of
all Turkic peoples. 4 The Ottoman Turks, before the
Kemalist movement, had not shown great interest in the
Azaris and their cause.5 However, some Russian Azari
intellectuals, downplaying the Sunni-Shii split, appealed
more and more to ethnicity. Some of these intellectuals,
such as Agaev and Hussain Zade, actually went to Turkey to
realize their pan-Turkic dreams.
Pan-Turkism, however, did not endure long in
Azarbaijan. There is no doubt that the Young Turks'
seizure of power in Constantinople was an important factor
in strengthening pro-Turkish sympathies between 1908-1914
among the Russian Azari intellectuals. Yet, these
sympathies seem to have been more pro-Turkish and not
particularly pan-Turkic.6 Indeed, one question that at
that juncture could not be answered yet was whether the
Azaris, Russian or Iranian, could identify with the
Ottoman Turks?
There was, also, an important opposing group who
looked with disapproval to this growing intellectual
sympathy for Turkey. This group was the Shii clergy who
still had close connection with Iran and had no sympathy
for Sunni Ottoman Turks even though they were Turks and
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thus ethnically and linguistically akin to the Azaris.7
The Ottoman Turks, on the other hand, encouraged both
pro-Turkish and pan-Islamist tendencies since both served
to create common denominators for non-Turkish and Turkish
Muslims.
When W.W.I. broke out Iranian Azarbaijan was still
occupied by the Russian forces. The Ottoman Turks refused
to recgonize Iranian neutrality due to the presence of
these forces in Azarbaijan. Soon the Ottoman forces were
in occupation of Azarbaijan as well. There is no doubt
that the Ottomans, in their drive towards east, had both
pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic objectives. Not only were they
intent on reviving the lost power and glory of the
Caliphate but they also intended to annex other Turkish
inhabited lands such as Azarbaijan.
Considering what Iranian Azaris had endured since
1909 it is not surprising that they welcomed the new
invaders. Like most Iranians they sympathized with the
enemies of Russia. It is said that "strict neutrality was
held to involve hanging anyone who took up arms against
the Ottoman invader."8
Kasravi writes that the temporary defeat of the
Russians by the Ottomans brought relief to the Iranian
Azaris:
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Azari revolutionaries even before the war had good
memories of the Ottoman Turks who had given sanctuary
to the revolutionaries and constitutionalists fleeing
Iranian Azarbaijan to escape Russian torture and
death squads..9
Initially the sympathy towards the Ottoman Turks was
limited to some Azari intellectuals. Yet the call for
holy war moved even those traditional Azari Shiis who
looked at the Sunni Turks with suspicion. For many
Russian Azari intellectuals Turkey was a saviour who would
eventually help them create an independent Azari state.
The Ottoman forces were supposed to render this assistance
to the "North" from Iranian Azarbaijan.10
In Iranian Azarbaijan, the war brought some easing of
Russian repression. The Russians were forced to focus
their attention to other fronts. Again, newspapers and
other publications began to resurface and the Azaris
resumed their political activities.11 However, the
Ottomans were defeated by the Russians in the Caucasus War
and the Russians occupied Tabriz again. The political
activists either went underground or fled.12
These developments changed the situation. In the
Russian Azarbaijan the Russian forces tried to show the
Azaris that insurrection could have undesirable outcomes
by making examples of other ethnic groups. This together
with a more favorable attitude by the new Russian Viceroy
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and the ensuing economic prosperity due to the war-time
boom in oil prices, created a situation in which the
Russian Azaris began to show signs of loyalty to the
Russian state; even supporting Russia against Germany and
Ottoman Turkey.13
But in Iranian Azarbaijan, the war years brought
economic disaster. The economic link between Russian and
Iranian Azarbaijan that had helped the development of
Azarbaijan's economy suffered greatly and this caused a
sharp rise in the unemployment rate. 14 More important,
the image of Ottoman Turks, among the Iranian Azaris,
suffered due to the misbehavior of the Ottoman forces
during their stay in Azarbaijan.1 5 One thing, however,
did not change and that was the resentment and anti-
Tsarist feelings of the Iranian Azaris. Indeed muiahedin-
e Azarbaijan [the Azari fighters], as Kasravi calls them,
were actively agitating against the Russians.16
Thus while Iranian Azarbaijan was struggling against
foreign occupiers without a plan and in a disorganized and
disorderly fashion, in the Russian Azarbaijan, most
intellectuals were striving to create an independent
entity in Transcaucasia. To achieve this, different
groups and organizations were being formed among which the
Hemmatists [socialists] and the Musavatists [nationalists]
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were the most important. Turkey, in the meantime, had
proven to be an insufficient inspirational motive. Thus,
the independent entity to be born either had to be a state
separate from Turkey or an autonomous part of the Russian
Empire.
It is important to note that in the short period
between 1900 to 1918, Russian Azarbaijanis demonstrated a
great rise in the evolution of their ethnic consciousness.
However, the problem that the Russian Azaris had to
confront was the surprising heterogeneity of groups and
ideas within the Azari population. In contrast to such
ethnic groups as the Armenians who claimed and expressed a
national identity for centuries and their fundamentally
nationalist party Dashnakistiun was a symbol of their
homogeneous nationalist aspirations, Azarbaijanis were
only beginning to find ways, albeit different ones, to
express themselves.
The October Revolution of 1917 was welcomed by all
Iranians particularly the Azaris for it meant the
withdrawal of the Russian troops from Iranian Azarbaijan.
In the Russian Azarbaijan, the Revolution spurred the
resurgence of Hemmat [socialist] and Musavat [nationalist]
parties. With the beginning of the Russian civil war
(1918) the three Transcaucasian ethnic groups, i.e.,
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Azarbaijanis, Armenians and Georgians decided on a
Transcaucasian federation and self rule. However, the
existence of latent Armenian-Azarbaijani hostilities and
the fact that the three states had different goals meant
that eventually serious problems would arise. The
Transcaucasian federation was soon dissolved with each
state declaring its own independence.
On May 28, 1918, the independent state of Azarbaijan
was declared. Because of Persian fears of irredentism,
the new nation was forced to refer to itself as Caucasian
Azarbaijan. Azabaijan signed its own peace with the
Ottomans and it received Ottoman troops in order to
suppress Armenian troops in Karabagh and to recapture Baku
from the Bolshevik Hemmatists.
The Ottoman occupation of Russian Azarbaijan also
drastically changed the attitudes of the northern Azaris
towards the Ottoman Turks. The Ottomans began to
interfere in the internal affairs of Russian Azarbaijan,
and Ottoman officials displayed contempt for Azarbaijani
leaders. The Ottomans were still pursuing the goal of a
greater Turanian Empire. The result of Ottoman attitudes
and behaviour was a steep decline in Azari support for
pan-Turkism. The fact also remains that the Azaris
considered themselves as superior to the Ottoman Turks.
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The diplomatic correspondences of Franz von Papen, German
Ambassador to Turkey, addressed to the German Foreign
Office are revealing:
...The Eastern Turks [non-Ottoman Turks] feel the
Turks amalgamated in the new Turkish republic are not
entitled to be included under the term true Turkish
'nationality.' They had lost their real Turkish
character, not in the recent past, but long ago. In
Baku, the Anatolian Turks are regarded as being
simply Levantines who speak Turkish; as little
contact as possible with them is encouraged. This
evolution has a history of many hundred of years; in
the last centuries of Ottoman history the higher
officialdom of the court and of the empire were
represented by only a small percentage of Turks. At
first they were of Hungarian origin, then Albanians,
and later, during the regime of Abdul Hamid, they
were dislodged by Circassians and Arabs. (This
historical fact and political point of view was often
confirmed during political discussions with
interested persons in Tabriz). The topic is actual
since the inhabitants of Tabriz are also Azarbaijan
Turks and feel they have parentage with the Baku
Turks....1 7
Von Papen confirms the decline of pan-Turkic
sentiments among the Azaris:
The new Azarbaijan state does not wish to be hampered
with other Eastern Turks. The Azarbaijanis maintain
that Volga Turks, Tatars, Turkmen, etc., because of
their dispersion, cannot claim national independence;
they need to pass through a long evolution, and the
task of educating them in the operation of state
should not fall to the Azarbaijan revolutionary
movement....18
On October 9, 1918 when the Ottoman Turks surrendered
to the Allies, they were replaced by the British in the
The British attempted to establish aRussian Azarbaijan.
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liberal state in Azarbaijan. British administration of
the region, thus, resulted in the growth of national
institutions along Western democratic lines. The oil
embargo placed on Bolshevik Russia by the British created
economic problems for Azarbaijan. By August 1919,
however, the British had withdrawn from the region, and
Russian Azarbaijan, for the first time, was free of any
foreign influence and left on its own to face an
increasingly victorious Red Army. As the Red Army pushed
southward, Azarbaijan proposed a union with Iran. Iran,
however, at the mercy of the British herself, refused the
offer.19
For Bolshevik Russia the reconquest of Azarbaijan was
essential. Lenin was determined to recover the oil fields
of Transcaucasia that were vital for the survival of his
nascent revolutionary state. Thus, the Bolsheviks and
their Himmatist [Azari socialists] allies who were using
effective propaganda to increase their numbers, formed a
plan to reconquer Azarbaijan. Himmat would overthrow
Musavat Azari nationalist] within Baku and let the Red
Army which was moving southward into the city. On April
27, 1920, the Russians regained Azarbaijan. 20
It is ironic that the Azarbaijani state lost its
independence at a point when Russian Azarbaijanis had
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acquired a well-defined national identity. The political
experience they had gained since the turn of the century
and particularly the short period of independence had
helped this new identity solidify. National awareness was
also expressed in Azari claims on Azarbaijan as a national
homeland.
THE KHIABANI OVEMENT IN IRANIAN AZARBAIJAN
The years immediately after the war also witnessed
the expression of self-definition in Iranian Azarbaijan.
After suffering almost two decades of intermittent
occupation, chaos, famine, and extreme hardship, Iranian
Azaris could not help but feel that they must fend for
themselves. Political instability had created a situation
in which the Azaris for the first time perceived
themselves separated from the center of power. The
"Khiabani Movement" was the manifestation of such
perception.
Some Soviet writers argue that it was the October
Revolution that gave impetus to what they call "national
liberation movement" in Iranian Azarbaijan and thus
consider Khiabani, the leader of the movement, as "well-
disposed towards the Soviet government."21 The October
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Revolution, obviously, had inspirational effects on the
movement. However, it should be pointed out that the
Democratic Movement in Azarbaijan was neither socialist
nor did it have a favorable attitude towards the Russians.
Shaikh Mohammad Khiabani, the leader of the movement,
was an ex-clergy who had been active as a
constitutionalist and was elected in the Second National
Assembly as a Tabriz representative. He was a member of
the National Democratic minority faction in the Assembly
and was considered a staunch Iranian nationalist. In 1911
when the consitutionalists were being persecuted by the
Russians he fled to Caucasus and in 1914 he returned to
Azarbaijan with the purpose of liberating Iran from
foreign domination. During the Ottoman occupation of
Tabriz he was arrested and banished. After being released
he returned to Tabriz and in 1917 he was one of the major
organizers of the celebration for the October Revolution.
The October Revolution encouraged the emergence and
growth of Soviet-like political entities in northern
provinces of Iran. In Gilan and Azarbaijan the Russians
together with the assistance of some members of the Azari
population created committees that closely resembled
soviets. In Azarbaijan a local committee of Azari Social
Democrats with the help of a Russian Azari soldier
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sponsored the evacuation of the Russian troops.2 2 Such
committees helped the idea of local self-government take
hold. Thus, Khiabani who was the head of the state branch
of the Democratic Party in Azarbaijan helped this branch
fill the political vacuum in Azarbaijan.
At this time, the Azaris of Iran had a number of
grievances. As was mentioned, they were practically
abandoned by the central government who not only could not
extend any assistance during the Russian occupation but
was not even able to protect Azaris against depredations
of different Kurdish tribes. Also the fact that Azaris
had been completely under-represented in the Third Majles
as well as the economic decline of Azarbaijan had caused
great resentment in Azarbaijan.
Khiabani had established a daily newspaper called
Tajaddud [modernity] that became the organ of his Fereh-e
demokrat-e Azarbaijan Democratic Party of Azarbaijan].23
In his newspaper, Khiabani printed provocative articles
that accused Prime Minister Vosuq al-Dowleh -who had
signed the 1919 Treaty with the British-24 of ineptitude,
corruption and treason.25 Khiabani also had oratorial
skills and his newspaper mostly printed his speeches that
were inflammatory, fiercely anti-British and, of course,
critical of Vosuq's regime. The main demands of the
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"Democrats" were: equitable representation of Azaris in
the Majles as well as creation of local and state
committees [anjumans] who would have the responsibility of
managing the internal affairs and guaranteeing the
provincial security. The "Democrats" also requested the
establishment of a new government that would be impartial.
Apparently the pro-British nature of the Vosuq's regime
made the Azaris feel that the southern provinces of Iran
would receive a preferential treatment at their expense.2 6
By 1920 Khiabani had managed to gather a number of
Azari dissidents, people who for one reason or the other
were dissatisfied with the state of affairs. These groups
ranged from merchants, some members of the ulama,
bureaucrats and certain detachments of military police to
students and other disenchanted members of the
intelligentsia.27
In the beginning the movement limited itself to a
series of demonstrations. Yet, soon Khiabani and his
followers succeeded to occupy the Post Office, police
station and other governmental buildings and proclaimed
Tabriz the center of the "national libration movement" of
Iran.2 8
Although subsequent events and actions by Khiabani
and his followers could not be interpreted as anything but
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separatist, there is no reason to believe that prior to
these events, Khiaban had entertained any secessionist
ideas. Indeed, he bitterly opposed the Ottomans when they
advocated such ideas while occupying Azarbaijan.29 Also
when a Russian newspaper wrote about the movement as one
"which is intent on separating Azarbaijan from Iran,"
Khiabani and his followers vehemently rejected the
allegation and proclaimed that they only wanted to
"improve things and that Azarbaijan was an inseparable
part of Iran."3 0 However, amidst all these cries for
Iran, the communal and parochial overtones of the movement
were becoming more discernible. Among the goals
proclaimed by the seizure of political power in Tabriz
were: replacing state officials with administrators
acceptable to the people of Azarbaijan as well as
achievement of equitable parliamentary representation and
a more adequate budgetary allocation for Azarbaijan.
Khiabani and his followers, thus, soon began to drive
the officials of the central government out and took
control of other Azarbaijani cities and towns.
Subsequently, a so-called "national government" was
established and most important of all the name of
"Azarbaijan" was changed into "Azadestan" [Land of
Freedom]. The "Democrats," thus, argued that "Azadestan"
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had always been the center of liberation activities in
Iran and now the liberation of "Azadestan" will spread to
the rest of Iran and this was just an initial phase of the
liberation of the whole country.31 Indeed, the
"Democrats" considered their government as the only
legitimate government in Iran that would eventually
eradicate foreign influence and corrupt politicians and
create a Democratic Iran with provisions for Azarbaijani
autonomy. The "Democrats", in the meantime, initiated a
series of reform policies in Azarbaijan that ranged from
fixing prices to the creation of educational institutions
for the poor in Tabriz and distribution of state lands to
the peasantry.
Khiabani, subsequently, severed all ties with the
center and proclaimed himself as President of the newly
formed Republic of Azarbaijan. When due to this and other
pressures the government of Vosuq fell, Khiabani refused
to accept any kind of negotiation with his succassor
Mushir al-Dowleh who was a liberal constitutionalist and a
known patriot. Khiabani was, indeed, on an unreturnable
path.
There is a debate regarding the "separatist"
character of Khiabani movement. Although Khiabani and his
followers repeatedly rejected allegations regarding the
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secessionist nature of their movement, the fact remains
that the movement, mainly advocated by the intelligentsia
and the urban poor, was nationalist in character.
However, nowhere in Khiabani's speeches one can find any
reference to "pan-Azarbaijani" ideals that later surfaced
among some Azaris of Iran. Yet, it is important to
remember that Khiabani succeeded in actually "separating"
Azarbaijan from the domain of the central control for a
brief period. And although Khiabani and his followers
insisted that they were fighting for Iran and an Iranian
cause and had no separatist intentions, to the central
government the changing of the name "Azarbaijan" to
"Azadestan" could only be interpreted as another
indication of their secessionist objectives. Indeed, the
government mainly perceived the movement as Soviet
inspired. There is, however, no documented evidence to
prove that Khiabani was cooperating with the Russians
regardless of the Russian interest in him and his
movement. In point of fact, different sources agree that
Khiabani was not willing to be identified with the
Russians and did not accept their assistance.32
The movement was defeated when the new government of
Mushir al-Dowleh utilized the only organ that Khiabani had
not been able to subdue, the Iranian Cossack force.33 The
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Iranian Cossack force was headed by Reza Khan who in 1921
carried out a coup and in 1925 proclaimed himself the Shah
of Iran and ended several years of chaos and anarchy in
Iranian politics. In september 1920 the Iranian Cossacks
dispersed the rebels. Khiabani who had taken refuge in a
friend's house was killed and his movement collapsed
immediately.3 4
Khiabani's movement is perhaps the first of its kind
in the history of Iranian Azarbaijan. It vs a response
to the forces that -from the last few decades of the 19th
century- had begun to penetrate Iranian Azarbaijan. These
forces not only were a reflection of change in Iran but to
a great extent they had direct relations to the Russian
occupation and other changes ting place in the Russian
Azarbaijan. Azarbaijanis of Iran, indeed, were among the
first groups of the Iranian population who experienced a
breach with the old order of things. This challenging
experience, however, did not destroy their ties or their
attachment to Iran, its culture and Shiism. In point of
fact, this may explain the indecisiveness that has been
attributed to Khiabani.35 His feelings toward the idea of
reform in Iran and his communal proclivities regarding
Azarbaijan again exemplify the fluidity of Azari ethnicity
and the ambivalence that the Iranian Azaris have felt
184
throughout many decades of this century. If Khiabani and
his followers insisted on the non-secessionist nature of
their movement, they were probably honest. There were,
however, immediate consequences to the actions that they
took to express their grievances. Among the most
important of these consequences was the emergence of an
independent political entity in Iranian Azarbaijan, an
entity whose existence was mutually exclusive with that of
the central government's.
The movement also suffered from certain shortcomings
the most important of which were internal divisions and
lack of grassroots support. Kasravi, an Iranian
nationalist and an Azari himself, belonged to one of the
factions of the Democratic Party that was expelled. He is
very critical of Khiabani in his writings, accusing
Khiabani of having made "Azadestan a pretext for his
plans."3 6 This division eventually cost Khiabani his
life. The movement's own military force was meagre and the
rank and file of the Iranian Azaris were not willing or
prepared to put their lives on the line for it. Thus, at
a time when Khiabani and his followers were beseiged by
the Cossacks and the Kurdish and Shahsevan tribes of
Azarbaijan, the needed assistance was not forthcoming.
Although this movement was an indication of a burgeoning
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Azari national consciousness, Azari ambivalence was the
greatest impediment to its success.
THE RUSSIAN FACTOR IN IRANIAN AZARBAIJAN:
The impacts of the Russian occupation of Azarbaijan
have already been elaborated. Other, less visible but
equally important, influence from Russia was the
penetration of Marxist ideology. The establishment of
leftist influence in the Iranian Azarbaijan goes back to
the turn of the century and the presence of many Azari
workers in Baku who were attracted to the Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party. Hemmat the Social Democratic
Party of Russian Azarbaijan that was established in 1904
fostered the creation of an organization of Iranian
workers called Ijtimaiyyun-e Amiyyun [social democrats].
These workers who were mostly from Iranian Azarbaijan were
organized under the supervision of Russian Azari
Bolsheviks. David Nissman quotes an interesting comment
by a Soviet historian:
Iranian Social Democracy was founded with the help
and direct participation of the Bolsheviks of the
Transcaucasus. 37
Indeed, the first attempt to establish a political
party along Communist lines took place in 1916 by two
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Iranian Azari workers in Baku.38 Adalat [justice] Party
attracted a great number of Iranian workers in Baku.
Seyyed Ja'far Javadzadeh Pishevari] who played prominent
roles in Gilan Soviet Republic and also in Azarbaijan
Democratic Republic in 1945, was the editor of the Party's
organ Hurriyat Freedom] that was published almost
entirely in Azari and was particularly popular among the
Azari workers.39 Also, at the time, the Bolsheviks and
the Russian Army through Soldier's Committees or Soviets
of Soldiers Deputies were involved in organizational and
propaganda work in Iranian Azarbaijan.4 0
The attempts of the Bolsheviks to influence events in
Iran reached its zenith with the landing of the Soviets at
Enzeli in the Province of Gilan Caspian shore].
Analyzing the events that led to the establishment of the
Gilan Soviet Republic is beyond the scope of this study.
It is, however, sufficient to point out that the emergence
of a communist regime in Russia also had an impact on many
Azaris who were in frequent interactions and
communications with their kin in the Soviet Union.
Indeed, most of the early Iranian Communists were of Azari
origins, [See table II]. This fact made Azarbaijan more
vulnerable to the Soviet ideological influence and
politico-military penetration. The emergence of the
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Soviet Azarbaijan also changed the character of the
Russian plans for Iran and other Muslim countries located
in Russia's southern flank.
After the October Revolution and the take-over of the
independent government of Azarbaijan by the Red Army,
Russian Azarbaijan became part of a highly centralized
state within the Soviet Union. The new-found national
consciousness of the Russian Azaris had to be repressed
and subsequently replaced with a kind of consciousness
that would be acceptable to the Bolsheviks.41 To pursue
such an objective, several policies were adopted the most
norteworthy of which were language policies that were
directed:
at bringing the Azari literary language in line with
actual usage and the study of the Azarbaijani past in
order to establish and codify it in line with the
demands of party and state. 42
In 1929 Latin script was adopted for Azari language
and on the eve of W.W.II. the script was changed again to
a modified form of cyrillic.4 3 The effect of such a
change was that literary communication between Soviet
Azarbaijan and Iranian Azarbaijan became much more
difficult.. Iranian and Soviet Azaris, therefore, could
not engage in literary and cultural exchange as easily as
in the past when the Russian Azaris used Persian and/or
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Arabic script. Indeed, the Soviet authorities by gradual
purging of Azari national Communists made sure that the
Russian Azari intellectuals could not try to stir
nationalist sentiments among the Iranian Azaris since such
sentiments could in turn arouse Russian Azaris. It is,
however, ironic that these policies eventually helped
solidify Russian Azaris' sense of nationhood. Initially,
this feeling of nationhood was not, in an explicit way,
extended to the Iranian Azaris. It was after the
consolidation of the Bolsheviks that the idea of a "united
Azarbaijan," integrated under the auspices of the Soviet
Union became popular particularly among the Azari
intellectuals in the Soviet Union.4 4
For the Russians, however, Iran was important in
terms of revolutionary activity. They were, of course,
not interested in creating national awareness among the
diverse population of Iran. Thus, they paid great
attention to the revolutionary movements that were
emerging in Iran during the War. Among these movements
the Khiabani movement in Azarbaijan and the Jangali
movement in Gilan (Caspian shore) were the most important.
We have already elaborated on Khiabani movement. The
Jangali movement was basically patriotic and anti-
imperialist and although the Russians even succeeded to
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infiltrate the movement and erected a puppet regime in
Gilan the movement eventually collapsed.4 5 Ineed the
Russians had "limited objectives" in Iran; objectives that
sometimes contradicted the revolutionary and lofty ideals
of the Communist idealogues. It is believed that after
their disappointing experience in Azarbaijan and Gilan,
the Russians decided to refrain from any direct action in
Iran 46. At this point Soviet policy was more
concentrated on preserving Iran as an independent, central
state while striving to ward off British influence. The
new Communist Party of Iran which had merged Adalat and
other leftist groups 1920) basically followed the same
line.47 The idea was that a bourgeois government in Iran
will eventually lead the country to a higher stage of
capitalist development and thus prepare her for a
proletarian revolution. Thus, uprisings by Azaris and
other ethnic groups in Iran were not viewed favorably not
only because these would weaken the central control and
make Iran more vulnerable to British [imperialist]
penetration but [in the case of Iranian Azaris, for
example] these uprisings could have demonstration effects
in the Soviet Union. However, the Socialist or
"revolutionary" revolts should be encouraged and if
possible assisted.48 The 1922 uprising of Major Lahuti, a
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Gerndarmerie officer, is thus attributed to such
manipulation. 49
Lahuti was an Azari Marxist who vehemently opposed
the emerging Reza Khan and his Cossacks.50 Indeed it was
both hiabani and Lahuti who brought Reza Khan and his
Cossack forces to Azarbaijan. The defeat of both
movements by Reza Khan and his Cossack army was one of
Reza Khan's first achievements in subduing centrifugal
elements in Iran and an initial step towards his policies
of integration and centralization. Lahuti's uprising was
far less popular than that of Khiabani's and it seems
personal and ideological reasons51 and possibly Soviet
agitations 52 rather than an Azari nationalist expression
were responsible. The demands of the rebels, for example,
were the dismissal of Reza Khan and payment of the much
delayed salaries of the Gendarmerie officers.5 3 The
movement seems to have been so unpopular that it is said
upon entering Azarbaij an, Reza Khan and his Cossacks were
greeted warmly by the Azari population.54
Thus, the Soviets were only willing to extend
assistance to leftist and non-nationalist movements in
Azarbaijan and other Iranian provinces. In 1920, Iranian
Azaris, however, do not seem to have been prepared for a
nationalist movement. Even Khiabani movement with its
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communal overtones failed to achieve grassroots support.
Exporting of the Azari national symbols from the "north"
to the "south" only began in 1942 when it was considered
"safe" to do so.55 As we will observe in the following
chapters subsequent events demonstrated that such
manipulations were not sufficient to create a nationalist
movement on a mass scale in Iranian Azarbaijan.
THE KURDS AND THE BALUCH:
We mentioned that the Consitutional Revolution and
subsequent weakness of the central government which
manifested itself in the rise of fall of cabinets until
1925 [when Reza Khan became Reza Shah] gave both the Kurds
and the Baluch an opportunity to practice their full
independence. Indeed. Iran was in such chaotic conditions
that any organized effort might have fostered Kurdish or
Baluch "communal" causes. But both groups failed to
demonstrate the kind of awareness that is conducive to
political action based on a national cause.
The Kurds and the Baluch,however, had different
experiences during the war years. The war closely affected
the Kurds both in Ottoman and Iranian territories. In
Iran, although the country was supposedly neutral, the
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Kurds were dragged into the War since the entire north and
western frontiers of Iran were occupied by the belligerent
powers.
Most Iranian Kurds demonstrated acute animosity
towards the Russians. Thus it was not surprising that
almost all Kurds responded to the call for Jihad [holy
war] by the Ottoman Sultan; even those who had received
money from the Russians.5 6
One can only speculate about the reasons for such a
unified response. The great fragmentation and inter-
tribal hostility rule out the possibility that ethnic
solidarity was a factor. Islam might be considered a
factor although other loyalties have sometimes proven to
be stronger among the Kurds. Kasravi provides us with
some explanations. He contends that even before the
Ottomans entered the War, the Iranian Kurds were getting
involved in open clashes with the Russians who had invaded
and occupied Azarbaijan since 1909. The Kurds felt great
resentment toward the Russians and their Assyrian and
Armenian supporters who lived in neighbouring areas.5 7
Kasravi attributes Kurdish uprising in the name of Jihad
to the Kurds' desire for looting. He maintains that it
did not make any difference for the Kurds whether they
were looting Assyrians, Armenians, Sunnis or Shiis. In
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their forays, he writes, "they just looted and killed."58
Here it is important to point out the age-old inter-
ethnic hostility between the Kurds and their Azari
neighbours in Iran. It seems that geographical proximity,
instead of cooperation and friendship, had created
suspicion and resentment between the two groups. The
Kurds never lost an opportunity to rob and loot Azari
villagers. Kasravi depicts the Kurds as savage, warlike
and brutal hordes who frequently took advantage of the
chaotic political conditions and weakness of the central
authority in order to attack the settled population who
most of the time happened to be Azaris,59 although many
Kurds themselves were not immune to these attacks either.
Regarding these raids it should be noted that many tribal
peoples engaged in raiding activities to supplement their
subsistence and economy. Raiding was resorted to
tParticularly during hard times. The Baluch also had a
reputation for raiding caravans and settled towns and
villages.6 0
The Kurds of Iran, however, suffered greatly from the
devastations and famine of the War. The Kurds who lived
in the Ottoman territories suffered even more not only
because of the War but the subsequent "Turkification"
policies of the Turks and the deportations of the Kurds to
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Western Anatolia that caused much misery and many deaths
among them.61
One can thus differentiate between the experience of
the Kurds and that of the Baluch during the War. The
Kurds not only experienced the War closely and were
affected by its destruction, they were being culturally
and politically repressed by the Ottoman Turks at the same
time. Nationalism was thus a reaction to prevent
"Turkification" and to achieve independence for the Kurds
who inhabited Ottoman territories. Among the Baluch in
the British Baluchistan although the idea of independence
was supported by the small circle of the Baluch
intelligentsia and a few tribal leaders, there was no
sustained and organized effort to foster this idea.
Although some Baluch tribes became involved in military
clashes with the British throughout the years, they did
not experience the trauma of the War as closely as the
Kurds did and they were not subjected to forced
assimilation. The political behaviour of both Iranian
Kurds and Baluch is also a reflection of the experiences
of their kin on the other side of the borders. The
Iranian Baluch remained independent and isolated even from
their kin in the British Baluchistan while the Iranian
Kurds began to show signs of awareness. Although at this
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stage Kurdish struggle in Iran was indeed manifested in
tribal unruliness, the ideals and ambitions of some tribal
leaders were being altered as a result of their
interactions and communications with the Kurds in the
Ottoman territories as will be elaborated.
Some scholars contend that the War and subsequent
defeat of the Ottomans helped a rapid spread of
nationalism throughout Kurdish areas. Van Bruinessen
writes:
There was a general awareness of President Wilson's
'fourteen points,' and of British plans for a Kurdish
buffer state between Turkey and Mesopotamia. As an
independent Kurdish state became feasible, many
shaikhs and tribal chieftains suddently became
nationalists and revolted... 62
The "British" factor has been stressed by some
writers who believe that the British, indeed, had an
influential role in "sponsoring" Kurdish nationalism
during and after the War.63 The Sevres Treaty [1920] and
the Twelfth of President Wilson's points which stipulated
conditions for creation of independent political entities
in Ottoman Kurdish inhabited areas gave the Kurdish
nationalists in Ottoman territories a great hope that the
Allies will assist them to achieve their independence in a
newly established state.64
In all these pronouncements, however, the Iranian
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Kurds, as one writer aptly put it, were "carefully
ignored."6 5 Arfa explains that the Kurdish
representative, Sharif Pasha, who was a former Turkish
ambassador to Sweden, was aware of the delicacy of the
situation and thus "was clever enough not to antagonize
Iran by claims on the Iranian Kurds."6 6
It should be pointed out that even at this stage, the
struggle for a Kurdish national cause was limited to the
Kurdish intellectuals and the urban intelligentsia in the
Ottoman Turkey. At the tribal level although the cries of
"Kurdistan for the Kurds" could be heard, as Van
Bruinessen observes, the difference between a "national
upheaval" and the more traditional type of a "chieftain's
unruliness was not a sharp one." Indeed, the social,
cultural and ideological differences that existed between
the Kurdish intellectuals and the Kurdish tribal
leadership persisted well into the 20th century. These
differences have been among the most important obstacles
to the success of a Kurdish nationalist struggle.
The Treaty of Sevres, after all, proved to be just a
piece of paper. The rise of Kemal Ataturk and his victory
over the Greeks made further dismemberment of Turkey
impossible. For the British, on the other hand, the
Kurdish issue was not politically expedient any longer.
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Indeed, the British did not insist on writing the Articles
of the Sevres Treaty regarding the Kurds into the Treaty
of Lausanne in 1923. The reason for this change of
position is explained by the fact that the British, at
this time, were intent on annexing Mosul [in southern
Kurdistan] to the newly emerging state of Iraq [under the
British mandate]. The British plans and policies,
therefore, were designed to serve British national
interests and thus had no room for a Kurdish national
homeland. The creation of various mandate states out of
dismembered Ottoman Empire further divided the Kurds who
lived in Ottoman territories. Now, the Kurds were
subjects of the states of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and, of
course, Iran.
After W.W.I. Kurdish upheavals took a radical turn.
These movements began to have more and more nationalistic
overtones. The Kurdish intelligentsia in Istanbul and
other urban centers as well as those who were in exile in
different European capitals were active in the politics of
nationalism. Among the tribes political consciousness of
Kurdish identity took the traditional form of tribal
dominance and independence, although there were signs of
emergence of a nationalistic sentiments, particularly
among the tribal leadership.
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In Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistan, the upheavals of two
tribal leaders, Shaikh Said and Shaikh Mahmud, are the
most important. The detailed account of these revolts is
beyond the scope of this study. It should be noted,
however, that both revolts, although they may be
characterized as traditional tribal upheavals, proved to
be a nuisance for the British and Turkish governments.
Indeed, Shaikh Said's revolt which occurred in Turkey cost
a great deal for the Ataturk's government and the Turkish
regime, thus, deemed necessary to deal with the Kurdish
question once and for all. This was a task that the Turks
accomplished efficiently through a series of harsh
policies ranging from forced settlement of tribes to
wholesale removal and dislocation of small tribes as well
as fierce "Turkification" which entailed calling the Kurds
"mountain Turks who have forgotten their mother tongue!"67
From then on, every expression of Kurdish identity from
the use of Kurdish language to the use of Kurdish dress,
was banned in Turkey.6 8 This suppression has' continued
well into the present culminating in excessive repression
of the Kurds by the government as well as the use of
violent terroristic acts on the part of Kurdistan's
Workers Party.69
Nationalism among the Kurds who lived in Ottoman
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territories, thus, emerged as a response to the impact of
the West as well as the repressive policies of the Turks.
The Kurds of Iran somewhat lagged behind for the obvious
reason that the process of change had not yet begun in
Iran. The modernization of Iran essentially began with
the emergence of the Pahlavis [1925]. It was also the
assimilationist policies undertaken by the Pahlavis that
curbed expression of Kurdish identity in Iran. Therefore,
at this juncture, Kurdish uprisings in Iran were mostly
local and hardly threatened the structure of the state.
More important, these uprisings lacked the nationalistic
overtones present in the movements of the Kurds in the
Ottoman territories.
It was after the War that the first large scale
movement of the Kurds in Iran with some nationalistic
hints took place. This movement was led by Ismail Aqa
Simko, the paramount chieftain of the Shakkak, the second
largest Kurdish confederacy in Iran.
The Shakkak tribes inhabited the mountainous areas
west of Lake Urumiyah in western Azarbaijan. These
tribes, mostly transhumant, were infamous robbers and
raiders and dominated a settled Kurdish population three
times more numerous than themselves.7 0 Arfa estimates the
poulation of the Shakkak around 2000 families in 1920.71
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The Shakkak was an independent, strong and unruly
confederacy that paid only nominal allegiance to the Shah.
Ismail Aqa's brother, Jaafar Aqa, was a notorious
raider and robber and very powerful in the last decades of
the Qajar period. Apparently the government of Mozaffar
al-Din Shah Qajar had exhausted all its possibilities
dealing with Jaafar Aqa since he was invited to dinner at
the home of the governor of Tabriz where he was stabbed to
death. Kasravi writes that Ismail Aqa and his brother,
Jaafar, and their father always took advantage of the
weakness of the central authority and were a nuisance.72
Ismail Aqa, nicknamed Simko, was already in revolt
during the War and according to Kasravi he vacillated
between "°'obedience" and "disobedience."73 During the
Tabriz uprisings he had fought against the
Constitutionalists and had been appointed the deputy-
governor of a district as a reward. This appointment had
been confirmed by the central government despite Simko's
unruliness. 74
Kasravi writes that Simko cooperated with the
Russians when they invaded Azarbaijan and then he joined
the Ottomans until the Russians left at which time he
captured their weapons and continued to harrass the
settled Azari population.75 Kasravi's accounts shed some
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light on different aspects of Simko's revolt. Kasravi
contends that Simko's ambitions were not limited to
acquiring independence for his tribe or subduing other
Kurdish tribes. According to Kasravi, Simko's
"disobedience" was different from that of his father's or
his brother's. Simko "had separatist ideas in mind and
was preparing to achieve his goals."76 Kasravi, however,
criticizes the Europeans for importing the "seed" of
separatist ideology to the East.77
As a historian of modern Iran, Kasravi's accounts are
indeed illuminating. Although he accuses Simko of
ruthlessness, banditry, robbery and blackmail, Kasravi
states that Simko was intent to realize the age-old dream
of the Kurds; "following the Turks and their endeavors to
bring about a 'Turkish gene,' Simko attempted at creating
a 'Kurdish gene.,'" 78 This is, of course, Kasravi's way of
comparing the Turkish nationalism of the Young Turks with
the probable Kurdish nationalism of Simko.
In his quest for independence, Simko attacked,
ransacked, looted and massacred many villages and towns of
western Azarbaijan mostly inhabited by Azari Turks who
refused to accept his authority and pay him taxes. In one
instance, Simko's men even attacked and ransacked Mahabad
[a Kurdish town in Western Azarbaijan]. 7 9 He also
202
succeeded to defeat his Assyrian rivals who had plans to
eatablish a homeland in some districts of Western
Azarbaijan for the Assyrians fleeing Turkish atrocities.80
These early successes as well as the initial lenient
policy of the government encouraged Simko and helped
enhance his position and prestige among the Kurds. The
stronger he became the more Kurdish forces joined him.
Not only his authority over most of the Kurdish tribes
inhabiting Iranian territory was unquestionable, he was
exercising power over some of the Kurdish tribes of
Turkey.81 Kasravi who witnessed Simko's adventures
writes:
Now Simko has risen a flag, demanding the 'freedom of
Kurdistan.' What is he doing? Is he preparing Kurds
for autonomy and self-determination? No! To him,
the freedom of Kurdistan does not mean these
things ....... He is looting villages, destroying
agricultural products, asking money from the poor and
miserable people ...... The wretched people of Salmas
and those areas who had been dispersed due to
atrocities committed by the Assyrians, now have
returned to their villages and want to earn their
livelihood again; but they find themselves caught in
the hands of the looting criminal Kurds of Simko.
This is the meaning of the freedom of Kurdistan.82
The quoted passage above demonstrates how the Azaris
of Iran felt about Simko and his depredations. The
central authority in Iran also had become quite weary.
Arfa contends that for Simko Kurdish independence simply
meant the establishment of his personal despotic rule over
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the other Kurdish tribes of Iranian Azarbaijan on the one
hand, and control of a large section of non-Kurdish
[mainly Azari] regions in west and northwest of
Azarbaijan, on the other.83 Indeed, Iranian historians
mostly depict Simko as a bandit; a renegade tribal
chieftain who was self-interested and arrogant and whose
only objective was dismemberment of Iran.84
Among Western scholars, Van Bruinessen, for example,
contends that Simko was in regular contact with Kurdish
nationalist circles and that "nationalist and private
ambitions went together in him and cannot be separated."85
Indeed, Van Bruinessesn believes that Simko's attempts had
nationalistic overtones and his brigandage and raiding
activities were only part of the tradition of being a
Kurdish warlord.86 Richard Cottam who calls Simko
"colorful and courageous." also writes that his main
objective was an independent Kurdistan.87
There is, however, no doubt that Simko's revolt did
not possess the organization and ideological quality of a
modern nationalist movement. The uprising not only lacked
organizational sophistication but Simko himself was not
able to create an overarching Kurdish loyalty; a communal
cause" for the average tribesman who was attracted
basically for possibilities of loot. It is said that most
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of his warriors "care and went according to his fortunes,
motivated more by pay and loot than by nationalist
sentiment and personal loyalty."8 8
The fact remains, however, that Simko's was the first
large-scale Kurdish revolt in Iran with an over-arching
Kurdish objective. Before then, Kurdish uprisings were
mostly short-lived, local disturbances. His revolt was
encouraged and nourished by the war time chaos,
uncertainties and the abject weakness of the central
government in Iran. Although Simko was influenced by his
affinity and communications with the Kurdish nationalists
in Turkey; the Kurdish tribal structure proved to be his
greatest foe. Lack of group solidarity meant Simko's
defeat vis-a-vis an organized, coherent, modern army that
was dispatched in July 1922 by the central government
under Reza Khan. Reza Khan, later Reza Shah, was intent
on building a strong, centralized nation-state in Iran and
the first steps in this direction were crushing the
centrifugal elements who threatened the political
integration and stability in the country.
As was mentioned before, the Baluch of Iran, since
the Constitutional Revolution and the weakening of central
authority in Iran, were independent for all practical
purposes. We mentioned in the previous chapter that
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Bahram Khan Barakzai had become the most powerful tribal
chief in Iranian Baluchistan. By 1910 Bahram Khan ruled
over most of Iranian Baluchistan89 During the War years
the Germans tried to enter into some dialogue with Bahram
Khan against the British. The British, in turn, decided
to negotiate directly with Bahram Khan not only to ward
off the German threat but to stop Bahram Khan's raids to
eastern Baluchistan [territory under British influence].
The British, in the meantime, dispatched a military
expedition to the Sarhad [the northern part of the Iranian
Baluchistan] to pacify the unruly tribes there. The
result was military defeat of several tribes of the Sarhad
[some tribes actually assisted the British]9 0 and the
replacement of Bahram Khan by his newphew Doust Mohammad
Khan Barakzai. Doust Mohammad Khan ruled Iranian
Baluchistan without much interference until 1928 when he
was defeated by the modern army of Reza Shah.91
Thus both Kurdish and Baluch tribes showed
centrifugal tendencies that were a response to the war-
time weakness of the central control in the country and
may be attributed to tribal proclivities for independence.
The Simko's revolt, however, contained elements of a new
awareness. A Kurdish identity was becoming crystallized
among the Kurds of Iran for many reasons. Iranian Kurds
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were obviously being influenced by the developments in the
Ottoman Turkey and Iraq. The propagation of nationalist
ideology by the Kurdish intelligentsia also was leaving
its impressions on Kurdish tribal elite in Iran. These
influences, however, were not expressed in an ideological
formulation of Kurdish identity. The Kurdish population
of Iran was still mostly rural, backward and tribally
organized. The tribal chieftain's bid for independence
was the only manifestation of a Kurdish identity.
However, such chiefs as Simko, were becoming familiarized
with new concepts and new expressions of ethnicity. It is
not a coincidence that Kasravi, the perceptive historian
of Iran, although indignant about Simko's depredations,
compares his aspirations with those of the Young Turks.
This was the first time among the Kurds of Iran that a
tribal chief was revolting in the name of "free Kurdistan"
and was articulating Kurdish aspirations in terms of
general and over-arching objectives. Although Simko's was
a seemingly "tribal revolt", it constitutes the genesis of
the Kurdish national struggle in Iran.
In contrast, Bahram Khan's and Doust Mohammad Khan's
bid for tribal power in Iranian Baluchistan lack the
nationalistic overtones of Simko's revolt. At this time,
a very small circle of Baluch "educated youth"9 2 in
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Eastern Baluchistan [British zone of influence] had begun
to consider possibilities for independence. This group
was particularly attracted to the Soviets as a counter
balance to the British. The Soviets seemed progressive
and as possible supporters they could help the Baluch to
get rid of the British and gain independence. Thus the
acceptance of a leftist ideology was setting in. And
although this attraction did not culminate in the
emergence of a Communist party it succeeded to foster
Baluch national cause in later years.93 The Baluch of
Western Baluchistan [Iranian territory] were hardly
touched by any of these developments on the "other side."
Even the consolidated rule of Doust Mohammad Khan in
Iranian Baluchistan that lasted until 1928 suffered from
internal fragmentation. Nationalism was the farthest
thing from the minds of the Iranian Baluch. All this,
however, highlights the absolute marginal aspect of the
position of the Baluch in the Iranian socio-political
structures. Such marginality persisted even after the
Iranian military was able to bring the Baluch areas under
the rule of the Iranian state and indeed formed the
foundations of the future interactions between the Iranian
state and the Baluch.
* * *k *
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This chapter briefly examined the overall conditions
of Iran before the advent of WWI. The ensuing crisis
situation in Iran as a result of foreign occupation helped
make an already weak and fragmented political structure in
the center more vulnerable. Indeed, the weakness of the
central authority led to the emergence of autonomous
movements in the outlying areas of the country. Most of
these movements, however, were devoid of a communal
content and were either inspired by foreign powers or were
bids for personal aggrandizement. This period is,
however, extremely important for Iranian Azarbaijanis who
for the first time articulated their grievances in
communal terms. The devastations of the Russian
occupation after the Constitutional Revolution, the
inability of the central government to prevent such
aggression, the misery and economic decline of the War
years demonstrated that the historical Azari
identification with the Iranian state and the Azari
integration in the mainstream political process of Iran
are not inexplicable phenomena. Indeed, tangible and
objective reasons stood for such a relationship the
absence of which meant a break with the past. The
Khiabani Movement was, first and foremost, a reflection of
such a break. This is a period when Persianization of
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Iran had not begun yet. However, the Azaris, by now,
understood very well that their status and position as a
privileged group may not be guaranteed. The Azari
intellectuals and the urban intelligentsia were thus
intent to safeguard their position vis-a-vis the group
that would control the state.
It is interesting to note that such a break with the
past could not be observed among either the Kurds or the
Baluch. Indeed there was a continuity that was manifested
in the two groups' de facto autonomous or independent
existence. As the state was unable to extend its
authority to the periphery these groups continued their
tribal way of life with internal relations and socio-
political structures hardly changed since 19th century.
The trans-border influences, however, seem to have
had some impacts on the Iranian Kurds whose largest tribal
uprising by Simko, a tribal warlord, had some communal
overtones. This aspect of the movement, however, did not
alter the perceptions of the politicians in the center who
considered such groups as Kurds or Baluch as unruly
centrifugal elements who basically had to be dealt with by
force. The inability of the government, however, meant
that there was no reciprocal exchange between these groups
and the state. The political scene resembled that of pre-
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Qajar period where different groups were absolutely
independent and chaos reigned supreme with one important
difference. Now, at least nominally a central authority
existed and some political institutions were in place.
What was needed was a strong center of power that would
rid Iran of foreign occupation and influence and integrate
the centrifugal elements.
The emergence of Reza Shah and creation of a modern
centralized state signified the dawning of a new era in
the history of the development of ethnic relations in
Iran. The following chapters will be devoted to the
Pahlavis and the modernization of Iran and the form of
relationship that developed between these groups and the
state in modern Iran.
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THE EMERGENCE OF REZA SHAH'S MODERN STATE
AZARIS. KURDS, BALUCH
As we noted, the War years produced chaotic
conditions in Iran. The occupation of Iran by Allied
forces had aggravated the fragmented social composition of
the population. At the same time after the Constitutional
Revolution political reform and economic stability had
failed to emerge since the political environment was not
conducive to such developments. Consequently, by the- end
of the War the country was on the brink of disintegration.
This chapter will discuss the emergence of Reza Khan,
later Reza Shah Pahlavi, as the strong man who subdued
various centrifugal elements, integrated Iran and
undertook the modernization and industrialization of the
country. The advent of Reza Shah Pahlavi is a significant
event because it signals the emergence of a modern state
in Iran. However, as will be elaborated in this chapter,
Reza Shah's nation-building efforts did not match his
success at state-building as the rise of centrifugal
tendencies after his abdication demonstrated.
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General Observations:
Reza Khan, even before he became Reza Shah, was the
only man who seemed capable of embarking upon the arduous
task of the "integration" of Iran. This, of course, he
did by virtue of the efficient armed forces he commanded,
the Cossack Brigade. A soldier and self-made man, in
1921, Reza Khan, the commander of the Russian-trained
Cossack Brigade, with the support and assistance of the
modern intelligentsia of Iran succeeded to stage a coup.
At the time, Iran was torn by centrifugal elements and
ravaged by the War and foreign occupation. As the War
Minister he had control over the armed forces that became
the basis of his power. By modernizing and strengthening
the army he was soon able to defeat his opponents and thus
in 1925 he was proclaimed the "Shah of Iran," establishing
the Pahlavi dynasty.
In his rise to power Reza Khan was supported by many
members of the intelligentsia and even some of the clergy
who realized Iran was in need of a strong central
authority not only to prevent its further disintegration
and create political unification but to foster economic
development. Indeed to many of these reformists it was of
utmost importance for Iran to regain her independence and
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sovereignty. These individuals who, indirectly or
directly, had been familiarized with the West and Western
ideals wished for Iran to become a dynamic, modern state,
one that would achieve economic progress and possess
effective political institutions. At the same time, the
humiliation of the War years and unabashed interference of
great powers in Iranian internal affairs had created an
acute desire for recognition. In order for this
recognition to be forthcoming a solid "Iranian" identity
had to be created. The search for identity, thus,
dominated the efforts of many of these individuals before
and after the War years. Iranian intellectuals,
particularly, were active in laying out the objective
bases and fostering the idea of such identity. Many of
these individuals considered Iran as a distinct entity in
terms of its history, language, religion, art and
literature. Ancient history provided the organizing
principle and legitimation for this identity. These
intellectuals discovered this common history and through
that tried to endow the rest of the population with a
sense of unique identity.
Thus Iranian, or more correctly, Persian pre-Islamic
history provided a core of historical facts around which
other cultural dimensions blossomed and together they
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became the rationale and a framework for the growing sense
of Iranian/Persian identity.1 One notes that poets,
journalists, writers and historians wrote about the
glories, achievements and greatness of pre-Islamic
Acheamenid and Sassanian dynasties.2 At the same time,
although there was no direct attack on Islam, the Arab
consequent of Iran was referred to in bitter and resentful
terms. 3 Persian language and literature were hailed and
emphasized as distinctive features of the newly emerging
identity. At this stage, no one seems to have worried
about or considered the culturally and linguistically
diverse population of Iran. Perhaps it was assumed that
the population of the periphery would automatically
embrace Persian language and other related concepts of
ancient Iranian history. The fact that some Azari
intellectuals also advocated this trend made the process
appear more legitimate. 4 It is also possible that the
utter backwardness of the periphery made its population
seem somehow "inconsequential" to the political destiny of
the country. What mattered was the emergence of an
independent, sovereign state in Iran that could be
recognized and function as such in the new international
arena. A strong state that could fulfill the desires,
hopes, and ambitions of these men for a brighter future.
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The relevance of Reza Khan to these nationalistic
aspirations was that his character and his modus operandi
provided a framework on the basis of which these
aspirations could be fulfilled. He was the strong leader,
these men hoped, who could rid Iran of exploitation and
backwardness. Indeed, he was "coming to be regarded as
the embodiment of that spirit of national pride and self-
assertiveness characteristic of the post-war generation."5
Thus, initially, Iranian reformists rallied around Reza
Khan and assisted him to the best of their abilities.
Reza Khan, or Reza Shah, on his part, took great advantage
of this ideological frame of reference provided by these
individuals and set out first to subdue the centrifugal
forces and secondly to consolidate his political power.
In the process of achieving the former, Reza Shah
gradually lost the support of most of the individuals who
had welcomed his rise to power.6 This was, indeed, an
indication of the inherent contradictions that existed
between the approach of a political man who was determined
to gain total power and initiate change the way he
envisioned and the idealistic aspirations of the
intellectuals to whom loyalty to Iran meant "social
reform, free elections, industrialization, land
distribution, the exclusion of foreign influence, and the
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nationalization of petroleum..." 7
To integrate Iran, Reza Khan's first measure was to
expand the authority of the state beyond the capital and
consolidate control over the periphery. The autonomy or
independent status of different groups living in the
outlying areas of Iranian territory was not compatible to
his vision for Iran, i.e., emergence of a strong,
centralized state. To end the autonomous status of the
tribal chiefs in the periphery and to subdue different
dissident movements in northern Iran, he utilized the
unified, well-organized army that he, himself, had
endeavored to build. The reconstruction of the army began
from his own Cossack Brigade which was initially expanded
and eventually unified with the Gendarmerie and other
small forces. Also the modernization of the military was
attempted by increasing the budget allocated to the armed
forces as well as sending sixty officers per year to study
in French military schools.8
The subjugation of the centrifugal elements was
carried out ruthlessly and without any sympathy for the
plight of the population concerned. By the time Reza Khan
was coronated as the Shah of Iran most of the Iranian
tribes were disarmed and settled by force.9 Many of the
disobedient tribal chiefs were either executed or kept in
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the capital as hostages. The more pragmatic chiefs who
considered continued resistance futile were pacified yet
kept in office since effective administration of the
tribal areas still depended upon cooperation of these
men.10 The nomadic tribes, particularly, were dealt with
very harshly. Nomadism was considered both a sign of
backwardness and a source of political instability. Thus,
a drastic program of settlement began which in the long
run proved to be a terrible socio-economic disaster both
for the nomads and the country's economy. 1 1 Ann Lambton
writes:
No detailed survey of the possibilities of settlement
or the effect the destruction of the tribal element
would have upon the economy of the country was
made ....... The annual migration of the tribes from
winter to summer pastures was prevented. Suitable
areas in which to settle the tribes were not always
chosen, adequate provisions for health and education
were not made, and sufficient facilities by way of
agricultural training and the provision of
agricultural implements were not given to the
tribesmen.... The tribal policy of Reza Shah, ill-
conceived and badly executed, resulted in heavy
losses in livestock, the impoverishment of the tribes
and a diminution of their numbers.12
However, Reza Shah's tribal policies drastically
undermined the power and position of the tribal political
elite. Since then, although Iran has not completely been
rid of tribal unruliness, various Iranian tribes have
ceased to create serious political instability in the
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country.13
As we noted, the basis of Reza Shah's power was the
military. The military helped foster the reconstruction
and modernization of the Qajar's traditional and
inefficient bureaucracy. Soon the bureaucracy
supplemented the military as another pillar of the modern
state in Iran. At the same time, centralization of
government helped Reza Shah implement a series of
political, economic and socio-cultural policies on the
national level. One important aspect of centralization
policies of Reza Shah was territorial division of the
country into administrative units that were directly
attached to the center. Before these units were usually
called avyalat [state] and, as we noted, they ad a
tradition of autonomy. 14 Now, the name ostan [province]
was given to these units which, symbolized their dependent
and non-autonomous status. Indeed, the dividing lines of
some of these ostans did not exactly correspond to the
ethnic/linguistic realities. Different townships in
Azarbaijan, for example, made up two provinces, Ostan III
including the townships of Tabriz and Ardabil, and Ostan
IV including the townships of Khoy, Rezaieh, Mahabad,
Maragheh and Bijar.1 5 Later, on the basis of such
divisions, Azarbaijan, during the rule of Reza Shah's son,
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was divided into two provinces of East and West
Azarbaijan. Also Kurdish and Baluch inhabited regions
that previously had their own avelat [state] were now
lumped together with other townships and called the Fifth
Ostan and the Eighth Ostan respectively.1 6 Tehran, as the
capital, became a special central province where the
administration of other provinces was controlled. Also
governors and other administrators were appointed by the
center. These provinces lacked all powers of decision
making and were in absolute subordination to the central
authority. Effective control of the outlying areas was
also facilitated by construction of new roads and
importation of cars and trucks.17
As part of the overall process to transform Iran into
a unified and homogeneous nation-state several other
policies were implemented. The military conscription was
made universal and compulsory; European dress was
introduced and it became mandatory for all Iranians to
have birth certificates and family names. The most
important part of the homogenization policy was
implementation of mass education along secular lines.
Persian was made the sole language of instruction in the
schools all over the country. As was mentioned before,
in his efforts to legitimize his secular rule, Reza Shah
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utilized the "national" ideology elaborated by the Iranian
literati which was based on the legacy of the ancient
Persian Empire and its so-called Aryan past. This
ideology advocated the adoption of one language and one
culture by the diverse population of Iran. Indeed the
following article published in the newspaper Ayandeh
[Future] sums up this ideology:
Our ideal is to develop and strengthen national
unity. The same ideal created the nation-states of
Germany, Italy, and Rumania. The same ideal
destroyed the multi-national state of Ottoman Empire.
What do we mean by "national unity"? We mean the
formation of cultural, social and political
solidarity among all the people who live within the
present borders of Iran. How will we attain national
unity? We will attain it by extending the Persian
language throughout the provinces; eliminating
regional costumes; destroying local and feudal
authorities; and removing the traditional differences
between Kurds, Lurs, Qashqayis, Arabs, Turks,
Turkomans, and other communities that reside within
Iran. Our nation will continue to live in danger as
long as we have no schools to teach Persian and
Iranian history to the masses, no railways to connect
various parts of the country; no books, journals,
newspapers to inform the people of their rich Iranian
heritage; and no Persian equivalents to replace the
many non-Persian place names in Iran.....18
This article is a reflection of the discomfort of the
Iranian elite and the literari regarding the problem of
"diversity" in Iran. The writer discusses the formation
of the nation-states of Germany, Italy, etc. without
paying any attention to the dynamics that helped create
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these nation-states. The socio-political and economic
forces that since the 18th century helped the evolution of
"nationalism" in the West were mostly absent in Iran of
the 20th century. Moreover, homogeneity was not initially
the basis of the unification of many Western nations.
Nevertheless, it was the fundamental process of change in
the Europe of 18th and 19th centuries -analysis of which
is beyond the scope of this sutdy- that made the emergence
of Western nation-states possible.1 9
It is true that Iran as an "state" had experienced a
long and continuous political existence and this made her
a rarity among many of the newly-emerging nation-states of
the 20th century. However, the pre-modern "dynastic
realm" in Iran did not need a "nation" to be validated
while the modern state would be inconceivable without it.
Diversity was thus considered as the root of the
"integration" dilemma. This "Problem" was particularly
important because many of the ethnic groups who inhabited
Iranian territory occupied -and still do today- strategic
zones in border regions where political instability would
involve a threat to the national and territorial integrity
of the state. In this light one can better understand
Reza Shah's efforts at homogenization and national
integration in Iran. As a fierce nationalist, the
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territorial integrity of Iran was highest in Reza Shah's
agenda. This may also explain the harshness of his
methods when dealing with centrifugal elements.20
Nation-building, thus, to Reza Shah and many Iranian
nationalists meant adoption of a series of coercive
measures to put an end to the "problem" of diversity in
Iran. If the peoples who inhabited Iranian territory
spoke the same language, dressed in European style and
paid homage to the same Shah, then Iran would represent a
unified nation-state like those of the Western Europe.
Force, however, was/is not an effective nation-building
tool. A strong, central civil-military bureaucracy may be
able to secure national unity by force but is it able to
inculcate the idea of "nationhood" in the minds and hearts
of the people? It is true that the use of force was not a
novel practice in Iranian history and various peripheral
groups were quite familiar with such patterns of political
behavior. There were, however, important differences.
The modern state possessed an organized, modern army with
"superior weapons and tactics;"21 it was also all-
encompassing and omnipresent. This was, indeed, a new
situation, one that called for new forms of adjustments
and adaptations. These adjustments and adaptations,
however, were not to constitute a" national
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consciousness."
It is interesting to point out the
nationalist/patriotic slogan of the Pahlavi dynasty that
advocated loyalty to Khoda. Shah. Mihan God, Shah,
Fatherland]. It is not surprising that the word "Mihan"
[Fatherland] instead of the word "Millat" Nation] was
used in the slogan. The concept of "nation" was -and in
many respects still is- an unfamiliar concept to the
diverse population of Iran. While the efforts of the
regime to create a strong sense of over-arching Iranian
identity were mostly concentrated in the area of symbol
propagation, it was never clearly elaborated what exactly
constituted the "Iranian nation." Persian language and
culture were considered as obvious tools for forging such
a "nation" and schools were apparently the best medium for
this "cultural engineering." The problem was that these
tools alone could not create political and economic
arrangements that would help foster emergence of such
identity. Indeed, the extremely rigid and uniform
curriculum of public and private schools reflected the
authoritarian approach of the government. Memorization of
abstract concepts was the basic method of learning without
any attention paid to the application of theory and
utilization of theoreatical knowledge in real life.22
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Although secular education did, indeed, spread in Iran
(following table], as a nation-building tool, education
did not prove to be very effective for the obvious reason
that most rural and tribal areas were not affected by
educational reforms.23 Reza Arasteh explains that not
only the traditional social structure impeded the spread
of education in rural areas, but difficult geography and
lack of transportation and communication infrastructures
as well as absence of other resources limited the
government's capacities in this regard.24
Year No. of Schools Total Enrolment
1924-25 3,285 108,959
1939-40 8,281 457,236 25
Despite the state's shortcomings in nation-building,
Reza Shah laid the foundation for Iranian economic and
industrial infrastructure. This initially entailed
building transportation and communication infrastructures
such as roads and highways.2 6 The Trans-Iranian Railway
that connects the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea is
considered one of the most important achievements of Reza
Shah's.2 7 Also in 1935 the Iranian government ordered
several planes from Europe and began passenger and freight
services.28
Industrialization policies of Reza Shah entailed the
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adoption of Western science and technology. Such
factories as sugar refineries and textile were established
in several urban centers. Banani contends that Reza
Shah's industrialization policies had two objectives: one
was the introduction of technological advances of the
West; and the other was the penetration of the central
authority into the "old corporate basis of society." 29
The result was the emergence of "state-capitalism."
Monopolistic firms were set up in most of which the state
owned all or a large percentage of the stock with most of
economic life and decision-making being concentrated in
Tehran.30 Most industry was concentrated in such light
industries as textiles and agricultural processing.
However, efforts to import heavy industries had to be
postponed because of the outbreak of the War.
Agriculture was one of the areas that did not receive
much attention from Reza Shah's state. Indeed, the full
integration of rural economy into the national economy did
not happen until well into the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah
Pahlavi, Reza Shah's heir to the throne. During Reza
Shah, although some preliminary steps were taken to
modernize agricultural practices, both traditional
agricultural methods and tenural arrangements remained
unchanged.3 1 However, the change initiated in other
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sectors of society did have some impacts on the Iranian
peasantry. Banani contends that external forces such as
"universal military training, the growth of factories, and
the construction of railroads," were responsible for the
"acceleration of population movement and social mobility"
in some areas.3 2 At the same time, some peasants did
benefit from "price support and credit."33
In 1927 banking operations were reformed and
modernized by the establishment of Iranian National Bank34
that became a symbol of Iran's economic independence.
Also drastic reforms in the areas of judiciary system and
public health were made.3 5 Undoubtedly one of the most
important achievements of Reza Shah's state was the
unveiling of women who were, for all intents and purposes,
an invisible stratum in the Iranian society. Reza Shah's
reforms provided unprecedented opportunities for women -
particularly middle and upper-class- to enter public life
and join the work force for the first time.36
Reza Shah's modernization policies, undoubtedly, had
great impacts on the urban Iranian society. Indeed the
emergence of new urban strata, such as a modern middle
class, a bureaucratic as well as a technocratic stratum
and a small urban proletariat was a result of such
policies. However, the nation-building aspect of these
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policies was negligible since the overwhelming majority of
the Iranian population was made up of the peasantry and,
as was mentioned before, the Iranian peasants were not
affected by Reza Shah's modernization and reform
policies.37
In the political sphere, however, Reza Shah's state
followed traditional patterns. The continuity of
"authoritarianism" could be observed in many aspects of
political institutions. This continuity was a result of
the patrimonial structure embedded in the executive branch
of a regime that could not go beyond the facade of
constitutionalism and parliamentarism. Although it may be
argued that it was only a climate that could allowe Reza
Shah to accomplish such policies as unveiling of women or
founding a secular and modern educational system, the fact
remains that this repressive climate prevented the
emergence of a close identification between the population
and the government. Indeed, creating a nation-state for
Reza Shah meant the establishment of a few features of a
strong state. The first aspect of this was, of course,
the centralization of political authority. Centralization
would not only provide greater political control, it would
enable the regime to mobilize and rationalize resources of
the country and achieve greater efficiency. Another
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aspect was the expansion of the state functions. Reza
Shah's state now had taken over the establishment and
maintenance of the national defense and had the capability
of generating or collecting revenues to an extent
unforseen by any previous state in Iran. The
proliferation of legal standards that led to the growth
and expansion of bureaucracy was another aspect of the
emergence of a strong state.
Reza Shah's state, however, was not able to withstand
the onslaught of the Allied forces on Iran with the break
out of WWII. In 1941, with the invasion of Soviet and
British forces of Western Iran, the government collapsed
and Reza Shah who was perceived as being pro-German by the
Allies, was forced to abdicate in favor of his son,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
As the iron grip of the state was relaxed, Iran
entered into another period of chaos and weakness of the
central government. At the same time, the army that was
instrumental in keeping the centrifugal forces under
control, disintegrated. The ramifications of these
developments were felt during the last two years of the
War when separatist movements by the Azaris and the Kurds
threatened the territorial integrity of the state.
The nationalist uprisings by the Azaris and the Kurds
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and the inactivity of the Baluch indicate that to a large
extent each group was responding to its particular
experience since the Constitutional Revolution. Such
response was also reinforced by several factors: a) the
distance between each group's homeland and the center and
the extent and range of communication infrastructure that
linked each group and the state; b) recruitment of each
group's political and intellectual elite by the state; c)
the indigenous socio-political structures and the extent
to which they were affected by state policies or
interaction with the state; d) the extent of the economic
integration of the group and its homeland (region) into
the national economy; e) the state's administrative
policies and the effectiveness of such policies in
transforming traditional structures; f) the state's
cultural policies such as language, religion, and
educational policies. In the following pages each group
and its particular response to the new political
environment will be examined.
THE Azaris:
Reza Shah's policies had a great impact in Azarbaijan
both economically and socio-politically. By centralizing
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commerce and trade in Tehran, Tabriz lost its advantageous
position among the Iranian cities. The decline of
Azarbaijan, compared to the prosperity of Tehran, created
a great deal of resentment among the Azaris who considered
their province as the "bread basket" of Iran. Indeed, the
monopoly policy of the regime badly hurt provinces such as
Azarbaijan that were forced to sell agricultural products
only to the government to subsidize a few urban centers.38
The following passage written by the British Consul in
Tabriz is revealing:
The completion of one organized body out of different
and to some extent independent local economies, such
as that of Azerbaijan, artificially links the
fortunes of his district with those of other
districts. This means that if disaster comes it will
be general and not local- a prospect not balanced by
any promise of greater general prosperity. Also,
Azerbaijan argues that it can, if left alone, very
well provide its own prosperity. The north feels
that the south has been carried away by meretricous
doctrines, and that it will drag the north with it to
disaster. The Shah, of course, is responsible for
linking the north to the south and he is hated
accordingly; even more perhaps, since he is detested
because in all the upsets he has created, he has
contrived to acquire a very large fortune for
himself. 39
The decline in the prosperity of Azarbaijan, also,
created a push migration into Tehran where economic
opportunities were available and such social services as
health and education were concentrated.40 In the
meantime, the official recognition of Persian as the
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language of instruction in schools all over the country
increased Azari discontent.
The ban on Azari literary works and publications and
compulsory use of Persian language in schools and
bureaucratic institutions, however, were welcomed by some
Azaris such as Ahmad Kasravi, the renowned historian of
Iran. As was mentioned before, Kasravi as an Iranian
nationalist considered Turkish a foreign language imposed
on the people of Azarbaijan.41 He believed the division
of Iranian society into ethnic, communal and sectarian
segments were harmful and dangerous and attributed Iran's
backwardness to disunity and cultural fragmentation.4 2
Also Taqizadeh, the famous Iranian politician from
Azarbaijan, advocated adoption and strengthening of
Persian as a means to revitalize Iran.43
It is not known, however, to what extent these views
were popular among the Azari rank and file. Azari
children, upon entering elementary school, had to learn to
read and write in Persian while the overwhelming majority
of them could hardly speak the language. The language
issue, thus, became a matter of vital significance.
All this reinforced the feelings of betrayal and
abandonment that the Azaris had begun to feel in the years
following the Constitutional Revolution. The Azari break
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with the Iranian state seemed very real to the Azari
intellectual elite and the members of the modern middle
classes. The usage of the phrase "Turk-e khar" that
equates Azari Turks with a jackass and is meant to signify
stupidity began after Reza Shah's Persianization of Iran,
according to many of my Azari interviewees. The Persians,
for the first time, were considered to be better than
Azaris; and this "holier than thou" attitude, although
greatly mitigated in relation to the Azaris, still
continues to persist today.
One impact of Reza Shah's cultural policies in
Azarbaijan was the regression of Azari poetry and other
literary works. The progressive Azari literature became
more conservative in both form and content.44 Berengian
writes:
The suppression of Turkic for literary use resulted
in a staggering amount of religious poetry produced
in this language since, except for ordinary
conversation at home, the only function left for
Turkic was for various religious purposes....These
religious poems helped the Azeri idiom survive the
Pahlavi period.45
It should be pointed out that some Azari poets and
writers recognized advantages in Persian as a highly
developed literary language. Such poets as Parvin
E'tesami [1906-1941] and Mohammad Hoseyn Shahriar who were
born in Azarbaijan, wrote only in Persian. Shahriar,
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however, began to write poetry in Turkish after Reza
Shah's abdication46 and again after the success of the
Islamic Revolution.4 7
The Democratic Republic of Azarbaijan:
The abdication of Reza Shah created a new political
environment in which the Azaris of Iran could further
their collective interests. These demands were not
restricted to cultural freedom and more equitable
distribution of resources. Many Azari intellectuals and
political leaders who were influenced by Marxist-Leninist
ideology imported from Russian Azarbaijan were expressing
separatist tendencies. These individuals succeeded to
temporarily separate Azarbaijan from Iran at the end of
the World War II.
The possibilities for the emergence of a separatist
movement were created by the War and abdication of Reza
Shah and the Soviet occupation of Azarbaijan. As we
noted, Azarbaijan had lost its prosperity during Reza
Shah's years. However, the province still boasted a much
higher level of industrialization compared to some Kurdish
inhabited areas and, of course, Baluchistan. The
conditions of the peasantry had not improved while the War
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years had widened the gap between the rich and the lower
classe.
This situation stirred many Tudeh members into
agitation activities in Azarbaijan particularly among the
Azari peasants who had been oppressed by the rich Azari
landlords.48 The Tudeh Party, founded in 1941, was made
up of the survivors of the 53 men whose organized leftist
activities was ended in the 1930s. After Reza Shah's
abdication other progressive elements joined these men and
founded the Tudeh. The party had a very interesting
ethnic make up. Abrahamian writes:
..Of the 2,213 former members..1,713 (78%) lived in
the more modernized provinces of Tehran, Gilan,
Mazandaran and Azarbaijan. Only 441 (19%) lived in
the moderately modernized provinces of Isfahan,
Khuzistan and Kermanshahan. And a mere 77 (3%) lived
in the backward provinces of Kurdistan, Fars, Kerman,
Sistan and Baluchistan.....
....The Azeri and other Turkic groups, which totaled
less than 27% of the population, formed between 32
and 43% of the party leadership.
...The Azeris....were also well represented in the
party's middle and lower ranks. Of the 168 delegates
of the First Congress, 44 (26%) represented party
branches in Azerbaijan. Among others, there were at
least 18 (10%) Azeris from outside of Azerbaijan....
Of 218 party activists arrested in the main cities in
1951, 28 (13%) resided in Tabriz. Of 24 civilian
members of the party who were executed or died in
prison between 1953 and 1960, 9 (37%) were
Azeris ....49
It should be noted that the party's leadership was
made up of mostly Persian or Persianized intellectuals.50
241
The disproportionate number of Azaris in the Tudeh
membership, however, was an indication of a higher rate of
urbanization and industrialization in Azarbaijan.
Azarbaijan not only boasted large urban centers and a
greater number of factories [Table IV], as we noted it had
a long history of communications and interaction with
Russian Azarbaijan. After the October Revolution, the
Iranian Azaris, instead of Baku, chose to migrate to
industrial centers within Iran.51
Azaris' interest in the Tudeh, however, does not mean
that the party advocated Azari cmmunal aspirations. On
the contrary, the Tudeh basically appealed to the
peasants, workers, members of the intelligentsia and lower
middle classes5 2 and not a particular ethnic community.
Indeed, the most important issues in the Tudeh agenda
were:
Progressive labor legislation; improved standards of
living for the peasantry; strict price controls to
curb inflation; free education and general health
services; elimination of reactionary elements from
public life and the restitution of democratic
practices; equality for minorities; reform of the
judicial system; disarming of the nomad tribes;
national industrialization; friendly relations with
all of Iran's neighbors; and the elimination of
foreign interference.5 3
The above passage which was a declaration of the
party's platform in 1943 demonstrates the party's
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proclivities and its favorable views towards
centralization and modernization. The party was not
interested in communal and ethnic aspirations of various
ethnic groups but more concerned with the idea of class
struggle which signified its Marxist orientation.54
During the War years when adverse economic conditions
had created more inter-ethnic tensions, many Azari members
of the Tudeh had begun to address the party's position
regarding communal issues. Indeed, the issue of Azari
ethnic identity was left unresolved between the Tudeh
leaders in Tehran and those in Azarbaijan. While the
Azari members considered themselves as a separate
"nation," the Tehrani members considered Azaris as
Iranians and their language as a local dialect. Indeed,
although the Tehrani members tried placate the Azaris, the
party's response to the grievances of the Azari members
was ambiguous.5 5 As a result the party's branch in
Azarbaijan began sponsoring demonstrations, demanding the
freedom to have Azari as the language of instruction in
schools and establishment of a provincial council (early
1945).56 Before the Tudeh's Central Committee could react
to these developments, the establishment of the Feraeh-e
demokrat-e Azarbaijan [the Democratic Party of Azarbaijan]
was announced by Pishevari and his friends.
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Pishevari, a veteran Communist, had emigrated to the
Russian Azarbaijan at the age 12 and helped establish the
first Iranian Communist organization in Baku, Adalat
[Justice}. The leaders of Adalat party mobilized a large
number of workers to help the Bolsheviks after the October
Revolution57 and later they became involved in the Jangali
Movement in the Gilan Province in northern Iran and
establishment of the Gilan Soviet Republic in the early
1920s.
After Reza Shah's suppression of Iranian Communists,
Pishevari was imprisoned. In prison he came to know the
"Fifty-Three." The Fifty-Three were composed of Dr. Taqi
Arani and his compatriots. Dr. Arani who was born in
Tabriz (1902) but raised mostly in Tehran, like Kasravi,
was an Iranian nationalist. He believed in the ersian
heritage of Iran and considered Azarbaijan as an integral
part of Iran. He also believed that Persian should be
reformed and used as a unifying language throughout Iran.
Arani, a "well-read Marxist and a convinced Socialist"5 8
became the founder and introducer of Marxist ideology in
Iran. Arani and fifty-two of his friends and disciples
were arrested and jailed by Reza Shah's regime. He was
murdered in prison (1940).59
It was in prison that Pishevari met the Fifty-Three
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and different accounts contend that both personal and
ideological reasons prevented a friendship to develop.60
Pishevari, after the formation of the Tudeh joined
the party. However, he soon withdrew and began publishing
his own newspaper Azhir alarm]; writing diatribes against
the Tudeh and its leaders.61 Soon after this Pishevari's
attempts at participating in the mainstream political
process was defeated. As an Azarbaijan deputy in the 14th
Majles, his credentials were rejected. It is at this
juncture that Pishevari left for Azarbaijan and thus the
establishment of the Democratic Party of Azarbaijan.
One can only speculate whether this episode was one
of the factors that contributed to the emergence of the
secessionist movement in Azarbaijan. Indeed one may argue
that had not the Majles rejected Pishevari's credentials,
his recruitment into the political process could have
prevented his bid for power in Azarbaijan.
Pishevari himself, regarding the formation of the
Democratic Party of Azarbaijan, writes:
At that time, there was no political organization but
the Tudeh party in Azarbaijan. This organization as
a result of years of struggle had become weak and
discredited.62
Pishevari continues that after a series of
discussions between him and two Azari friends they decided
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to form their own party. Abrahamian attributes this
"defection of the Tudeh branch in Azarbaijan" to the
insensitivities of the Tudeh Central Committee and
predicaments of the local branches of the party.6 3
Abrahamian, contrary to a few other scholars64 argues that
the Tudeh and Fergeh-e demokrat were two separate
organizations with different objectives and aspirations.
While Tudeh basically adhered to a Marxist ideology with
class struggle as the important factor in its agenda,
Fergeh-e demokrat, although Marxist, considered communal
aspirations as vital as class struggle, if not more
important.65
This is indeed an intriguing point in the evolution
and development of Azari ethnic identity. Many factors
had helped sever Azari ties to the Iranian state, among
which should be mentioned the Russian occupation of 1909,
the economic decline of Azarbaijan, the hardship of War
years, the neglect of the government, the Persianization
of Iran and the humiliating attitudes of the Persians
towards the non-Persians and more important of all the
inability or unwillingness of the center to incorporate
and co-opt different forces that demanded political
participation. Other important forces, however, began to
interfere as well. As we know Azaris like the majority of
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the Persians are Shii Muslims. Islam is a religion that
does not recognize ethnic or communal identities. The
believer is a member of te community of faithful. The
modernization of Iran temporarily helped weaken realigion
and religious institutions and consequently generated more
fragmentation. The weakening of religion made the group
boundaries between the Azaris and the Persians grow wider
and thus created more awareness of a distinct Azari
identity. The differentiating element of this identity
was, of course, the Azari language that helped distinguish
Azaris from the Persians and the rest of the population.
Reza Shah's Promotion of the Persian language thus
immensely threatened the newly-emerging Azari identity.
That is why it was the language that became a vital issue
for the preservation of this identity.
The dilemma of the Azaris was thus a problem of
identity. Now that the cohesive force of religion was
weakened and other factors also prevented their complete
identification with the ruling group, the question of
identity had become a vital one. At this juncture the
Azari intellectuals and the intelligentsia, educated and
communally conscious, appeared on the Azari political
scene and began searching for a meaningful way to define
themselves. In their efforts to find such definition
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these individuals emphasized language. In the meantime,
to articulate and express this identity, they tried to
find an ideological framework. Whatever this ideological
framework, it had to have the capability of helping these
community leaders to express a communal desire for self-
assertion and articulate the socio-economic and cultural
grievances of the community.
It was mentioned that as a result of Azarbaijan's
proximity to the Soviet Union, the Azari intellignetsia
were mainly influenced by social democratic and Marxist-
Leninist ideas. Thus, the redefinition of ethnic identity
and articulation of socio-economic and cultural demands
were expressed in the Leninist terminology, particularly
during the period of the emergence of the Fergeh-e
demokrat-e Azarbaijan. It should be pointed out that it
is not known how pervasive these ideological proclivities
were or whether they went much beyond the "progressive"
and "politicized" intelligentsia. Some Azari workers
might have been interested in "progressive labor
legislation." However as the leaders of the party later
admitted, Azari workers and peasants had neither the
"organizational cohesion nor the political and ideological
strength" to enable them to unite and fulfill their
"vanguard position in the revolutionary movement."66 In
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other words, the movement was probably not very popular
among both groups.
This fusion of Marxism with nationalism, however, is
a very interesting phenomenon that has not been confined
to Iran and its heterogeneous population. In many
different countries, this synthesis has produced powerful
and emotionally charged movements even though the two
ideologies are at times mutually exclusive.
As is well known, both Marx and Engels were weary of
nationalism. For them nationalism presented a difficulty
in the development of a worker's party. However, 19th
century Marxists tried to accomodate nationalism in the
struggle against autocracy. With the emergence of the
20th century, the Marxits and the nationalists drifted
apart. The Marxists viewed nationalism as a tool used by
the bourgeois class to perpetuate their rule. It was
believed that nationalism blurs class differences and
creates the feeling of common interest between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, it
separates the working classes of different nations who
should be united as one force; as working classes of the
world. Thus, nationalism does not serve the interests of
the proletariat6 7 and nationalism and Marxism become
"philosophically incompatible."68
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Lenin, however, had to deal with this structural
feature of the Tsarist Empire, i.e., the existence of
various ethnic groups or "nationalities." This, however,
presented a paradoxical problem that was again dealt with
in the most expedient way. When dealing with the
mainstream nationalism of such dominant ethnic communities
as those of Germany, Poland, Austria and Russia,
nationalism was considered a popular movement against
"imperial autocrats" and thus "functional." But when
nationalism "took the form of ethnic communalism resisting
central Communist Party control," 69 it was considered as
undesirable. Hence, the Bolsheviks did not hesitate to
crush and suppress ethnic communalism within Russia
itself.70
The Iranian Marxists were also familiar with this
"dual" treatment of the question of nationalities by the
Bolsheviks. It was Mohammad Amin Rasulzadeh, a Marxist
Azari, who for the first time wrote about the
disappointments of some Azari Marxists with Leninism and
its approach to the question of "nationalities." 7 1
Undoubtedly, the leaders of the Democratic Republic of
Azarbaijan were aware of the Soviet approach. However,
since the very survival of their movement depended on the
support and assistance of the Russians they chose to
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overlook this fact.
Indeed, the emergence of the republic owed much to
the Soviet presence in Iran. World War II provided
opportunities for the Azari Marxists and the Soviet
leaders to realize their dreams. While Azari Marxists
aspired an independent homeland, the Soviets were
contemplating ways to reach the warm waters of the Persian
Gulf as this was the legacy of their predecessors, the
Russian Tsars. Even before the War, there is reason to
believe that, the Soviets were planning for such
expansion.72 When the War began the Soviet desires in
incorporation of Iran was expressed in the Four Power Act
of 1940 between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union.
Although the Act did not materialize, it sought to asign
zones of influence to the contracting parties. The Soviet
"center of aspiration" was proclaimed "as the area south
of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian
Gulf."73 At the same time, Leninist ideology provided the
Soviets with ideological justifications for such an
expansion.
It is true that the vital interests of other powers
in Iran, particularly Great Britain, had prevented the
Russians from openly resorting to force. However, there
were other indirect and covert means to accomplish this
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objective. Assisting Iranian "nationalities" to express
their "national aspirations" was one of the ways the
Soviets could bring Iran into the Soviet sphere of
influence. Indeed, the least they could accomplish was to
secure the oil deposits of the northern Iran which they
badly wanted.7 4 WWII provided the long-awaited
opportunity. Not only Azarbaijan could be secured but
Iran could be brought under Soviet domination. Soviet
troops were in occupation of northern Iran since 1941 to
protect the supply route to the Soviet Union. It was,
thus, with great ease that the Soviets assisted Azari
Marxists to declare the establishment of the Democratic
Republic of Azarbaijan.
In the meantime, the occupation and Soviet
machinations in Azarbaijan were coupled with pressure
tactics to secure an oil concession to exploit the
northern parts of Iran. Indeed, "an oil concession,
especially one comparable to that of the British-Iranian
Oil Company in the south, would simply consolidate the
region as a security perimeter." 75 It is said that the
Soviet forces made many Azaris demand -by sending
telegrams and signing pettitions- the concession be
granted.76 The refusal of the Iranian government to give
in to the Soviet demands may explain why the Soviets
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sponsored the establishment of the renegade republic.77
Soon after declaring its formation, Feraeh-e demokrat
began publicizing its program and extending its branches
in Azarbaijan. At the same time, the Tudeh provincial
organizations in Azarbaijan dissolved the Tudeh party
branch and joined the Democratic party. The Tudeh, caught
by surprise, eventually was "persuaded" by the Soviet
authorities to accept the Democratic Party.78
In October 1945 the Party's first Congress met and
voted to form a militia. In this Congress representatives
of different social strata, including the members of the
clergy, merchants, tribal leaders, local dignitaries and
Communist and modernized intellectuals, participated.79
It is said that many people were motivated to align with a
Soviet-supported party at a time when such alignment could
safeguard one's property or enhance one's future
opportunities.80
The Congress issued a declaration according to which
such demands were made as: democracy for Iran, autonomy
for Azarbaijan according to the Atlantic Charter,
administration of Azarbaijan's internal affairs by Azaris,
creation of an Azari national congress that would elect
the ministers of the autonomous regime, the usage of Azari
Turkish in schools and government offices, etc... The
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declaration also added that Azarbaijan has no desire to
separate from the rest of Iran.8 1 However, despite this
reassurance the central government immediately declared
the movement illegal, Soviet-inspired and non-indigenous.
The Democratic Party, in response, resorted to force
to assert its authority. The Red Army overtly assisted
the party's militia and in the process the central
government's military posts were disarmed and encircled
while ultimatums were issued to the local commander to
either surrender or leave the region. Assistance and
troop reinforcement by the central government were made
impossible when the Red Army prevented any movement of
troops from Tehran to Azarbaijan.8 2 Thus all military
posts of the central government in the region were taken
over, sometimes with excessive use of violence.8 3
To implement the resolutions adopted in the
aforementioned Congress, the party held general elections
for an "Azarbaijan National Assembly."84 All strata of
the population including women -who were given the right
to vote- participated in this election. At the same time
the Party succeeded to negotiate the evacuation of the
last contingent of Iranian troops through a preliminary
agreement signed between the central government of Iran
and the Azarbaijani regime which recognized the
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sovereignty of the democratic regime over the province and
called for further negotiations to settle the ultimate
relationship between the two. Nevertheless, the regime
retained its army and maintained full and independent de
facto control over the province. The Party also assembled
a National Assembly in Tabriz. The deputies elected
Pishevari as the Prime Minister of the autonomous
government. Immediately after this, Pishevari's regime
launched a series of socio-economic and political reforms.
A "people's army" was established; a university was
created that was the first university ever founded outside
the area of the central province; a land distribution
program was promised and partly implemented; freedom of
religion was granted to all, including the minorities.8 5
Also Azari became the official language of the Republic.
The Democratic regime stressed the purification of Azari
from "foreign" [basically meant Persian] words. It is,
however, ironic that in the process the "speech of Tabriz"
was beginning to be replaced by that of "Baku." Indeed,
the gradual encroachment of Russian into the language made
literary communication more difficult.86 Language,
however, was an issue of utmost significance for the
leaders of the Republic. Pishevari in the first issue of
the daily paper Azarbaijan wrote:
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We have absorbed our mother tongue with our mother's
milk and have taken it with the exhilarating air of
our land. Those who are insulting it and endeavor to
show it as an imposed and artificial language are our
true enemies. Many perfidious foreign elements have
tried for centuries to prevent the flourishing of
this beautiful language. In spite of this, our
language has survived in a strong and persistent
manner ..... 87
The regime, indeed, encouraged literary endeavors in
Turkish and this period is one of the most prolific in the
history of the Azari literary activity in Iran
particularly in relation to patriotic or nationalistic
poetry that mushroomed and filled the pages of various
journals, periodicals and books. Berengian writes that
although most of these works were mediocre, there were
some very powerful and beautiful works particularly those
written by three Azari poets: Biriya [the Education
Minister of the Republic who was killed by a lynch mob
after the collapse of the regime], Ali Tudeh and Balash
Azaroghli who both fled to the Soviet Azarbaijan and enjoy
immense respect and prestige there today88 and have joined
those intellectuals who discuss the "southern question" in
the northern Azarbaijan.8 9 Indeed, the continuation of
this literary outpour was carried out in the Soviet
Azarbaijan in the form of what is called "the literature
of longing."90
Regarding the impacts of the policies undertaken by
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the Regime, it is been said that "even strongly anti-
Pishevari residents of Tabriz admitted that more
improvements were made in the city of Tabriz in one year
of Democratic rule than in the twenty years under Reza
Shah."9 1 Many peasants and workers who found employment
in the Party's army were treated well with promise of high
pay and promotion. These men were provided with Russian
uniform and equipment and, according to Pesyan, they were
never told that the ultimate objective is the separation
of Azarbaijan but only the replacement of the corrupt
government in Tehran.92
The reaction of the elite in Tehran towards these
events was mixed. The deputies of the 14th Majles were
mostly bewildered. The central government was too weak to
prevent such activities. Abrahamian states that the
reaction of the ruling elite, the Tudeh and non-Tudeh
intelligentsia had one element in common; their opposition
to the linguistic demands.9 3 The Tudeh, apparently was
forced by the Soviet Union to support the movement but
could not be forced to support its nationalistic
predispositions. Thus, the Tudeh emphasized the
movement's reformist aspects and played down the
nationalistic ones.9 4 The support and protection of the
Soviet Union extended to the regime was justified as the
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fact that "all social mass movements utilize historical
opportunities"95 and that if the Soviets regarded the
Azarbaijan movement favorably that was because the
movement was a genuine attempt at social reform. Thus,
the central government should put aside its pro-British
policy and recognize that the Soviet Union has no
territorial ambitions in Iran.96 Yet, the Tudeh ignored
the language issue.9 7 The Democratic Party, however,
insisted on the language issue and in its organ Azarbaijan
declared that "it was high time Persian intellectuals
realized that there was such a language as Azari."98
The Tabriz delegates, however, later agreed to work
with the Tudeh. The Fergeh-e demokrat, the Tudeh and the
Iran Party, together with two regional organizations -the
Kurdish Democratic Party and the revived Jangali Movement
of Gilan- formed a coalition for the forthcoming
parliamentary elections.
However, before these elections could happen, the
democratic regime collapsed. The collapse of the republic
was mainly a consequence of the withdrawal of the Soviet
army. The Russians who had refused to leave Iran after
the War had ended, were under pressure from various
fronts. The Iranians, initially discouraged by the cool
reactions of the British and the Americans to their cries
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of help, appealed to the United Nations to no avail.9 9
However, before long both Americans and the British
realized the gravity of the situation when in 1946 their
troops had evacuated Iran and the Russians had steadfastly
remained. This prompted the Americans to resort to some
pressures while the newly -appointed Iranian Prime
Minister, Qavam, an astute and experienced politician,
began direct negotiations with the Russians. In the
meantime, Iran's appeal to the United Nations, as the
first appeal ever brought before this organization,
particularly made the Americans more alert to the
ramifications of the Soviet presence in Iran. Eventually
as a result of international pressures and Qavam's
negotiations the Soviets withdrew their troops from Iran.
Many reasons have been put forward to explain the
failure of the Democratic Republic of Azarbaijan. Some
writers attribute the fall of the Republic to the
withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the Russian reluctance
to extend additional support. Robert Rossow, for
instance, contends that the Soviet support for the
Democratic Regime was only a means towards the larger
goal, i.e., the reduction of Turkey.1 00 Abrahamian,
although not overlooking the Soviet factor, elaborates on
the domestic reasons particularly economic failures of the
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regime.101 Apparently these failures managed to alienate
a great many of the Azari rank and file who were mostly
motivated by socio-economic considerations. Katouzian
also contends that the Regime's land reform policy was too
disorganized and hastily implemented. On the one hand
many peasants did not benefit and on the other the
"radical manner" in which the land reform was implemented
frightened many merchants and others who thought their
properties would be confiscated. 1 0 2 One of the most
important factors was the Regime's identification with the
Soviet Union. As we have mentioned before, the Azaris of
Iran had born the brunt of Russian occupations and
atrocities at different junctures in history and these
memories were all too fresh. The ideological nature of
the movement also did not sit very well with the Azari
rank and file.
Russians ....were Communists and Communism for the
majority of both urban and rural Iranians meant
little more than official atheism, forced labour
camps, hunger and famine, sexual promiscuity and the
collective ownership and use of everything, including
one's wife.' . ...many .... including Azarbaijanis
[were frightened] into the belief that 'wife-sharing'
was around the corner.103
Yet, instead of distancing themselves from the
Russians the leaders of the Regime used "jargons, slogans
and tactics"1 0 4 that identified them more with that power.
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The significance of the Soviet support can only be
demonstrated by the fact that as soon as the Soviet troops
withdrew and the Iranian government dispatched the army,
the Democratic Regime fell. Pishevari and several other
leaders of the Regime escaped to the Soviet Union where
they were taken to work camps in Siberia. Undoubtedly,
the Soviets did not want the nationalist orientation of
these people to affect the Russian Azaris.105
Although the Soviet Union of Stalin period did not
give a welcoming reception to the leaders of the
Democratic Regime, one of the results of this episode was
that the question of the "southern Azarbaijan" was kept
alive and well in the Soviet Azarbaijan. A "national
liberation" literature was developed in the Soviet
Azarbaijan in which national symbols important to both
Azarbaijans were created. Among these symbols the "Aras
River" that divides the two Azarbaijans is the most widely
used.1 06 Of course, until the Islamic Revolution and the
subsequent weakening of the central authority the Iranian
Azaris were not able or cared to reciprocate this
'longing' through literary discourse.
The "southern question" in the Soviet Azarbaijan was
institutionalized through the efforts of the Russian Azari
intellectuals and the emergence of scientific and cutlural
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institutions whose sole function was to study Iran and the
southern question.1 0 7 The policiy makers of the Soviet
Union, however, refrained from direct interference in
Iran's affairs after this episode. But the Communist
party of Azarbaijan kept the "southern question" alive in
a subtle but systematic way. It was only after the
Islamic Revolution that a more "aggressive" approach to
the "southern question" was adopted in Soviet Azarbaijan.
The Democratic Republic of Azarbaijan was an attempt
by the Azari intellectual elite to define their community.
As was mentioned before, the modernization of Iran and
subsequent weakening of religious institutions weakened
the Shii identity of the Azaris which they shared with the
Persian population of Iran. The subsequent monopoly of
power by the Persians and the stress of the ruling elite
on Persian symbols helped distinguish Persians from the
rest of the population including the Azaris who felt
excluded and humiliated. The Azaris like other ethnic
communities had two choices: either to assimilate or to
resist incorporation. Many did choose to resist and this
resistance was not only due to a well-developed culture
and language but to the existence of an Azari national
entity on the other side of the border. Indeed, the
exsitence of Russian Azarbaijan and the strengthening of
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Azari national identity by Soviet policies was a constant
reminder to the Iranian Azaris that they are a distinct
and separate entity. Most of the nationalist movements in
Iranian Azarbaijan were supported and assisted by the
Azaris of the Soviet Union and their impact and influence
should not be underestimated. In point of fact, Russian
Azarbaijan served as a channel through which Soviet
ambitions regarding Iran were to be materialized.
The Democratic Republic was the result of such
assistance and influence and without it the movement
probably would not have amounted to anything significant.
There are, however, reasons to believe that had the
Democratic Republic of Azarbaijan succeeded, it would not
have remained within an undivided state of Iran despite
the claims of its leaders to the contrary. There is no
doubt that for the leaders of the movement prudence
dictated the temporary playing down of their real
political objectives. Thus they demanded "autonomy" while
many features of their movement signified a "separatist"
attempt. Among these features the most obvious is, for
example, the Republic's own police force and its militia -
later transformed into an army- that was considered as the
"backbone" of the Republic. 10 8 Also the Democratic
Republic had an ideologically leftist political
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orientation which was inherently at odds with the
monarchical and patrimonial political structure of the
Iranian state.
The Democratic Republic of Azarbaijan was the loudest
expression of Azari national consciousness throughout
modern history of Iran. Later events, however,
demonstrated that Iranian Azarbaijanis share a great deal
with Iran as a political and territorial entity and if the
state adopts the "correct" approach towards them, they
will feel quit comfortable with their identity as
"Iranians."
THE KURDS:
Reza Shah's tribal policies have already been
discussed. These policies, of course, included the Kurds
who were mostly disarmed with some tribal chiefs kept as
hostages in Tehran. The main objective of these policies
was to prevent the Kurds from getting involved in armed
insurrection and tribal unruliness. Hassan Arfa who
himself directed some of the government's expeditions
writes:
.... The Shah decided that the time had come to bring
the unruly Kurdish frontier tribes definitely under
control...The Kurds did not fight for independence or
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autonomy, and at the end of the campaign the rebel
tribes were disarmed. Those who had helped us,
however, were allowed to keep their arms for the time
being. ..109
In the meantime, according to the new administrative
arrangements, the Kurdish inhabited areas of Iran were
divided between the Fourth and the Fifth Provinces, i.e.,
the Province of Western Azarbaijan and the Province of
Kermanshahan respectively. None of these provinces
contained a homogeneous Kurdish population. The Kurds
shared the province of Western Azarbaijan with a large
Azari population while in the province of Kermanshahan
there existed a sizable Shii Kurdish community as well as
other groups. The administration of these areas, as
elsewhere in Iran, was directed and controlled by the
central government. This direct and strong central
control meant that most tribal chiefs lost their political
power and status.
As we noted, Kurdish inhabited areas in Iran are
mostly suited for grazing animals and agricultural
activity. In these areas the land and particularly
pastures were tranditionally owned by the tribe, i.e.,
assigned to the tribe by the sovereign which actually
meant a de facto control of the land by the tribe
itself.1 1 0 Reza Shah's rule, however, changed these
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arrangements. Firstly, during early years of Reza Shah's
period, considerable areas of land in Kurdistan were
confiscated by the state.lll Secondly, the forced
deportation of some tribes11 2 made their lands available
to other groups. Thirdly, the Land Registration Laws of
1928-1929 made rich landlords out of many tribal Khans who
seized both the agricultural and pasture lands 11 3. Before
the land reform program of the second Pahlavi Shah, the
lands in Kurdish inhabited areas were entirely in the
hands of either large landed proprietors or tribal Khans
with very little peasant ownership.11 4
It was also during Reza Shah's period that capitalist
relations and market economy were introduced to Kurdish
areas. These areas, however, were unevenly integrated
into the national economy and a full integration only
happened during the reign of Reza Shah's son. Reza Shah's
neglect of agriculture, however, did not mean the growth
of industry in the Kurdish inhabited areas. Tehran,
northern provinces and Eastern Azarbaijan served as
favorite sites for factories and plants.1 15 [Table IV]
However, the Kurdish inhabited areas of Iran were not
devoid of urban centers. Such cities and towns as
Urumiyah and Mahabad in Western Azarbaijan and Sanandaj
and Kermanshah in the province of Kermanshahan should be
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mentioned. Indeed Iranian Kurdish areas, despite their
rural and tribal nature, did contain a modest urban
population and it was among this population that the
leaders of the first Kurdish nationalist uprising in Iran
emerged.
During Reza Shah period, like Azaris, the Kurds had
grievances about their cultural freedom and objected to
the compulsory use of Persian as the language of school
instruction and administration. The regime, particularly,
considered its repression of Kurdish cultural expression
legitimate since it could be justified by ethnic and
cultural affinity of the Kurds and the Persians. This
affinity, indeed, has helped obscure an important fact for
some writers and also many Iranians; that the Kurds
possess a distinct identity and they do not wish to be
incorporated into any other group. When the revival of
the Iranian pre-Islamic past -that the Kurds and the
Persians apparently shared in peaceful coexistence- did
not induce the Kurdish population of Iran to identify with
the state, one writer wrote:
That the Kurds should rise up against Turkey is quite
understandable; that they should kick against the
Arabs of Irak...to whom they consider themselves
superior, is even more explicable; but one is
astonished that good relations should be disturbed
between the Kurds and the government of Tehran. Are
they not both Iranian? Are their languages not close
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to each other? Are they not nourished on the same
ancestral legends? Everything then ought to bring
the two peoples together and undoubtedly the
situation of the Kurds in Iran is, on on the whole
better than that of their neighbours ...11 6
The above passage and other observations such as that
of Eden Naby's who contends "the Kurds hold a special
fascination for Iranian intellectuals,"117 tend to confuse
ethnic or linguistic affinity with the issue of identity.
Ethnic and linguistic similarities notwithstanding, the
Kurds from time immemorial held a distinct identiy
separate from that of the Persians. One important reason
for such distinction was that the Kurds, most of the time,
were ruled by the Persians and never shared power with
them. The body politic is an extremely important
determinant of group identification. A group that is
subjugated and ruled will hardly identify with the rulers
regardless of the ethnic or cultural similarities. This
is not, of course, a one-sided phenomenon since the ruling
group will also consider itself as distinct and separate.
In the case of the Kurds the differences were accentuated
after the Safavids made Shiism the official religion of
Iran. Indeed there was/is not an intrinsic significance
in the Shii-Sunni split that keeps the Kurdish and Persian
identities apart. As Donald Horowitz so aptly writes:
...It is not the particular differentiating
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characteristic that matters...That is largely an
accident of context and contact. The differentiating
characteristics that become prominent will be defined
in terms of what traits an emerging group has in
common as against other groups with whom it finds
itself in a single environment.118
The significant issue is thus juxtaposition of two
groups with different identities in a common environment.
The Sunni-Shii split becomes important because it is the
most visible differentiating factor. Language, in this
case, also becomes important because Persian and Kurdish,
although having the same origins, are two distinct
languages.
Reza Shah's policies such as his onslaught on the
socio-political structure of the tribal society, the
depoliticization of the tribal chiefs, the privatization
of tribal lands and coercive acculturation as well as
forced sedentarization all immensely affected Kurdish
society.
The depoliticization of tribal structure and
transformation of tribal chiefs to "landed aristocracy"
had both economic and psycho-political impacts on the
average Kurd. Economically the privatization of property
made landless agricultural laborers out of Kurdish
peasants or nomads. The tribal aristocracy, as long as it
cooperated with the regime, could use this labor any way
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they saw fit. Thus, the relatively egalitarian tribal
society was transformed into one of oppression and
exploitation.11 9 The transformation in the role of the
tribal chiefs as well as the onslaught of new political
and administrative structures and pacification and
forceful sedentarization challenged the familiar socio-
political structures.12 0 At the same time the average
tribal warrior who bore arms and was proud of his
predatory activities, was now reduced to a mere settled
peasant at the mercy of the landlords and the government
gendarmes who would help the landlords collect their dues.
As privatization of land proceeded and the landlords
became more wealthy, the phenomenon of he "absentee
landlord" emerged which meant the ties between the Kurdish
elite and the rank and file were futher severed. The
result was, of course, a marginalized Kurdish peasantry
who were exloited by their own elite as well as the
government officials. One important consequence was
emergence of a form of social stratification that did not
exist before and had important socio-political
ramifications for future Kurdish society.
The weakening of the tribal structure, however, meant
that many politicized Kurds had to begin to search for new
forms of identity. In a tribal society, an individual's
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identity is tied to the tribal structure without which
this identity has little meaning. Membership in a small
group such as "family" makes membership of the larger
group such as "clan" or "lineage" or "tribe" meaningful.
If this structure is weakened the automatic mechanisms
that determine role-relationships or one's social niche in
a particular society will no longer operate effectively.
Thus one notes that the kinds of discontent expressed have
not always been grievances about economic deprivation.
Although economic grievances have been real and pervasive,
they have been usually additional to factors which in one
way or the other have tended to threaten a group's
identity. This is true of the Kurds of Iran who
immediately after Reza Shah's abdication found an outlet
to express their grievances.
The Democratic Republic Of Kurdistan:
Reza Shah abdicated upon the occupation of Iranian
territory by the British and Russian forces. The northern
part of Iran was under the occupation of the Russians
while the British occupied the southern part.
The Soviet forces in Azarbaijan dealth directly with
the Kurdish tribes in the mountains west of Lake Urumiyah.
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These tribes were allowed to keep their autonomy in
exchange for certain favors such as providing grain for
the Red Army. The southernmost areas of Kurdish tribes
were, of course, contained by the British forces.1 2 1
There was a vacuum area situated between the two
zones controlled by the British and the Russians where two
tribal chiefs, Mahmud Khan of Kani-Senan and Hama Rashid
claimed autonomy. These two tribal chiefs were recognized
by the Iranian government as semi-official governors of
their areas; but later were defeated by the Iranian
army. 122
Archie Roosevelt who was in the area at the time
writes:
By the fall of 1945, all of Kurdistan south of the
Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht line was again firmly in
government hands. The vacuum was thus reduced to the
small area between this line and the Soviet forces
based on Rezaiyah, in which there was only one town
of any size -Mahabad....1 23
Mahabad was the town where the nascent Kurdish
intelligentsia of Iran, for the first time, found an
outlet to express their national aspirations through an
organizational framework and later a leader. Eagleton who
has devoted a book-length study to the Mahabad Republic
writes that in the chaotic conditions of those years,
Mahabad was relatively secure as a result of the presence
272
of a number of respected religious and civil leaders among
whom Qazi Muhammad ranked high.124 In the meantime, the
Russians whose aspirations and plans regarding Iran had
never been a secret watched Kurdish areas with interest
and throughout their occupation not only endeavored to
influence the Kurds but tried to win their trust.1 25
Firuz Kazemzadeh writes:
In Kurdistan...Moscow was able to exploit not so much
anti-Iranian as anti-government sentiments of the
tribal aristocracy. After years of oppressive peace
imposed by Teheran, the Kurds had had enough of
corrupt representatives of a distant authority,
enough gendarmes patrolling their roads, and enough
tax collectors, army recruiters, and other such
"trespassers." They were ready to revert to their
more traditional and happier way of life, to raids,
vendettas, and brigandage.12 6
Indeed, the dissatisfaction of the tribal leaders and
the aspirations of the nascent Kurdish intelligentsia
provided the Soviets wtih an opportune moment to chip away
the authority of the central government. In 1941 a number
of prominent members of Kurdish tribes, including Qazi
Muhammad, were invited to visit the Soviet Union. The
make-up of this group was mostly feudal and conservative.
However, the group returned to Kurdistan from the Soviet
Azarbaijan with the impression that the Soviet authorities
were "with them."12 7
In May 1942, when Russian Consul-General of Tabriz
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and a number of other Soviet officials met with several
Kurdish chiefs regarding the security of the Russian
occupied areas, the Kurds responded by stating that they
would not return the rifles seized from the Iranian army
and more importantly requested that Kurdish language
should be the language of instruction in schools and that
they should have freedom in their national affairs.1 28
This episode made the Russians realize that the Kurds can
be used to further Soviet plans in Iran.
In the fall of 1942 a group of young Kurds of Mahabad
mostly of middle class background established a party
called Khomola-i zhian-e Kurdestan [Committee for the
resurrection of Kurdistan]. The party which was composed
of the secret cells extended its membership from the
initial 15-20 members to 100 in the period of 6 months.
Since initially the party had no formal leadership, a
Kurdish captain of the Iraqi army, Mir Haj, who
represented a Kurdish community in northern Iraq called
"Hewa" [hope] gave advice to the party.129 Membership to
the party was only open to the Kurds and every member was
supposed to take the following oaths:
1- "Not to betray the Kurdish nation.
2- To work for self-government for the Kurds.
3- Not to disclose any secrets oral or written.
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4- To remain a member for life.
5- To consider all Kurds, men and women, as brothers and
sisters.
6- Not to join another party or group without permission
of the Komola."130
In 1943, Komala members by popular vote elected a
central committee in which only a few of the founding
members were elected. Eagleton writes that this fact
shows that the party was being transformed into a dynamic
organization. He, however, adds that no one at the time
realized that at least as far as the naming of the
executive body was concerned, a Communist model was being
used.131 Komala, soon, began expanding very rapidly with
chapters in Iraq Turkey.132
At this time there was no effective Iranian authority
in Mahabad and Russians although in word respected Persian
sovereignty, did not allow Iranian forces to their area of
occupation. Arfa explains that the Russians were
ambivalent in their approach towards the Kurds. On the
one hand, they liked to see an independent Kurdish state
comprised of Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish Kurds, "which
would be friendly or even subservient to Russia" and would
thus pave the way for a deeper Soviet infiltration into
the Middle East. On the other hand, they were afraid that
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should such state show a spirit of independence, it could
fall under Western influence since Kurdish elites were
basically feudal landlords and conservative religious
leaders.133
This problem was apparently solved when Komola's
leaders met with the Soviets. As the party had grown too
large to continue meeting in private homes, the Soviets
were asked to found a branch of "Iranian-Soviet Cultural
Relations Society" in Mahabad. The Russians gladly
complied and instead a "Kurdish-Soviet Cultural Relations
Society" was established.134
One more unresolved question for the party members
which had now come to the open, was whether to invite Qazi
Muhammad, the leading citizen of Mahabad, to join the
party. Qazi was reputed to be an authoritarian
personality and some were afraid he would dominate the
party. Eagleton writes that upto this point the party was
a "democratically ordered grouping". No leader was chosen
or did any one of its members try to form a dominant
clique within the party. And since no known Marxist or
Communist had joined, there had been no attempted take-
over from the left.13 5 Qazi was, however, invited to join
in October 1944. He accepted the invitation and since
then "although never elected to the Central Committee, he
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was the guide and the voice of the party."136
Roosevelt maintains that the Russians were
particularly happy to see Qazi's monopoly of power in the
party and suggests that he was the kind of a man they were
looking for in order to control Komala.1 37 The fact,
however, is that Qazi not only was not a lackey of the
Soviet Union but he was a pious religious leader whose
conservative inclinations would not even make him a
suitable target for Soviet propaganda. He was, rather, a
pragmatic politician and a nationalist Kurd who aspired
the establishment of a Kurdish independent entity. He
knew very well that the Kurds were not capable of such
endeavor unless assisted by an outside power and at that
juncture the only outside power willing to extend such
assistance was the Soviet Union.
The Russians not only kept Iranian army out of the
area, they also gave promises to the Kurds regarding
Kurdish nationalist aspirations in the post-war period.
We know that the Russians, at the same time, were involved
in another separatist movement in Azarbaijan. But the
Russian tactic when dealing with the two movements were
not similar. The leadership of the Azari movement was
Communist and ideologically and organizationally very
sophisticated while that of the Kurdish movement was
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basically conservative, religious and feudal. More
important than that, deep-seated and time-honored
hostility between the two ethnic groups as well as
cultural, ideological and socio-economic differences made
any Russian attempt at the unification of the two groups
impossible. Indeed, Arfa contends that one of the reasons
that prompted the tribal chiefs of the Western Azarbaijan
to join the Kurdish movement was their hostility towards
the Azaris. Fearing they would fall under the control of
the emerging Azarbaijan Democratic Republic they joined
Komala to counterbalance the Democratic Party of
Azarbaijan.l 3 8 These facts demonstrate one important
aspect of the movement; that it was not an all-
encompassing expression of national aspirations with
grassroots support. Yet, it was important to the Kurds of
Mahabad and its surrounding areas not to mention the
Kurdish nationalists in neighboring countries. Indeed,
the movement, through time, has been transformed into a
major event of colossal proportions for the nationalist
Kurds everywhere.
At the suggestion of the Russians the name of
"Komola" was changed to the "Democratic Party of
Kurdistan." Kurdish autonomy, the use of Kurdish in
schools, employment of indigenous officials in the
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administration of Kurdish areas and a more equitable
allocation of resources were among the most important
points in the Party's program.139
In the meantime, the Russians increased their efforts
for unification of the two movements in Azarbaijan and
Kurdistan. Qazi, however, resisted Soviet attempts to
induce him to consider the possibility that "Kurdish
aspirations should be achieved within Azarbaijani
autonomy.,,1 40
Soon, the Russians delivered to the Kurds 1,200
rifles that belonged to Iranian gendarmerie and were
captured by Azarbaijani militia. Meanwhile, Mulla Mostafa
Barzani, a Kurdish warlord, and his tribal forces from
Iraq crossed into Iran. Barzani and his tribe were in
open revolt in Iraq and once they were pressured by the
Iraqi forces they moved to Iran and joined the Mahabad
movement. Barzani was followed by a few Iraqi officials
of Kurdish descent who were active in Kurdish national
struggle.14 1 Mulla Mostafa gave the Mahabad movement the
military support it so desperately needed; a support that
it could not reliably receive from many tribal chiefs in
Iran who were in occasional contact and compromise with
the central government. 1 4 2
The party, now, resembled an organizationally
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sophisticated and efficient political organization. Thus
after the emergence of the Democratic Republic of
Azarbaijan was announced in Tabriz, on January 22, 1946 in
a convocation of the entire city of Mahabad, Qazi, dressed
in a Russian General's uniform, retaining his religious
turban, announced the establishment of a Kurdish Republic
in Mahabad.
However, for above-mentioned reasons, the Russians
preferred for Kurdistan to be part of the Democratic
Republic of Azarbaijan. Indeed, Qazi and other leaders of
the Kurdish Republic soon realized that in relations to
the Azarbaijani movement they were considered just another
constituency and not an independent and separate
entity.143 In addition to the old inter-ethnic hostility
between the Azaris and the Kurds, other outstandig issues
were: Kurdish claims on the towns of Khoi, Rezaiyeh, and
Shahpur in Western Azarbaijan which contained sizable
Kurdish communities and "the rich, cultivated plains which
surrounded them and without which the Kurds would be
confined to a narrow mountainous strip along the Turkish
frontier and the Mahabad region to the south of
Rezaiyah." 14 4 It should be pointed out that these areas
were also inhabited by a considerable number of Azari
Turks and the Azaris would not cede them to the Kurds and
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had also dispatched some army units there.
To prevent a clash, the Russians arranged meetings
between the two ethnic groups and an agreement was signed
on April 23, 1946, according to which:
"1- The two signatory governments will exchange
representatives whenever it is deemed advisable.
2- In those areas of Azarbaijan where there are Kurdish
minorities, Kurds will be appointed to government
departments, and in those parts of Kurdistan where there
are Azarbaijani minorities, Azarbaijanis will be appointed
to government departments.
3- A joint economic commission will be formed to solve the
economic problems of the signatory nations. Members of
this commission will be appointed by the heads of the
national governments.
4- The military forces of the signatory nations will
assist each other whenever necessary.
5- Any negotiations with the Tehran government will be
conducted in the joint interest of the Azarbaijan and
Kurdish national government.
6- The Azarbaijan national government will take the
necessary steps to promote the use of the Kurdish language
and the development of Kurdish culture among the Kurds of
Azarbaijan and the Kurdish national government will take
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similar steps with regards to the Azarbaijanis living in
Kurdistan.
7- Both signatory nations will take measures to punish any
individual or group seeking to destroy the historic
friendship and democratic brotherhood of the Azarbaijanis
and the Kurds."145
The question of the territories was not discussed in
this agreement. Yet to the Iranian government, Article
number 4 which stipulated a military alliance between the
two Republics was a flagrant violation of Iranian
sovereignty.
The agreement, however, did not help the relationship
of the two ethnic groups. In several talks that the
Azaris held with the central government of Iran, they
managed to gain some sort of "recognition" which was
denied to the Kurdish Republic.1 4 6 Thus, as Roosevelt so
aptly put it:
The Kurds had progressed from the condition of
minority in the Iranian state to that of a minority
in an Azarbaijan Turkish state.14 7
As we noted, all these came to an end when the
Soviets were forced to evacuate the Iranian territory.
Both republics were thus abandoned and left on their own.
Iranian army units, subsequently, entered first Azarbaijan
and then Kurdistan. Apparently the reaction of the
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population of the two provinces was quite different. In
Azarbaijan, people were jubilant and welcomed the troops.
In Mahabad, things were didfferent. An Iranian military
officer who travelled to Mahabad after arrest and
execution of Qazi writes:
People are all sad and their faces are puzzled. You
cannot find a happy face in this town even if you
look hard..148
A great deal has been written about the sympathetic
or charismatic character of Qazi Mohammad. As a religious
leader, he is said to have inspired respect and
allegiance. And to his Kurdish followers he was a
courageous leader who symbolized Kurdish national
aspirations. As the President of the Republic, he not
only received no salary but refused one.14 9 Qazi also
proved that he was not an authoritarian figure as he was
thought to be. Roosevelt writes:
Qazi...became merely the leader of the party...The
villages were run by their old landlords and tribal
leaders with the aid of a gendarmerie locally
recruited and dressed in Kurdish costume, but
commanded by officers from Mahabad with Soviet
uniforms. Mahabad itself, from a typically drab
Persian provincial town, had become picturesque and
colourful, its streets thronging with Kurds in
national costume, free for the moment of the hated
Iranian soldiers and gendarmes.15 0
It is not known whether a "Kurdish Democratic
Republic" was in the minds of the group of individuals who
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founded Komala in the early 1940s in Iran. Did Qazi
intend to become involved in a secessionist movement when
he became the spokesman for the party? There is no doubt
that some actions have unintended consequences and a logic
of their own. Although the Kurdish nationalists, like
Azaris, claimed that they only demanded "autonomy" within
an undivided Iranian state, their movement gradually began
to manifest all the trappings of a separatist movement. A
Republic with its own president and army would naturally
be considered a state within a state by the central
authorities in Tehran.
The movement failed not only because the stronger
military force dispatched from the center was able to
subdue it, it failed because of inherent conflicts and
contradictions within the Kurdish society itself. As
usual, there was a lack of unity among the Kurdish tribes
and parochial interests and tribal rivalries made it
impossible for the Kurdish tribes to find a common
denominator on the basis of which they could unify. The
movement itself was mostly made up of urban Kurds -a small
segment of the Kurdish population at the time- who felt
little affinity with the tribal Kurds. The movement also
lacked an organized, disciplined army. Mahabad Republic
had to rely on tribal forces who only showed lukewarm
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allegiance and at the time of need abandoned it. There
was also the issue of identification of the Republic with
the Soviet Union. Roosevelt explains that tribal
animosity and suspicion towards the Soviet Union went
beyond historical, social and religious reasons. It also
had economic basis:
The Kurdish tribesmen depended largely on their
tobacco crop for their livelihood, and now that their
market in the rest of Iran was cut off, they suffered
considerable hardship. In certain areas food
supplies already strained had to be shared with the
destitude Barzanis, who had long outgrown their
welcome.... 151
At the same time, the support of the Russians proved
to be half-hearted. Although the Republic was established
with Soviet blessing, the support that the Russians
extended was limited. When the moment of truth came both
"autonomous" movements were abandoned.
Qazi and his regime, however, were able to implement
a number of policies that greatly helped change the
conditions of the people of Mahabad and its environments
during the very short period that the movement lasted.
Kurdish was made the language of instruction for Kurdish
children. Indeed, just before the downfall of the
Republic, Kurdish texbooks were published for primary
schools. A newspaper and a political monthly, both called
Kurdistan, were being published as well as two literary
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magazines, havar and hilal. All this had made the Mahabad
movement, the focus of attention of other Kurdish centers
such the ones in Syria and Iraq.152 There was no
political oppression and there existed much more freedom
than did in Azarbaijan. There was a constant flow of
information. The taxes were collected according to the
old order with one exception that the tax collectors were
now Kurds and the money collected stayed in Mahabad.153
All that notwithstanding, Qazi and his regime were
still not able to unify different Kurdish tribes of Iran.
As the central government was preparing to occupy Mahabad
many Kurdish tribes denied their forces to the Republic.
When the Iranian army entered Mahabad, no resistance was
put forward. Qazi and the rest of Kurdish leadership
surrendered the town, although already Mulla Mustafa
Barzani had tried to pursuade them to flee. Qazi, his
brother and his cousin were tried and hanged. Five more
Kurdish leaders were hanged later. In the meantime, Mulla
Mustafa and his tribal forces successfully fought their
way into Soviet Union where Barzani remained for more than
a decade.
The Democratic Republic of Kurdistan was the
expression of nationalist aspirations of Iran's Kurdish
urban middle classes. Although the movement did attract
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tribal elements temporarily, tribal fragmentation proved
to be its worst enemy for tribal identities were more
important than an over-arching and all-embracing Kurdish
identity. With modernization, however, tribal structures
were on the wane. In the next chapter we will discuss
whether the Kurdish tribal structure was resilient enough
to endure the tide of change.
THE BALUCH
As we noted, by the time of Reza Khan's rise to
power, Iranian Baluch were independent for all practical
purposes. Doust Mohammad Khan, the chief of Baranzai
tribe had subdued many other petty chieftains and thus
consolidated most of Iranian Baluchistan under his rule.
The decision to integrate Baluchistan with the rest of
Iran was made in 1927 and carried out in 1928. According
to General Jahanbani who commanded the military campaign
in 1928, initially Doust Mohammad Khan and the rest of the
Baluch population involved in the insurrection were
approached with promises of amnesty and tax refunds if
they surrendered.154 The resistance of the Baluch
resulted in military clashes between the government forces
and those of Doust Mohammad Khan's. In these campaigns
the government was not only assisted by some Baluch tribes
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but for the first time air power was utilized. 155
Baluchistan was thus effectively pacified in 1928. The
"Baluch Period" which is so nostalgically referred to by
the Baluch is indeed the period before 1928 when the
Baluch enjoyed independence.1 56 The following passage is
a vivid expression of Baluch's feelings regarding the loss
of their independence and regret about tribal disunity:
...The entire Persian Baluchistan....sunk unto
unbearable misery and uneasy terror. He [Reza Shah]
pursued with a wanton whole bag of tricks in
exterminating Baluchi rule and influence over Persian
Baluchistan. The Pahlavi upstart strengthened his
unhappy reign by hang, draw, and quarter. This was
art and part of his despotic strategy. Inaugurating
a reign of dread and awe, he believed in one word;
everything or nothing....
Neither the ties of blood, nor the surprizing
pressure of necessity could reconcile the internal
quarrels and disunity of the Baluch chiefs, all of
whom fell one by one before the wanton aggression of
the Pahlavi despot..1 57
Soon military garrisons became the major features of
the region. Until the rule of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi,
Baluchistan became part of the Province of Kerman the 8th
province]1 58 while remaining within the realm of military
bureaucracy with military governors administering the
region. The region also witnessed intermittent tribal
unruliness; howeve, none of enduring significance or
communal overtones. Most of the subsequent uprisings were
dealt with easily and harshly.
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During the reign of Reza Shah, things hardly changed
in Baluchistan. A great deal of the lands in Baluchistan
since the rule of Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar were state
[crown] lands. Lambton, in her study of landlords and
peasants in Iran pointed out that at the time of her
research [1951], the state-owned lands in Baluchistan
included "some property and ganats in towns of Khash and
Zahidan and some twenty-odd villages in the neighborhood
of Bampur and Iranshahr. This land is leased mainly to
non-local people." 1 5 9 Indeed, The scarcity of land
suitable for agriculture and of water has been an
impediment to the emergence of large land-holdings in
Baluchistan. Land proprietors in Baluchistan were mostly
either the hokkams [the semi-feudal rulers of the south]
or the sardars [the tribal chiefs of the north].1 6 0 The
average Baluch peasant was the poorest and the most
deprived inhabitant of Iran who was not only oppressed by
government agents but exploited by Baluch rulers
themselves. As harsh environmental and topographical
conditions made Baluchistan seem unsuitable for
industrialization and modernization, no development
project was carried out in the province during Reza Shah
period. Also no attempt was made at creating an
infrastructure in Baluchistan.
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The pacification of the region had little effects on
the socio-economic structures in Baluchistan. The tribal
structure of the nomadic and semi-nomadic northern
Baluchistan was left intact. The semi-feudal structure of
the agricultural southern Baluchistan would naturally be
more vulnerable to the presence of the military. The
regime, however, retained the compliant and cooperative
local rulers.161 Indeed, the state's omnipotent presence
in Baluchistan in the form of military governors,
garrisons and the gendarmes was an indication that the
Pahlavi control was different from the intermittent
control of the Qajars. The objectives of Reza Shah's
regime in Baluchistan were to keep the region
territorially integrated with the rest of Iran and to
prevent further tribal uprisings for independence. In the
meantime, compliant tribal and feudal leaders of the
Baluch society who had kept their power and prestige
intact, due to their cooperation with the government,
gradually began to assume the role of the intermediary
between the government and the Baluch rank and file.1 62
This particular function of the Baluch political elite -on
which we will elaborate in the next chapter- became a
conspicuous feature of the dynamics of the relationships
between the Pahlavi state and the Baluch society.
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Unfortunately data on Iran's social indicators are
mostly lacking for this period until 1956 when the first
complete census of Iran was carried out. The data nearest
to the Reza Shah's period that could be found for this
study was published in 1949 and concern the availability
of medical services for different provinces infor the year
1326/1947. The Eighth Province [Kerman that included
Baluchistan] with a population of 950,000 had only one
doctor in private practice; i.e., the population per
doctor in private practice was 950,000! Of course, the
doctor in question could have practiced in Kerman that
was, then and now, a more advanced and prosperous province
than Baluchistan.1 6 3 [Table V]. At the same time no
thriving urban center appeared in the region and hardly
any educational reforms carried out there. In these
circustances, it is not suprising that the abdication of
Reza Shah did not stir nationalist uprisings in
Baluchistan. Such issues as "freedom for cultural
expression" and "equitable allocation of resources" as
well as demands for political participation did not become
significant factors in the relations of the Baluch with
the state. There were hardly any schools where Persian
could be imposed. There was no civil bureaucracy where
under-representation of the indigenous population could be
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objected to. There was also no change in the hatred of
the Baluch for the Persians. The Baluch hated the Shii
"Gajars" whom they considered as "cheats" and "liars"1 64
while the Persians looked down at the Baluch as lazy and
good-for-nothing savages.1 6 5 The state's iron control
intensified this animosity. Now the Persians were the
omnipotent conquerors and the Baluch the vanquished. Reza
Shah's conquest was the culmination of hundreds of years
of agression on Baluchistan;1 66 one that made western
Baluchistan an integral part of the Iranian territory.
* * * *
This chapter examined the advent of Reza Shah
Pahlavi and the emergence of the modern state in Iran.
Reza Shah as a strong man, a nationalist and a modernizer
set out to industrialize and modernize Iran and to protect
her independence by building a strong state and personally
dominating the political process. The drive to build a
strong state demonstrated an important aspect of the
Iranian psyche particularly after decades of chaos and
humiliation in the hands of outside powers. A strong
state could protect Iranian independence and indeed the
state's validity was based on such a protection.
Nonetheless, a strong state could not necessarily create a
unified and homogeneous "Iranian nation," since no lasting
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political institutions were built that could bring the
diverse population of the country into the political realm
and endow them with a collective "national consciousness."
Indeed, although Reza Shah's state was a modernizing one
the traditional political structures were preserved and
political development thwarted. The important objectives
of the modernizing state in Iran were centralization and
growth of military and administrative apparatuses,
territorial integration, industrialization, adoption of
Western technology, creation of a market economy, and
creation of an infrastructure. Indeed, there was a great
emphasis on economic progress, Westernization and
preservation of Iranian national sovereignty.
However, as was mentioned, Political development was
not in the regime's agenda. There was an unwillingness to
foster a kind of change that would assure the
participation of different groups in the political order.
The regime thus suppressed all social movements and did
not tolerate articulation of political sentiments. Indeed
for the majority of the people the "authoritarian" nature
of politics remained unchanged. However, if in the past
the practical exercise of power was intermittent by the
central authority, now it was a constant factor in the
lives of the people. If in the past armed insurgency was
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possible and sometimes successful, now it was futile and
self-defeating. The state had become omnipotent and
although the diverse population of Iran did not feel any
particular loyalty or obligation to this strong center of
power, they knew that their proper response to this
authority should be obedience.
At the same time, although centralization of
political power helped weaken the traditional local
authorities, the state was not able to attract the loyalty
of the rank and file of the population who never
identified with the political system. Indeed, the form of
political organization in Reza Shah's Iran, like that of
the Qajars', corresponded to the patrimonialism of Max
Weber. The Shah held power neither by virtue of external
and formal criteria nor by means of a mandate from the
people. He demanded submission in the name of a tradition
regarded as inviolable; the tradition of Kingship. Since
the secularization policies of Reza Shah meant that the
regime could not utilize religious symbols in its search
for legitimacy, the political symbols that were utilized
belonged to an ancient past that was too remote and
unfamiliar to the Persians and absolutely alien to the
non-Persian population.
The emphasis on the Persian character of Iran and
social transformation had immediate consequences for those
communities who experienced both. The Azari and Kurdish
communities who occupied regions closer to the center of
power [table III] and were more exposed to the socio-
political penetration of the center, reacted to this
penetration while Baluchistan which is one of the remotest
corners of the Iranian territory was hardly affected.
At the same time, the state's bias in favor of the
dominant group and its unwillingness or lack of capacity
to bring different groups into the political arena made
the political and intellectual leaders of Azaris and the
Kurds feel abandoned and left out. These feelings were
particularly acute amongst the Azaris whose ties to the
Iranian body politic were weakened after the
Constitutional Revolution. The Persianization of Iran had
reinforced the distinction and separation that Azaris had
begun to experience since the Russian occupation of
Azarbaijan in 1909. Although such alienation was a short-
lived phenomenon in the case of the Azaris, it helped them
realize that their privileges cannot be taken for granted.
A secessionist movement was thus the outcome of the
alienation of the Azari intellectual and political
leaders.
The Kurds, on their part, for the first time
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experienced a break with the past through the dramatic
onslaught of the modern state on the socio-economic,
political and cultural fabrics of their society. Before
the advent of the modern state, the autonomous existence
of such ethnic groups as the Kurds meant that their
relationship with the state in no way effected their way
of life. The modern state, however, by extending its
reach through implementation of various policies,
transformed such aspects of the Kurdish society as social
and political structures, social stratification and
economic relations. The result was displacement and
confusion since at the same time the state had failed to
create an alternative source of identification. The small
politicized Kurdish intelligentsia thus resorted to an
uprising that questioned the legitimacy of the state.
The Baluch also had to be subdued by the modern state
but the nature of the state's rule in Baluchistan
precluded any socio-political transformation. With the
indigenous socio-political structures intact and the
persistence of rural and tribal nature of society, it is
not surprising that no political movement of communal type
emerged in Baluchistan after the abdication of Reza Shah.
The Baluch were happy to revert to their previous way of
life again, free of government control.
296
All these demonstrated that the process of nation-
building was not complete in Iran since the state still
needed a nation as an expression of itself. Perhaps
nation-building was too much to expect of a man who, in
less than twenty years, created internal security,
political stability, relative independence from outside
control and attempted to industrialize and modernize a
traditional and undeveloped country. However, later
developments in Iran demonstrated that the modern state,
like its traditional counterpart, can devise policies to
keep communal aspirations in check; call was needed was a
more stable political environment.
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POPULATION OF URBAN CENTERS 1867 (QAJAR PERIODI
Tehran (mostly Persian) 85,000
Tabriz (Azaris) 110,000
Kermanshah (Kurds) 30,000
Orumiah (Kurds, Azaris and others) 30,000
Khoi (Azaris) 20,000
Ardebeel (Azaris) 10,000
Hamadan (Azaris, Kurds, others) 30,000
Zanjan (Azaris and others) 20,000
REVENUES DEMANDED FROM EACH PROVINCE BY THE QAJAR COURT
Azarbaijan
Kordestan, Kermanshah and
adjacent districts
Hamadan (Azaris and Kurds
and others)
Tehran and adjacent districts
*- Compiled from
Iran: 1800-1914.
Press, 1976.
620,000 Tomans
50,000 Tomans
30,000
210,000
Tomans
Tomans
Charles Issawi's The economic History of
Chicago: The University of Chicago
TABLE I
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ETHNIC ORIGINS OF THE LEADING PERSONALITIES OF THE EARLY
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN
NAME
Assadollah Ghafarzadeh
Ahmad Sultanzadeh
Heydar Khan Amir Ughli
Ja'far Pishevari
Karim Nikbin
Hussein Sharqi
Ardashir Ovanessian
Aqababa Yusefzadeh
Muhammad Akhundzadeh
Muhammad Dehqan
Salamallah Javid
Ali Sartipzadeh
Muhammad Hejazi
OCCUPATION
Journalist
Journalist
Engineer
Teacher
Journalist
Journalist
Pharmacist
Teacher
Teacher
Writer
Doctor
Journalist
Tyepesetter
PLACE OF
Iranian
Iranian
Iranian
Iranian
Iranian
Central
Iranian
Iranian
Iranian
Kashan
Iranian
Iranian
Tehran
BIRTH
Azarbaijan
Azarbaij an
Azarbaijan
Azarbaij an
Azarbaijan
Azarbaij an
Azarbaijan
Azarbaijan
Azarbaijan
Azarbaij an
Ibrahami Alizadeh Civil Servant Iranian Azarbaijan
*- Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran Between Two Revolutions.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1982. PP. 132-
133. Sultanzadeh and Ovanessian are Armenians from
Azarbaijan.
TABLE II
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DISTANCES OF SOME AZARI. KURDISH AND BALUCH TOWNS AND
CITIES FROM THE CENTER (TEHRAN) in kilometers
Tabriz 628 Kilometers
Kermanshah (Kurds) 530 Kilometers
Mianeh (Azaris) 453 Kilometers
Kangavar (Kurds) 461 Kilometers
Zanjan (Azaris and others) 314 Kilometers
Sahne (Kurds) 492 Kilometers
Hamedan (Azaris, Kurds, etc.) 368 Kilometers
Zahidan (Baluch and others) 1561 Kilometers
Zabol (Baluch and others) 1771 Kilometers
*- Compiled from Iran Almanac and Book of Facts. 1969.
P. 445.
TABLE III
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MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLAVI AND CARROT AND STICK
AZARIS, KURDS. BALUCH
The emergence of the modern state in Iran entailed a
serious gap between the elite and non-elite. The state
that had failed to come up with an adequate formula to
legitimize its authority, was seriously shaken with the
secessionist movements in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan after
the abdication of Reza Shah.
This chapter will examine Mohammad Reza Shah's rule
and the consolidation of the modern state in Iran. It
will be explained that Mohammad Reza Shah's state was able
to devise policies to keep various ethnic groups
depoliticized. These policies ranged from effective co-
optation of the indigenous elite [Azaris] to indirect rule
and military suppression [Kurds and Baluch]. As a
consequence after its consolidation the Shah's regime did
not have to deal with communal upheavals that would
threaten political stability. The state, however, was not
able to offer a "national" formula in order to create a
civil society based upon consent. The result was an
inherent weakness that eventually resulted in the
overthrow of the regime through a popular revolt carried
out mainly by Persian and Azari uprban strata
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General Observations:
Reza Shah's heir-apparent, Mohammad Reza, came to
power after his father's abdication in 1941. At this
juncture the central control was weak and the old ruling
classes continued to dominate the political scene while
centrifugal elements again seized the oppportunity to
assert their independence.
Although the presence of the occupying forces and the
weakness of the center did not disrupt the parliamentary
nature of the government, the parliament for the first two
years of occupation of Iran was made up of the old ruling
classes mostly Reza Shah's appointees with no sign of
political participation in the periphery and among the
rank and file. The experiences of Reza Shah's autocratic
rule and the movements in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan,
however, had important impacts on the perceptions and
expectations of the Iranian intellectuals and the modern
intelligentsia.
These experiences together with the near total
disintegration of the country as well as the humiliating
presence of the occupying forces helped authenticate and
strengthen Iranian nationalism. This nationalism became a
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central feature of Iranian politics after the war years
and played a significant part in the events of the 1949-
1953 period. The single, most important aspect of this
nationalism was its "anti-imperialist," particularly anti-
British character that was later expanded and included
resistance against infiltraion of all foreign powers in
Iran.
The emergence of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the
National Front that was an "umbrella organization"
composed of various politically active groups and parties
with a nationalist orientation, was the culmination of
nationalist expressions of different urban strata. The
middle classes formed the core of the nationalist
movement.
The groups that were united under the banner of the
National Front claimed very diverse constituencies. They
were unified under a broad and vague program, i.e., the
replacement of the old ruling classes with a
representative and nationalist government that would carry
out social and economic reforms and put an end to Iran's
dependence on the West.1 This task, according to Dr.
Mosaddeq the leading figure among the Iranian
nationalists, could only be realized by creating a
"negative equilibrium," i.e., by keeping Iran neutral in
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foreign affairs and reducing her dependence on such
companies as the British owned and controlled Anglo
Iranian Oil Company [AIOC]. The nationalization of oil
industry was the natural outcome of this point of view.2
The premiership of Dr. Mosaddeq [1951-1953] signified
an attempt by the Iranian nationalists to achieve the
above-mentioned goals. This short period was the only
time that Iran experienced parliamentary democracy and its
failure proved devastating to the success of future
secular and liberal democratic endeavors in the country.
Indeed, one of the most important impacts of this failure
was the emergence of an acute xenophobia among already
suspicious and distrustful Iranian nationalists.3
A detailed analysis of Iranian politics during
Mossadegh's premiership is, of course, beyond the scope of
this study. However, it should be pointed out that the
over-arching nationalist aspects of politics in this
period obviously made the political objectives of the
politicians in the center and the communal aspirations of
Iran's ethno-linguistic communities, mutually exclusive.
Although during the short period of Mosaddeq's
premiership all Iranians enjoyed some freedom of cultural
and political expression, there was no doubt that
Mossadegh and the National Front advocated the creation of
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a strong and centralized yet democratic government in
Iran. This, of course, meant that "provincial autonomy"
was not on the agenda of the nationalists. At the same
time, the National Front had proposed an agricultural
reform program that would limit the percentage of profits
a landlord could claim. 4 Thus, the members of the
provincial political elites, many of whom landlords,
opposed both Mosaddeq and the National Front. That may
explain the fact that the provincial rank and file
remained mostly unaffected by Mosaddeq's charisma. In
such provinces as Azarbaijan, however, a dual situation
could be observed. While in Tabriz, particularly, some
Azaris followed the example of the Persians and both
National Front and Mosaddeq were popular, 5 in other areas
of the province there existed fierce opposition. For
example, in the elections for the 17th Majles, when most
of the Persian population voted for the National Front, in
one Azarbaijani town the people voted for the old elite
and the pro-Court individuals.6 This prompted Mosaddeq to
suspend the elections7 to investigate possible rigging.
But as Mosaddeq's own Minister of Interior informed him
later, "even with the invalidation of the suspected
ballots" the Azarbaijani deputy would have won.8
This was, indeed, a reflection of the socio-political
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situation in Azarbaijan itself. On the one hand there was
a large number of urban middle and technocratic classes
who together with the Azari intellectuals supported Dr.
Mosaddeq. The mass of the peasantry, on the other hand,
were still very much in the sphere of influence of the
landlords and local political elite.
The national situation also represented a myriad of
different forces and loyalties. The charismatic figure of
Dr. Mosaddeq, nationalization of oil industry, and
opposition to British presence in Iran had temporarily
brought these forces together under the banner of the
National Front. However, it was soon evident that some of
these forces were incompatible and on irreconcilable
paths. It was only a matter of time for these groups to
come into a collision course. The same rule applied to
the provinces in many of which National Front was not
particularly popular. It is interesting to note that no
consideration was given to different ethnic groups of Iran
by the National Front because this was indeed a non-issue
at those tumultuous times. Even the symbols that were
manipulated by Mosaddeq and his supporters demonstrated
this fact. Most of these symbols appealed to the
overarching "Iranian" people with no attention paid to
parochial or communal attachments and loyalties. It is
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again possible that the peripheral population by the
virtue of its position was considered "inconsequential."9
It should also be noted that the issue of
"nationalization" of oil industry that held the urban
constituency of the National Front together was hardly of
immediate interest to the local political elite who either
strove to keep their privileges intact or aspired for
local autonomy.
Placating the provincial political elite was,
however, not very high on the Prime Minister's agenda.
Mosaddeq had to struggle against a combination of internal
and external forces. This and other reasons eventually
brought him down through a coup staged by the Iranian army
and other forces loyal to the Shah with the backing of the
CIA and the British Intelligence Service.1 0
The Reemergence Of The Pahlavi State:
The outcome of these events was the re-emergence of
the Pahlavi state under Mohammad Reza Shah. To survive,
the Shah attempted to strengthen the state and his
personal power base. The result was the strengthening of
the traditional political forms and the weakening of
liberal democratic and rationalizing tendencies.
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Unlike his father, Mohammad Reza Shah had a weak
personality but like him, he meant to rule and not just
reign. This tendency had manifested itself from the early
years of his rule. In 1949, the Shah in an attempt to
increase his power called for a Constitutional Assembly
that was convened in order to revise the Consitution. 1 1
Among different measures to increase the power of the Shah
was the formation of the Senate with 60 members, half of
whom the Shah would appoint. Fifteen were to be appointed
and elected from Tehran and fifteen appointed and elected
from the provinces. The provincial contribution to the
Senate was limited to a number of important provincial
cities as follows:
Qazvin [Persians and Azaris]= 1 Tabriz [Azaris]= 2
Rezaiyey [Azaris, Kurds]= 1
Kerman [Mostly Persian]= 1 Isfahan [Persian]= 1
Hamadan [Persian, Azaris and others]= 1
Ahwaz [Persians, Arabs, and others]=l
Shiraz [Persians]= 2 Mashhad [Persians]= 2
Kermanshah [Shii Kurds, some Persians]=l Rasht
[Gilanis]= 1 Sari [Mazandaranis]=l 12
A brief look at the make up of the Senate
demonstrates the predominance of the Persians. As we
note, there were no appointed or elected Senators from
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Baluchistan although in subsequent years a few Baluchi
tribal leaders were "chosen" for the Majles. The
interesting point about both the Senate and the Majles is
that as the power of the Shah increased the
representatives of both Houses only consisted of hand-
picked and loyal "servants" of the Shah.
The Shah strengthened the traditional aspects of
Iranian politics, there is no doubt that a parliamentary
form of government wolid pose severe limits on the
monarch's authority. To secure his position the Shah had
to acquire complete control of the administrative,
judicial and military machinery of the state. This meant
that the state apparatus had to be organized in such a
fashion that it could be controlled from a single command
post. The revenues from the sale of oil that helped
Iran's rapid modernization made the infrastructural reach
of the state possible and thus facilitated such control.
The Shah, however, like his father, was weary of
international criticism. It was important that a
constitutional and parliamentary facade be kept intact and
provide some sort of legitimation for the monarchical
system. The parliament, elections, political parties,
etc., all existed in the Shah's Iran. However, they were
all a farce. Even the Prime Minister and his cabinet were
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not a genuine and independent executive body. 13
During Reza Shah autocracy was justified and
supported through the introduction of a state-manufactured
and extreme nationalism. Indeed, Islam as a justification
for the rule of the Shah was more or less replaced by this
nationalism. Mohammad Reza Shah brought some changes into
this picture. To counter the specter of Mosaddeq and his
"negative equilibrium," the Shah coined the term "positive
nationalism," which apparently meant to explain Iran's
amicable relationship with the "West" and cool relations
with the "East." Also there were more attempts to appease
the religious leaders. The Shah who claimed he had
occasional "religious experiences" and "visits" from the
Shii holy men, paid great lip service -and in some cases
more than that- to some of the grand ayatollahs and at
times manipulated religious symbols. There were
indications that the regime was trying to give a Shii
legitimacy to the Shah and his regime by association to
Shii symbols and institutions. This strengthening of the
traditional aspects of Iranian cultural and socio-
political structures initially helped the Shah who was
absolutely devoid of any personal charisma. The masses of
the people accepted the Shah, out of a sense of awe, as
the ruler of an Islamic/Shii people. This, of course,
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worked until television destroyed the myth. Mohammad
Reza Shah continued his father's assimilationist policies
through forceful Persianization and acculturation. There
was, however, one important difference. Mohammad Reza
Shah made serious attempts to co-opt local political
elites and counter elites and to certain extents he
succeeded to depoliticize most of the periphery.1 4
Indeed, except the first few years of his rule, Iran did
not experience serious provincial disturbances based on
communal aspirations. It would, however, be a mistake to
interpret the calm of this period as the regime's
accomplishment in creating an over-arching national
consciousness. It was, indeed, the combination of
physical force and omnipotent presence of the state as
well as its placating policies toward the local
leadership, i.e., carrot and stick that proved effective.
It is understandable that the Shah in order to hold
to power had to keep many traditional features of the
Iranian state intact. However, like his father, he
aspired to international prestige and status. This could
only be accomplished by modernization and economic
development. In order to facilitate modernization some
rationalizing policies had to be adopted. The military
and the bureaucracy were the two institutions through
322
which many policies were implemented.
The army and the bureaucracy, however, could not
forge an over-arching national consciousness in Iran. It
is true that both institutions performed functions that
were otherwise poorly carried out. However, traditional
aspects of socio-political relationships in Iran that
manifested themselves in personalization of such
relationships limited the effectiveness of the functions
performed. Indeed, personal cliques were the main sources
of decision making within both institutions.15
Thus, during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah no shared
political orientation emerged in Iran. The "formula"
forged by the regime to rationalize its dominance over the
diverse population inhabitir-' the Iranian territory did
not correspond to the beliefs and sentiments of this
population. The peripheral communities continued to
identify with their local political elite and not with the
"national" elite.
It is interesting to note that the existence of
various ethno-linguistic groups in Iran had little direct
bearing on day-to-day political and economic process. The
absence of interest in the perhiphery was a reflection of
two factors: 1)- the regime's success in depoliticizing
the periphery and 2)- the weakness of local political
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leadership to exert influence in the center with the
exception of the Azari political elite who were
successfully incorporated into the national elite.
At the same time, modernization became a means for
the Shah and his ruling elite to overcome their
inferiority complex vis-a-vis the outside world. Rapid
economic development was the main goal without attention
to rational planning and equitable distribution. It is
true that Iran boasted a "Plan Organization" and economic
development of Iran during the rule of the Shah was more
"planned" than it was in his father's period. However,
many aspects of Iranian political structure proved to be
"anti-planning and anti-programming."1 6
The process of economic development in Iran during
the Shah basically followed the same course as it did
during his father's period.1 7 Centralization was now
institutionalized. The provincial administration was
controlled and directed from Tehran. The centralized
power structure in the capital appointed political
administrators to the provinces and provincial economy was
regulated by the local branches of respective ministries
headquartered in Tehran. All decisions about local
affairs, important or otherwise, were made in Tehran thus
making the provinces economically and politically reliant
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on the center.18
At the same time the center kept altering the
internal boundaries between provinces. At the time of the
first national census the number of provinces was changed
from 10 to 13. This was changed again at the time of the
second national census to 21 provinces. During 1970s, two
more provinces of Yazd and Zanjan were created. It is not
known to what extent ethnic considerations were important
in such alterations. It should however be pointed out
that these divisions did affect the three groups under
study here.
In the meantime, the personal and clique-oriented
Iranian power structure made cooperation between political
and the "ministerial-sectoral" administrators in the
provinces impossible. These individuals reported to their
own sectors with few channels for communications and
cooperation.19 The consequences of such state of affairs
were:
...Frequent power struggles among the ruling elite,
mismanagement of public institutions and investments,
corruption, inefficiency in government operations,
and ineffective planning practices at the provincial
and national levels..20
Overcentralization created the ubiquitous emergence
of a primate city, Tehran. 2 1 There were also a few
provincial capitals where socio-economic activities were
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concentrated.22 The growth of Tehran was an indication of
the accumulation of the wealth and power of the country in
one central location. Tehran with a population of 85,000
in 1867 (Table I] grew to more than 4.5 million in 1976
[Table VI]. Indeed, during 1970s, Tehran which embraced
14% of Iran's population also reaped a disproportionate
amount of the advantages of development. Tehran in the
1970's accounted for 51% of Iran's production of
manufactured goods, 30% of the industrial enterprises, 60%
of all wages and salaries, 33% of total investment, 35% of
the country's GNP, 38% of all institutions of higher
education, 52% of all students in higher education, 46% of
all doctors, 76% of all cars, and 100% of all banks,
insurance companies and other fiduciary insitutions, all
of which had their headquarters in Tehran.2 3 Tehran also
rated high for health and communication facilities.24
Economic planning began in 1949 [first plan 1949-
1954]. The first two plans [second plan 1955-1962],
mostly concentrated on building infra-structure,
investments in military and import-substitution
industries.2 5 These two plans that were devoid of any
planning methodology and investment decisions, in the
words of one scholar, 'reflected primarily the subjective
judgments of the planners."26
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The third and fourth plans 1963-1967 and 1968-1972)
were more comprehensive. Regional development authorities
were created for such provinces as East Azarbaijan,
Khuzistan and others to boost their potentials through
agricultural/irrigation/electricity generation projects or
for "relief" purposes in case of such poverty-ridden and
backward provinces as Sistan and Baluchistan. Also
agricultural growth poles were created in East Azarbaijan
and other provinces [mostly inhabited by Persians] and
industrial projects were undertaken in such provinces as
East Azarbaijan, Esfahan and Markazi [the latter two both
Persian-inhabited].2 7 Most of these projects and plans
were carried out in those provinces with agricultural
potentials and large urban centers. The result was
further widening of the gap that already existed between
the "advanced" and "backward" regions. The more developed
provinces also reaped a disproportionate share of urban
development projects with more industries and social
services concentrated in a number of provincial capitals.
In the early 1960s the land reform program was
implemented. The land reform had primarily political
objectives. It was thought the distribution of land among
cultivating peasants will create a social and political
base for the regime in the rural areas. At the same time
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the state believed that land reform would weaken the power
base of the large landowners and thus help remove a
potential source of political instability. This the
regime succeeded to accomplish. The power and clout of
the large landlords were drastically reduced. However,
the land reform program only distributed lands to the
peasants with traditional rights to cultivation
[nasaadar]. Those who worked the lands but did not hold
such rights, i.e., the agricultural laborers and the
village proletariat,2 8 did not receive lands and as Farhad
Kazemi contends "the marjority of the poor rural migrants
who went to the principal cities of Iran came from among
those agricultural laborers who were now pushed off the
land." 29
As overconcentration of resources and excessive
centralization necessitated decentralization, throughout
the Fifth Plan, there was much talk and some initial
efforts at decentralization. However, "development still
centered on the growth-poll strategy. Indeed, to the
Iranian planners, decentralization came to mean only
deconcentration of Tehran or concentration of sectoral
investments in specified poles outside the capital.30
The tables at the end of this chapter demonstrate
existing disparities among the Azaris, the Kurds and the
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Baluch during the Pahlavi rule. Although all three groups
show absolute increases and improvements in almost all
social indicators, the provincial disparities are wide.
The central province always ranks first followed by other
Persian speaking provinces and East Azarbaijan. The
provinces of Western Azarbaijan and Kermanshahan [oil-
producing province] are somewhere in the middle and
Kurdistan and the province of Sistan and Baluchistan,
despite improvements, lag behind. There is no reason to
believe that ethno-linguistic considerations were
responsible for such gaps. One thing is, however,
certain. The difficult terrain in both Kurdistan and
Baluchistan may be considered as an important factor that
contributed to the government's neglect.
The following tables demonstrate migration patterns
in the areas of interest to this study. Table (a)
demonstrates the rate of population increase due to
migration between 1966-1976 and table (b) shows the
percentage of rural-urban migration in the year 1972.
Table (a)- The Rate of Population Increase Due to
Migration (1966-1976)
% of Increase % of Increase Due to
Migration
Tehran 65.4 52.5
Tabriz
[Azaris]
Ardebil
[Azaris]
Kermanshah
(Kurds]
Sanandaj
[Kurds)
Mahabad
[Kurds]
Province of
Origin
Tehran
E. Azarbaijan
W. Azarbaijan
Kurdistan
Kermanshahan
67.9 52.6 31
Table (b)- 1972
No. of Internal % of Rural to Urban
Migrants Migrants
1,803,657 46.6
132,115
60,149
27,549
112,246
64.6
71.3
41.9
55.6
Sistan and
Baluchistan 27.985 22.0 32
In this table, as we note, the highest rate of
migration occurred in the provinces of East and West
Azarbaijan while the province of Sistan and Baluchistan
witnessed the lowest rate of migration. This population
mobility is indeed an indication of the more "advanced"
status of Azarbaijan as opposed to Baluchistan.
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48.0
77.1
35.6
55.1
59.7
81.5
43.7
61.4
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Another important facet of modernization policies in this
period was the expansion of a huge mass communications
network. The following tables demonstrate the growth in
the ownership of radio and television sets in Iran during
1965-1986. Regional data have not been available.
Number of Radios in UseZPer 1,000 Inhabitants
1965 1970 1975 1980 1986
1,800/63 .... 6,400/166 11,000/240
Number of Television Sets in Use/Per 1.000 Inhabitants
1965 1970 1975 1980 1986
110/4.6 533/19 1,700/51 .... 2,600/57 33
By March 1974, NIRT National Iranian Radio and
Television] had 15 major television production and
transmission centers. These included 2 in Tehran and 1 in
some provincial cities. Among the cities those of
interest to this study were: Tabriz [Azaris], Ardebil
[Azaris], Mahabad [Kurds], Rezaiyeh [Azaris and Kurds],
Kermanshahan [Shii Kurds], Sanandaj [Kurds], Zahedan
[Baluch and others].34
The media, particularly NIRT, were completely
controlled by the government and reflected the regime's
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notions of development and change for the Iranian society
as well as providing legitimacy for the regime. Most of
television programming, for example, were geared to
acculturate the Iranian society to a Western style of
life. In such provinces as Azarbaijan, Kurdish inhabited
areas and Baluchistan and Sistan, local radio and TV
stations broadcast a few hours of local programming and
music in the native provincial] languages. The content
of these programs, however, were mostly propaganda or
admiration of the Shah, his family and his policies.35
Much has been said and written about the exposure to
the mass media. Karl Deustch, for example, stresses the
role of what he calls "basic communication grids" in the
process of political integration. However, Deustch does
not consider this as the only factor that affects the
"growth of nations."36 Deutsch, in fact, identifies seven
more factors that contribute to this process. These are:
transition from subsistence to market economies, the
integrating influences of core areas on the "socially
mobilized" rural populations; urbanization and subsequent
results of social mobility within urban areas and between
"town and country"; different concentration of capital and
skills and social institutions between regions and classes
and their "lift pump affects on other areas and
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populations" with the successive entry of different social
strata into the nationalistic phase; the emergence of
individual self-awareness and the rise of individual and
group interests that would prompt people to join groups
united by language and communications habits; the rise of
"ethnic awareness and the acceptance of national symbols";
the identification of ethnic awareness with state coercion
which in turn will result in the transformation of one
group into a dominant one.37
The key factor for Deutsch is the concept of "social
mobilization." Social mobilization is a process that the
population of modernizing societies undergo; a process of
movement out of traditional patterns of life and into new
values and behaviors. Social mobilization is defined as
"the process through which major clusters of old social,
economic, psychological commitments are eroded and broken
and people become available for new patterns of
socialization and behavior." 38 Deustch later elaborated
on the link between social mobilization and politicization
of the population. In other words, a socially mobilized
population will demand political participation and such
demand if unmet could "express itself informally through
greater numbers of people taking part in crowds and riots,
in meetings and demonstrations, in strikes and
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uprisings."39 Although the above statement can be
interpreted as a recognition of a possibility for ethnic
conflict, Deutsch himself does not elaborate. He,
however, explicitly links social mobilization to national
integration by writing that "a nation, is the result of
the transformation of a people or of several ethnic
elements, in the process of social mobilization.40 Thus
one consequence of social mobilization is "a shift of
emphasis away from the parochialism....of many traditional
cultures to a preoccupation with the supralocal but far
less worldwide unit of the territorial, and eventually,
national, state."41
Although Deutsch recognizes the significance of such
factors as language in the communication between the
rulers and the ruled and admits that in a heterogeneous
country, rapid social mobilization can result in political
instability, he believes that the state can solve this
problem by a series of "creative adjustments"4 2 about
which he does not elaborate. He, however, states that if
a government is not capable to meet the demands put upon
it by the rapid social mobilization it will confront
political instability regardless of the ethno-linguistic
character of its population.4 3 Deutsch indeed briefly
deals with the link between assimilation and group
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conflict by stating that if the socially mobilized group
is not assimilated then group conflict can be expected.44
Deutsch's approach, however, becomes ambiguous when in one
article he writes:
The process of modernization will draw many of the
most gifted and energetic individuals into the cities
or the growing sectors of the economy away from their
former minority or tribal groups, leaving these
traditional groups weaker, more stagnant and easier
to govern.45
Despite his ambiguous approach, in the last analysis,
Deutsch's overall tendency is to link social mobilization
to national and political integration. His theoretical
postulates thus lose their effectiveness when applied to a
case study such as Iran.
There is no doubt that modernization policies of
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi entailed the social
mobilization of a great number of the population. The
commercialization of agriculture had impacts on many
peasants who were being integrated into the larger
economy. We also noted that the land reform policies
resulted in massive migrations into urban centers.
Increase in the rate of urbanization, transitional
economies, development of communication and transportation
networks, differential or uneven development and its
consequences all helped the "mobilized individual" of
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Deutsch emerge in Iran. One should, however, note that
this was not an all-encompassing phenomenon; since only
those segments of the population who experienced change
had become socially mobilized. There is, however, no
reason to believe that such social mobilization entailed
emergence of a common identity among the diverse
population of Iran. Deutsch's approach, thus, becomes
insufficient here because the concept of "social
mobilization" and other related concepts that are linked
to the "growth of a nation" do not adequately answer the
question of "what makes a society hang together?"
If by "integration" one means the forceful inclusion
of diverse peoples within the territorial state, then one
can claim that Iran was "nationally" and "politically"
integrated during the Shah's regime. It is, however,
obvious that if a state has to resort to coercion to keep
the polity together then "national integration" is nothing
but a chimera. In the same light, one may ask does common
participation in a money economy and collective subjection
to an autocratic rule mean that a society is integrated?
It is true that the efforts of the Shah's regime helped
foster economic integration of most of the regions in Iran
and economic interdependence can work as an integrative
force. However, it should also be noted that in some
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remote areas such as Baluchistan the participation of the
indigenous population in a common system of production was
almost nil. Also it is true that the establishment of
functionally differentiated institutions at the center
helps the decay of local and indigenous political
structures where it is intended to do so. But, the
important question is: did a strong collective
consciousness emerge that could unite and join together
all these different units and make a united whole out of
them? Although the revolution of 1978-79 proved that the
Shah's regime had not been able to create mass
identification and loyalty towards the state, the
following accounts of Azaris, Kurds and Baluch demonstrate
that through policies of intimidation and accommodation,
i.e., "carrot and stick" the regime successfully
neutralized different groups as long as it ruled over the
Iranian populations.
THE AZARIS:
The Democratic Republic of Azarbaijan was the last
open and organized expression of Azari national identity
in Iran. The organizations and institutions of the
Democratic Regime immediately collapsed with no political
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leadership surviving the onslaught of the Pahlavi regime.
The Tudeh also did not engage in any organizational
activity in Azarbaijan until 1951. Around this time, a
number of the surviving members of the Democratic Party
made contacts with the Tudeh that resulted in the
emergence of party organization in Azarbaijan.46
During this period, Azaris, like other ethno-
linguistically distinct groups, were deprived of the use
of their language in schools and administration. Thus,
many activists, particularly those who engaged in literary
endeavours, immigrated to Tehran "where there was less
danger of identification with the cause of the Pishevari
regime.,,4 7
Early fifties coincided with the rule of Dr.
Mosaddeq. As we noted Dr. Mosaddeq and the National Front
advocated the idea of Iranian nationalism and opposed
local autonomy. Although population of Tabriz is said to
have supported Dr. Mosaddeq 4 8 there are indications that
not everyone in Azarbaijan felt the same way. The Azari
landlords were irked by Mosaddeq's advocacy of the rights
of the peasantry and the political leaders who were
disappointed because of his opposition to local autonomy
did not extend their support either.
The political atmosphere, however, was more open and
338
less repressive towards the Communists. Thus many of the
men who were Pishevari sympathizers or members of his
government, established such organizations as "The
Association of the Friends of Azarbaijan" or "The
Association of Azarbaijani Writers" and were engaged in
literary activity in Tehran.4 9 These "associations"
published various papers and books of prose and poetry in
Tehran particularly between 1951-1953. After the fall of
Dr. Mosaddeq, however, their activities came to a halt.
Throughout the rest of the Shah's period although there
was a formal ban on Azari publications, it seems that the
regime did allow "politically correct" literature in Azari
to be produced. Berengian writes:
The greate bulk of the literature produced in the
post-war period has receded to the level of folk and
popular expression and thus falls into the category
of the now permissible designation mahalli [local].
Even the works with legitimate claim to the status of
"art" or "formal" literature hide themselves behind
this label, in order not to meet with serious
discouragement. For similar reasons, most writers in
Turkic prefer publishing under pseudonym, and most
Turkic works appear with Persian titleso50
Although any mention of Pishevari and the Democratic
regime had been a taboo both in Azari literary works and
among the Iranian Azaris, Eric Hooglund who spent 2 years
(1966-68) in Iranian Azarbaijan writes that the memory of
Firgeh-e demokrat was well and alive among many Azaris in
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the late 1960s.
Among the younger generation ca. 18 to 25 in 1966-
68], there was an especially positive,even idealized,
view of this time. Most Azarbayjanis, even those who
expressed disapproval of the autonomous movement,
resented bitterly the national holiday on December 12
to commemorate the "liberation" of Azarbayjan.51
This has also been confirmed by Nabdel who believes
the repression of Azari culture and language has created
this "escapism."52 It is, at the same time, an indication
that not only a distinct Azari identity has continued to
exist but the Azari younger generation demonstrates its
disappointments with the regime through the expression of
Azari identity.
At the same time, since social stratification and
social structure in Azarbaijan resembled those of the
Persian-inhabited areas, the process of change in
Azarbaijan resulted in the emergence of similar social
strata, however in a smaller scale. As among the
Persians, the Pahlavi rule prompted the emergence of new
classes in Azarbaijan who were distinct from the
traditional classes not by virtue of their wealth but by
their world-view. Like their Persian counterparts, these
new classes owed a great deal to the Pahlavi modernization
policies. Many of these new bureaucratic and technocratic
strata actually migrated to Tehran and were working in
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various state institutions. It is important to note that
the Iranian Azaris, although were subjected to cultural
bigotry and slurs by the Persians, never experienced
social, economic and administrative discrimination.
Indeed the Iranian Azaris enjoyed the same rights and
privileges as the Persians.
In Table VII which is compiled from Marvin Zonis's
The Political Elite of Iran, one notes that although the
number of political elite born in Tehran and in other
Persian speaking areas is by far the largest, Azarbaijan
ranks highest among other groups.5 3 The same results is
obtained from the data on the birth place of nearly 4,500
members of the Iranian elite [Table VIII]. Of 4464
individuals who were requested to provide information,
1683 had not indicated their birth place. Among the rest,
those born in Persian speaking areas again ranked highest
with Azaris following. It should also be mentioned that
Farah Diba [the late Shah's wife] was from Azarbaijan as
well as a number of important civil and military officers.
During this period, although many Azaris complained
about unequitable allocation of resources and the imposed
restrictions on the Azari language, separatist activities
were scarce. The strategic importance of Azarbaijan and
the numerical strength of the Azaris had made the Shah's
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regime responsive to Azari political elite. Not only the
political leaders of Azarbaijan were accommodated but
social mobility was unhampered for the average Azari.
Thus the patterns of Azari response to the changing
political scene in Iran was similar to that of the Persian
population. The Azaris revolted to topple the regime like
the Persians but they did not demand autonomy or
independence.
Many Azari peasants shared the same experiences as
their Persian counterparts. Azarbaijan was the first
province in which land reform was carried out.54 Also the
greatest number of peasants benefiting from the first
stage of the land reform were located in East
Azarbaijan.55 It should, however, be pointed out that
despite the fact that Azarbaijan was among the relatively
developed provinces of Iran, in 1966 such cities as Tabriz
and Ardebil contributed 50,000 and 120,000 persons
respectively to the population of Tehran.56 Also in a
study of squatter settlements in Tehran the squatters from
the province of East Azarbaijan ranked highest after
Khurasan and Central provinces.57
The calm in Azarbaijan during the rule of the second
Pahlavi Shah should not be interpreted as total support of
the Azaris. Not unlike the Persians, opposition was
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strong among the intelligentsia, the intellectuals and
some of the clergy or religious students [tullabs]. Some
Azari intellectuals, particularly those with leftist
tendencies were very critical of the regime. The most
important among the Azari intellectuals who objected to
the authoritarian rule of the Shah and demanded autonomy
for Azarbaijan were Dr. Qolam Hossein Saedi [1935-1985)
and Samad Behrangi [1939-1969). Both men mostly wrote in
Persian and one was a novelist of international stature.
It should be noted that not all Azari nationalists
were intellectuals. Other personalities appeared who
signified the existence of inherently communalistic
tendencies. Ali Tabrizi was one such individual who, is
said to have been a peddler selling books near the City
Park in Tehran. Tabrizi who wrote pan-Turkish poetry and
demonstrated great animosity toward Persians was able to
attract the attention of the Azari lowest strata in
Tehran. Nabdel, an Azari Leninist-Stalinist intellectual
who headed the People's Fedayin Guerrilla Organization of
Iran in Azarbaijan, rejects Tabrizi's poetry as
"reactionary trash" and believes that such tendencies will
impede and hamper the real struggle of the working peoples
against the capitalists and the bourgeois middle
classes.58
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The Azari rank and file, however, demonstrated great
interest in the "national" or "folkloric" poetry and
prose. In fact one particular booklet of Azari poems,
called Heydar Babaya Salam, written by Mohammad Hossein
Shahriar made history. It is translated into Persian and
Published in Turkey and the Soviet Azarbaijan. Heydar
Baba is the name of a mountain in Azarbaijan near a
village where Shahriar spent his childhood years.
Although the poems are devoid of political content, they
are embodiments of Azari fears, hopes and aspirations.
Shahriar, by writing Heydar Baba gave the mountain a
mythical quality.
Heydar Baba and a number of other "politically
correct" works were the only ones that were allowed to be
published in Azari. During 1960s, however, the Shah's
regime, consolidated and more secure, increased the time
allotted to Azari music and other programs in Radio Tabriz
and Radio Rezaiyeh. In the meantime, the Azarbaijan State
Television and Radio in the Soviet Union that had begun
broadcasts to Iran over Radio Baku since 1941, started to
direct these programs at a specifically Iranian Azari
audience in the mid-1950s.5 9 Soon literary works
published in Baku were being sold in Iranian Azarbaijan's
book stores.6 0 Nabdel contends this was a consequence of
the "revisionism" that with the emergence of Khroshchev
occurred in the Soviet Union. In answer to the question
why it waFs possible to disseminate and sell literary works
from Baku and not from Iranian Azarbaijan, he writes that
firstly "revisionism" meant the end of real Socialism in
the Soviet Union and secondly most of the important papers
and books were in Cyrillic and only a small fraction of
Iranian Azaris could read and understand them and thirdly
these works were such trash that could hardly pose any
threat to the stability of the regime in Iran.61 These
interactions, regardless of the reasons, kept the bonds
between the two Azarbaijans alive and well.
THE EXTERNAL FORCES
The flirtations of the Russian Azari intellectuals
with Iranian Azaris continued throughout the Shah's
regime. The "southern question ' in the Russian Azarbaijan
was institutionalized by establishment of such
organizations as the Azarbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences
that through two of its institutes, the Institute of the
Peoples of the Near and the Middle East and the Nizami
Institute of Literature helped production and
dissemination of research projects and literary works
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about Iranian Azarbaijan.6 2 According to Nissman:
All Soviet Azerbaijanis who [were] prominent in
discussions on the southern question in the post-war
period [were] party members and some held important
positions at the All-Union level.63
There is no doubt that the Soviet authorities were
interested in the "national liberation" of the Iranian
Azarbaijan but they mostly left this task to the Soviet
Azaris themselves.
The Iranian Azaris, for their part, although
interested, do not seem to have reciprocated Soviet Azari
enthusiasm. It is in the Soviet Azarbaijan that we find
the idea of the "south" and the "literature of longing" so
strong and emotionally charged and not in the Iranian
Azarbaij an.
Regarding the perceptions and feelings of the Iranian
Azaris toward the Ottoman Turks it should be pointed out
that the Azaris have not demonstrated a great deal of
sympathy for the Turks and ethnic and linguistic
affinities have not acted as unifying factors. Indeed,
except a short period during W.W.I. when the Iranian
Azaris welcomed the Ottoman "liberators" as opposed to the
Russian "occupiers," there has been no indication of the
Azaris' interest in the Ottoman Turks and frequent Turkish
overtures of unity and solidarity have not elicited
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favorable Azari response. Iranian Azaris have obviously
felt more comfortable to live within an undivided State of
Iran than aspiring to join the Ottoman Turks with whom
they seem to have only a language in common. At the same
time the experiences of both Iranian and Russian Azaris
with the Ottoman Turks during both Wars have made them
realize that they will be somehow less than first class
citizens in a state dominated by the Ottoman Turks.
THE KURDS:
The downfall of the Mahabad Republic of 1946 and
subsequent consolidation of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
made organized Kurdish nationalist endeavours almost
impossible. After the demise of the Republic, a
systematic program of disarming and settling of those
Kurds who were nomadic or semi nomadic began. Many
Kurdish chieftains pragmatically gave allegiance to the
regime and claimed that they were forced to cooperate with
the fallen Republic.64 Those who were still defiant were
pacified militarily while Kurdish publications and the use
of Kurdish in schools and administrative offices was
banned.
The Shah's regime, contrary to the regime in Turkey,
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recognized its Kurdish population but emphasized the
Kurds' Aryan or Iranian origins. The Kurds, like the
Azaris and other ethno-linguistically distinct groups,
were neither counted nor granted separate representation
in the government. The Pahlavi regime only recognized
non-Muslim groups as "religious minorities" and the Kurds
as Sunni Muslims did not qualify to be recognized as such.
With the consolidation of the Shah's regime most
Kurdish nationalist and activists especially the KDPI
[Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran] went underground and
throughout the Pahlavi period KDPI, while gradually taking
a more leftist stance, was under siege.65 The
government's harrassment of the KDPI was particularly
heightened after Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the return
of Mulla Mostafa Barzani [the tribal leader of Iraqi
Kurdish nationalist movement] to Iraq.
The average Kurd in Iran, however, remained poor and
deprived particualrly in the province of Kurdestan proper.
The Kurdish inhabited areas in this period were divided
among three provinces of West Azarbaijan, Kurdestan and
Kermanshahan. The Kurds share the province of West
Azarbaijan, with Azaris while in Kurdestan and
Kermanshahah they comprise the overwhelming majority of
the population. Among these three provinces the province
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of Kermanshahan attracted more development spending.6 6
The reason for more prosperity in the Kermanshah Province
is that there is an oil field [Naft-i Shah Field] in the
area located in immediate proximity to the Iraqi border.
This field is connected by two pipelines one for
petroleum and one for natural gas products] to one of
Iran's older refineries in Kermanshah built in 1935. This
refinery processed only a very small percentage of Iran's
total refined output and provided petroleum for domestic
consumption only.6 7 The province of Kurdestan, however,
is rugged and very mountainous and mostly neglected while
province of Western Azarbaijan due to its agricultural and
other potentials has been more developed than Kurdestan.
The data in the tables at the end of this chapter
demonstrate that the disparity between these three
provinces was a constant factor throughout the Pahlavi
rule. Although each province showed some absolute
improvement the differential rate of development continued
to persist.
Prior to the land reform program considerable areas
of land were in the hands of tribal khans as landlords who
treated the peasants as chattel and took advantage of
their power and status.6 8 After the land reform, as
Qassemlu the Secretary General of the KDPI wrote, the big
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landlords have disappeared and in turn there are more
medium landlords who managed to hold on to their lands and
also more small landholding peasants. 69 The traditional
structure has thus given way to market economy and
subsequent economic integration of Kurdish rural areas
into the national economy. Many peasants who were driven
off the land joined the ranks of the unemployed Kurds in
urban areas.70
Another change brought about by land distribution and
the consequent deruralization of the Kurds has been the
gradual weakening of the tribal structure. The process,
however, has been extremely slow. Although many Kurds who
have moved into the urban areas might have lost their
previous attachment to a particular tribe, the tribal
mindset still persists. 71 Indeed, the growth of
urbanization among the Kurds does not mean that loyalty to
the Pahlavi state replaced their traditional tribal
attachments. The reasons for this phenomenon, again,
should be sought in the particular approach of the state
toward the Kurds and their leaders.
It is, undoubtedly, true that the Shah's regime did
not demonstrate much interest to accommodate the Kurds as
it did the Azaris. A psycho-historical investigation that
may illuminate the reasons for such neglect is beyond the
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scope of this study. Indeed, although the Pahlavi state
referred to the Kurds as "pure Iranians" and "ethnic kin"
of the Persians, in reality the regime's approach did not
go far beyond those rhetorics. If the Qajars looked for
ways to accommodate some powerful tribal leaders, the
reasons should be found in the Qajars inherent military
and bureaucratic weakness. The Pahlavi regime with an
omnipotent and strong army did not have to pay lip service
to the tribal warlords to guarantee their cooperation.
Some tribal chiefs and other political leaders were, of
course, coopted but no significant effort at power sharing
was attempted. However, the Kurdish political and
economic elite did compris a small percentage of the
national elite, among whom Dr. Ardalan the last Court
Minister and General Palizban who was the last Governor
General of Kermanshah province should be mentioned. These
men, however, were token Kurds from wealthy families who
mostly had lost touch with the Kurdish rank and file.
There was thus little identification between the average
Kurds and the few Kurdish leaders co-opted by the regime.
In [Table VIII] data collected from Iran Who's Who,
Kermanshah ranked highest as the birth place for
individuals born in Kurdish inhabited areas. It should be
noted again that most of the Kurds of Kermanshah are Shiis
351
and do not necessarily share the aspirations of the Sunni
Kurds of Iran. The Iranian Shii Kurds have systematically
sided with the government as opposed to their Sunni co-
ethnics.
As the Shah's regime did not make a real attempt at
power sharing, the moderate Kurdish activists became more
and more radicalized. At the same time, the Kurdish
different urban strata particularly the Kurdish middle
class were disappointed at the National Front and its
stance vis-a-vis the question of Iranian "nationalities."
Thus, most Kurds did not show much interests in
cooperation with the National Front. The fact that the
Kurds are sunnis also helped separate them from religious
forces whose main objective was the removal of the Shah's
regime. This alienation and separation from other
opposition forces led the Kurds more into nationalist and
leftist directions which, in turn, helped politicize
larger segments of the Kurdish middle classes and the
intelligentsia.
The Kurdish peasantry continued to look toward the
tribal elite some of whose modernized and urbanized
segments participated in the underground nationalist
activities. The KDPI that was underground throughout the
rule of the Shah, boasted many feudal and .ribal leaders
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among its membership. Qassemlu, the Secretary General of
the party himself belonged to the Kurdish feudal elite.72
EXTERNAL FORCES:
Two factors seem to have had important effects on the
struggle of the Kurds in Iran. The first is the external
element, i.e., the Kurdish struggle in the neighbouring
countries particularly in Iraq. The second is the intra-
ethnic fragmentation and conflict not only among the Kurds
in different countries but within the Iranian Kurdish
community. The 1958 Revolution in Iraq and subsequent
events brought the Iraqi Kurds into direct confrontation
with the Iraqi central government. From 1960 to 1975 the
Iraqi Kurds under the banner of Mulla Mostafa Barzani
engaged in violent military clashes with different regimes
in Iraq. During this period the Shah of Iran indirectly
and soon directly gave financial and military assistance
to Barzani forces in order to destabilize Iraqi politics.
This confronted the Iranian Kurds with a dilemma.
Qassemlu writes that during this period KDPI's activities
in Iran "were frozen."7 3 Indeed as long as the Iranian
government was the life line of the Iraqi Kurds the
Kurdish political elite in Iran chose not to do anything
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to disturb the delicate situation. And this brings us to
the second issue, that of internal fragmentation among the
Kurds. To be able to cooperate with Barzani who
represented feudal, conservative forces in Iraqi
Kurdistan, the KDPI chose a more conservative leadership.
However, Barzani to reciprocate the Shah's favours,
arreasted and handed over to the regime, several Iranian
Kurdish activists with leftist leanings who had decided to
continue their struggle. He even executed one Kurdish
leader and returned the corpse to Iran. This was, indeed,
a prime example of Kurdish fragmentation and a low point
in Kurdish political history which is replete with such
acts of betrayal and fratricide.
It is ironic that the Iraqi Kurds, although have paid
the highest price for their conflict with the state, have
also enjoyed more cultural and some political freedom.
Compared to the Iranian or Turkish Kurds, the Iraqi Kurds
were the only group who succeeded to acquire a legal
status. This legal status while differentiated the Kurds
from the rest of the Iraqi population, i.e., the Arabs,
helped guarantee Kurdish rights to safeguard and develop
their own culture. The history of the struggle for this
legal status dates back to the British occupation of
southern Kurdistan during and after the W.W.I. Under the
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Mandate, the government of Iraq kept these guarantees in
force, and occasionally upheld them.
Iraq, as a nation, on the other hand, was founded in
the context of Arab nationalism. Thus the Kurds who
according to the Iraqi Constitution were to have been
"partners" with the Arabs,74 claim that they were being
systematically discrimianted against by the Arab
authorities. The Kurdish national movement, however, had
a far better growth and evolution in Iraq than elsewhere
and this is partly due to the fact that the Iraqi Kurds
enjoyed more cultural freedom than their kinsmen in Iran
and Turkey. Kurdish literary materials have been freely
published in Iraq and the relative freedom of primary
education in Kurdish has allowed for the standardization
of the Sorani dialect of Kurdish.7 5
The Shah of Iran entered Kurdish-Arab equation when
the Iraqi Kurds had learned with much disappointment that
their Arab "partners" were reluctant to share power and
economic gains with them. The Shah, however, never meant
to assist the Iraqi Kurds to the end. A Kurdish success
in Iraq would, undoubtedly, have had "demonstration
effects" in Iran.
Thus, the vicissitudes of international politics as
well as Kurdish internal fragmentation should be
355
considered as important impediments to Kurdish
unificaiton. Unlike Azaris whose division between two
states has not contributed to a cultural alienation, the
division of the Kurds has made an already precarious
cultural identity more difficult to materialize. Most of
the Kurds of Iraq [except those who live in northernmost
area] can exchange cultural and literary works with those
who live in a large part of the Iranian Kurdish-inhabited
area. The same literary products are not intelligible to
the Kurds who live in the northern parts of the Iranian
Kurdish areas who in turn speak the language [dialect]
used in Kurdish areas of Turkey and northern Iraq. The
Kurds in Turkey are unable to engage in literary exchange
with either Iraqi or Iranian Kurds not only because of a
different dialect they speak but because in Turkey latin
script is used and in Iran and Iraq Arabic script is the
literary medium. All these as well as the conflict
inherent in a tribal society have had far-reaching
political ramifications the most important of which has
been the manipulation of Kurds as pawns in the inter-state
power politics.
The Pahlavi regime might have had the support of a
few Kurdish landed elite but by and large the regime never
seriously attempted to gain some sorts of "grass roots"
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support among the newly emerging Kurdish middle and lower
middle classes. The regime was also impervious to the
situation of the Kurdish peasantry. The result was
further radicalization of Kurdish intelligentsia and
middle classes. Many Kurdish organizations, particularly
student organizations, became very active in both Iran and
abroad in the last decade of the Pahlavi rule. The basic
objective of these organizations was propagation of the
idea of "Kurdish national identity." Among these
organizations, the KDPI was the most organized and
efficient.
The KDPI basically demanded autonomy for the Kurds
within an undivided democratic Iranian state with foreign
policy, national defence and plans for national economy
remaining in the domains of the central government.
Autonomy, of course, meant complete cultural and
administrative self-determination. The KDPI also
proclaimed that since the dictatorial regime of the Shah
left no room for democracy in Iran the party opted for
armed struggle.7 6 This, of course, explains the onslaught
of the regime on the party and its leadership.
it is thus not surprising that the KDPI and the
Iranian Kurds readily and willingly participated in the
Revolution of 1978-79 and until the success of the
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Revolution the declared objective of the party was the
overthrow of the Pahlavi regime. It was only after the
new regime was established that Kurdish cries for autonomy
and self-determination could be heard.
In the following chapter we will review the 1979
Revolution and the reasons why the Kurdish political elite
could not come to terms with the Islamic Republic.
THE BALUCH:
Although the weakening of the central authority after
Reza Shah's abdication had endowed the Baluch with more
freedom, the Shah's consolidation soon re-established the
authority of the central government in Iranian
Baluchistan. However, during 1950s, the Shah's regime had
to deal with tribal resistance which was manifested in the
revolt of Dad Shah, a Baluch petty chieftain. Dad Shah
who is considered a hero and a martyr by the Baluch and a
renegade bandit by the Persians, engaged in hit and run
activities against the central government's officials and
military and police outposts. In the process he also
killed an American military aid official and his wife
together with another American accompanying them.77 This
prompted the regime to try to deal with him once and for
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all. Hosseinborn writes that Dad Shah was betrayed by
other Baluch chiefs who lured him to a metting place where
he was killed.78 Dad Shah's revolt, although important
for the Baluch, did not possess a nationalist quality and
was devoid of grass roots support. From then on despite
the fact that military units were permanently stationed in
the region, the regime's co-optation of the Baluch tribal
elite mostly with subsidies and stipends and sometimes
with position was particularly successful in keeping the
region calm.
During the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, Baluchistan
was completely integrated into the Iranian civil
bureaucratic structures. Also the provincial frontiers
were altered again. Baluchistan now came to include
Sistan which is non-Baluch and Shii and thus the province
of Sistan and Baluchistan was created. Part of the region
was also annexed by provinces of Khorasan and Kerman and
the Baluch living there counted as Khorasanis or Kermanis.
Such division is the main reason many Baluch nationalists
reject the population data given by the government. To
all this one should add the systematic out-migration of
the Baluch to find employment elsewhere in Iran or in Arab
Sheikhdoms and also the in-migration of Persian settlers
in Baluchistan.7 9
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During the Shah's period no Baluch was ever appointed
to a high provincial administrative position let alone
governorship. The officials running the bureaucracy in
the province were mostly Persian and some Sistanis who are
Persian speaking and Shii. In the meantime, as in other
ethnically distinct provinces, an assimilationist policy
was pursued. The compulsory use of Persian hampered
literary development of an already underdeveloped Baluchi
language. Also, as in Kurdish Areas, wearing of ethnic
costums was banned.
In 1957, the Shah's regime commissioned an Italian
Economic Mission, Italkonsult, to study and submit a plan
for the soio-economic development of southeastern region
of Iran. Spooner writes that the Mission provided the
government with a detailed account of the agriculture,
hydrology, and geology of the region. However, its work
on sociological aspects of Baluchi life, however, was not
completed.8 0 It is also not clear to what extent the
government took into consideration the recommendations of
the Commission since modernization policies of the Shah's
regime hardly touched Baluchistan until 1970s. Ann
Lambton who visited Baluchistan in 1964 writes that the
region was barely affected by the first stage of the land
reform. Besides the fact that the province was among the
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regions where the number of estates were very small, the
few villages that were transferred to the peasants "were
not typical of the province."8 1 The interesting point is
that the villagers cultivating these lands were Yazdis
[Persian-speaking] and thus non-Baluch.82
During 1970s, the Baluchistan Development
Organization was established by the government to
facilitate building of infrastructure in the region.
Along with sedentarization the government assisted in the
spread of irrigation agriculture. At the same time the
amount of funds allocated to the region increased.8 3
Baluchistan was, by now, almost completely integrated into
the national economy. Roads were constructed through
which Zahedan [the capital of the province] was linked to
Chahbahar, an important port in the Gulf of Oman. To many
Baluch the military bases at Chahbahar and other places in
Baluchistan were the main reasons for the building of the
infrastructure there.8 4 The province throughout the
Shah's rule remained devoid of any industrial plant.8 5
However, the process of change, as late as it came,
affected many aspects of Baluch life. Urban classes began
to appear while radio and television connected the Baluch
to a world beyond their reach. By early 70s, most Baluch
possessed a transistor radio and could not only listen to
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Baluchi broadcasts of Radio Zahedan but also had access to
Baluchi boradcasts from Pakistan. Also it was in 1973
that the University of Baluchistan was established and
although most students attending the university were non-
Baluch, from 1972 to 1979 there were between 60 to 100
Baluch students attending the university. At the same
time a Teachers Training College in Zahedan provided more
opportunities for upwardly mobile Baluch.86
There was also some erosion of the tribal structure.
The new economic opportunities such as wage employment and
market production as well as migrant labor and a thriving
smuggling activity helped transform the tribal economy and
this, in turn, had an impact on the basic mode of
adaptation in Baluchistan which was manifested in the
decline of pastoralism. Salzman writes:
Why invest capital in such a vulnerable sector when
other sectors, such as irrigation agriculture,
commercial activities driving motorcycle taxies,
working in retail stores, tailoring], and even large
scale smuggling seem more secure?8 7
The political calm in Baluchistan during the rule of
the Shah can probably be attributed to two factors. One
is the slow pace of change and the other is the regime's
control through indirect rule. From the outset, many
Baluch tribal and feudal leaders were coopted by the
regime. This "indirect" use of existing traditional
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authority structures enabled the state to rule Baluchistan
even when the region was not fully integrated into the
national economy and civil bureaucracy. Salzman documents
the regime's policies of indirect rule through stipends
and subsidies. In the areas where he studied, some
Sardars [tribal chiefs of northern Baluchistan] misused
the funds provided by the center since the government had
put them in control of a "great many of the tribe's
resources and thus provided them with a middle-man
function." 88 At the same time, a very small minority
among the Baluch political elite was appointed to posts at
the national level. These individuals were five or six
loyal Baluch leaders who were chosen and appointed as
representatives in the rubber stamp parliament.
Salzman attempts to explain the absence of Baluch
nationalist movement in this period in terms of the
overall effects of change on Baluchi identity:
...Contact with other peoples in developing and
modernized urban settings of Iran and the Persian
Gulf has undercut the insular local orientation and
the conviction that to be human is to be
Baluch.... The tribesmen have not become cosmopolitan
but Baluch chauvinism has gone into a steep
decline.89
Salzman concludes that as a result of the above
impediments to the growth of the Baluch identity, the
Baluch have resorted to the revival and elaboration of
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Sunni Islam to bolster their identity vis-a-vis Shi'ite
Persians.90
Another anthropologist, Brian Spooner, also has
attempted to explain the rise of religious leaders among
the Baluch. However, while for Spooner this phenomenon is
a result of a general fall in the activity of secular
leadership9 1 for Salzman the rise of religious leadership
was simultaneous with the increase of the authority of the
secular leadership.92 Although Salzman attempts to
explain this obvious discrepancy by attributing it to the
fact that the two anthropologists studied different parts
of the region, his explanations are not very clear.
What is certain is that the process of change
particularly the introduction of new political and
administrative structures challenges the social world of
the indigenous peoples thus undermining social cohesion.
the "indirect rule" does not mean that the power of the
tribal chiefs or the traditional political structure
remains intact. The monopoly of force is concentrated in
the central government and this fact characterizes the
relationship of the center and the group as one of
submission and domination. This political domination is
usually accompanied by cultural domination. The following
passage is revealing:
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Among the assortment of luxury items, there are
electrical appliances, machine-made rugs, cowboy
costumes, chic rubber shoes, eau de cologne, and
perfumed soaps ...... In Chahbahar, you can see a
Baluchi student with a lei costume, wearing a foreign
cologne, insisting that he is imitating the
Persians. 93
The transformation and displacement brought about by
the process of change had undoubtedly affected the Baluch.
The emergence of religious leaders in the Baluch political
arena can be better understood in the light of what
happened in the mainstream Iranian politics. Like many
Persians, the Baluch torn between two worlds, one losing
its relevance and the other menacing and alien, resorted
to an Islamic expression of identity in their search for
self-definition.
Such attention to religion could also be explained by
the fact that many Baluch did not approve of the
submission of their political leaders to the Pahlavi
state. They were well aware of the abuse and corruption
of their chiefs who played the role of intermediaries
between the group and the bureaucracy. These political
leaders indeed lost their credibility and traditional
legitimacy in time.94
Salzman, thus, may be correct when he asserts that
Baluch parochialism was affected. However, there is no
reason to believe that change had helped reduce Baluch
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identification with the indigenous community. Similar to
the situation among the Kurds a sense of a wider loyalty
to the ethnic community was replacing identification with
the tribe. The events after the Revolution of 1978-79
demonstrated that the transition had indeed enhanced
Baluch sense of ethnic identity.
However, since the Iranian Baluch lack a history of
nationalist activity with capable leaders and
sophisticated organizations, it is not surprising that the
Iranian Baluch usually looked at the Pakistani Baluch for
direction and inspiration. Even the Pakistani Baluch with
their much larger urban middle strata and longer history
of nationalist struggle have welcomed and utilized the
assistance of the "non-Baluch" elements.9 5
Nationalist aspirations in Iranian Baluchistan were
thus expressed through different channels. One a marxist-
Leninist channel inspired by the struggle of the Pakistani
Baluch and some of its leaders who had left a great
impression on the small and nascent Baluch urban middle
and lower middle classes composed of students, teachers,
shopkeepers, bureaucrats and some professionals. The
other, an Islamic channel headed by Maulavis Baluch
religious leaders] who began gaining power and prestige
during the last decade of the Shah's rule and were
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followed by the rank and file.
The emergence of the Baluch middle strata has been a
turning point in the growth of the group's ethnic/national
consciousness. The Baluch middle class has a vested
interest in the growth and promotion of a national
identity. Harrison writes:
As the Shah cautiously permitted education to reach
the Baluch, Iranian Baluchistan began to look like a
miniature version of Pakistani Baluchistan, with the
educated unemployed rapidly assuming politically
significant proportions. High school and junior
college graduates, in particular, had nowhere to go
and were starting to think in terms of independence
before the Shah's overthrow opened the way for an
unprecedented upsurge of political activity.9 6
Indeed, the middle class was the stratum who,
particularly, grieved about the educational system, the
mandatory use of the Persian language and the omnipresence
of the Persian teachers. In the meantime, many Baluch
migrants who returned from the Gulf states and were
affected by the nationalist activities of some Baluch
there, began helping organize "nationalist study groups
dedicated to 'Baluchistan for the Baluch.'" 97
Selig Harrison who visited Iranian Baluchistan on the
eve of the Revolution contends that the members of the
guerrilla organizations of Fediyan-e khalq [Marxist-
Leninist] and Mujahedin-e khalq [progressive Islamic) had
visited Baluchistan. He stresses the fact that despite
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obvious strength of the Marxist-Leninist sentiments among
politically conscious youth, these organizations and
particularly the Tudeh [Communist] Party were not able to
muster much support in Iranian Baluchistan.9 8 It should
>e noted that these organizations although support the
"oppressed nationalities" do not endorse the "right of
cessesion" or "independence." Indeed, the Baluch educated
youth have been more inclined to look up or aspire to join
such leftist Baluch organizations in Pakistan as the
Baluchistan's People's Liberation Front [BPLF].9 9
EXTERNAL FORCES:
Being a trans-border group, the Baluch are obviously
exposed to influences from their kin on the other side,
particularly in Pakistan. The external influence,
however, has been limited and transitory.
The Pakistani Baluch, although politically
subjugated, have enjoyed more cultural freedom than their
kin in Iran. The Baluch insurgency has thus been much
more intense and violent in Pakistan. The Iranian Baluchi
small middle class received inspiration from the Pakistani
Baluch but the tribal fragmentation and the successful
cooptation of the Baluch political leaders kept the Baluch
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rank and file static and depoliticized.
The details of the Baluch nationalist struggle in
Pakistan is beyond the scope of this study. It should be
pointed out, however, that the suppression of the Baluch
identity and attempts at the assimilation by the dominant
Punjabis created fierce opposition among the Pakistani
Baluch which culminated in a violent civil war between
1971-1977.10 0 In contrast to the Iranian Baluch, the
movement in the Pakistani Baluchistan has been organized
and has enjoyed sophisticated leadership. The main
figures of Baluch nationalist movement in Pakistan are
three powerful tribal chieftains. Their tribal origins
make these men appeal to the Baluch rank and file.
However, since as privileged members of Baluch society
they have had access to modern education and partly
because of their leftist leanings the three men have
enjoyed the backing of more modern elements of Baluch
society.
In pakistani Baluchistan such political parties as
the Pakistan National Party PNP], the Baluch Popular
Liberation Front [PBLF] and the Baluch Student
Organization [BSO] are all nationalist. However, each
advocates a different approach to the problem which is
mainly a reflection of their ideological orientation.
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It is ironic that during the rule of Mohammad Reza
Shah Pahlavi it was the Pakistani Baluch who were affected
by political necessities in Iran. With Zolfiqar Ali
Bhutto's coming to power in Pakistan and the initial
empowerment of Baluch leaders, conflict between the Baluch
and the Pakistani central government made the Shah of Iran
very nervous. At one point, Bhutto is reported to have
said "I cannot hand over Baluchistan to NAP [National
Awami Party] ,101 because the Shahinshah of Iran does not
approve of it."1 0 2 The Shah was obviously mindful of
demonstration effects of Pakistani Baluch independence or
secession. That is the main reason Iran actively
supported the Pakistani government in suppressing the
Baluch insurgency of 1971-1977. Iran had its own Baluch
under tight political control and was not going to allow
the Baluch movement in Pakistan to spill over into Iran.
Another influence from outside was the Arab,
particularly Iraqi, provocations in Iranian Baluchistan.
The Shah's assistance to the Iraqi Kurdish rebels prompted
Iraq to retaliate by stirring up the Iranian Baluch
through "smuggling in weapons and airing radio appeals in
Baluchi from across the Gulf."103
During, 1968-1973, a period called "Baghdad
Period" 10 4 the Iraqi leaders assisted a group of Baluchi
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exiles who together with Mir Abdi Khan the leader of
Sardarzai tribe of Iranian Baluchistan, had established
the Baluchistan Liberation Front [1964]. This was an
isolated case in the sense that although participation of
Mir Abdi Khan as a tribal chief was significant, he was
the only tribal leader who had become involved in Baluchi
nationalist struggle in Iran. It is not surprising that
the Front had to rely on the Arab support since there was
not much support for it in the region. The Shah's
successful cooptation had deprived the Baluch community of
Iran of a credible political leadership. More
importantly, in 1973, Mir Abdi Khan himself, gave in to
the Shah's regime and in a Radio Tehran broadcast
repented!1 05
The outcome of the Iraqi-Baluch alliance had a
lasting effect on the Baluch in the sense that many Baluch
began to re-examine this relationship and some even
refuted the claim that the Baluch had Arab ethnic
origins. 106 The Iraqi duplicity was revealed further by
the signing of the Algiers Agreement between the Shah and
Saddam Hossein according to which the two regimes were
reconciled and Tehran stopped supporting Iraqi Kurds. The
Baluch, thus, like the Kurds had to face the bitter
realities of the inter-state power politics.
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From then on, the nationalist struggle of the Baluch
was basically occurring in Pakistan. The Shah's regime in
addition to the Iron fist of the military increased
government spending in the 1970s and also no effort was
made to stop the large scale smuggling operation between
Pakistan, Iran and Persian Gulf ports. The regime was
trying to appease the Baluch political leaders and keep
the status quo intact. The Revolution of 1978-19 happened
when Iranian Baluchistan was disorganized and
leaderless. 1 0 7 Thus, contrary to the Kurds who
participated in the Revolution to bring down the Shah's
regime the Iranian Baluch waited and watched with
nervousness. The Shii aspects of the movement in Iran was
not very encouraging to the Baluch who could not trust the
Shii "Gajars."
This chapter examined the relationship between the
Iranian state and the Azaris, Kurds, and Baluch under the
rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi It was argued that
like his father, Mohammad Reza Shah was a modernizer who
stressed state-building at the expense of creating
"national cohesion" in Iran. The Shah, as his father,
earnestly believed that modernization of an underdeveloped
and mostly illeterate society will not be possible except
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through autocracy. Thus centralization of power and
economic planning were necessary to guarantee the success
of the regime's policies. In the process, a political
system emerged in which all authority was controlled from
the top while such seemingly democratic institutions as a
parliament, political parties, etc., existed in name only,
with no authority or autonomy of their own.
Mohammad Reza Shah, however, was not as determined as
his father in fostering the idea of Iranian nationalism.
As we noted, Reza Shah had championed the cause of an
independent and self-sufficient Iran, a strong state based
on an ancient civilization that would be free of foreign
control and external pressures. The emergence of Dr.
Mosaddeq and his brand of nationalism also signified the
same idea, ridding Iran of foreign exploitation and
control. It is interesting to note that the type of
"formula" presented by both men is essentially negative
and defensive instead of positive and integrative.
However, there is no doubt that political exigencies of
the time absolutely necessitated such an approach to
nationalism. Mohammad Reza Shah's brand of Iranian
nationalism, on the other hand, seems to have been forged
basically to counter Dr. Mosaddeq and his ideas as well as
to explain or justify the assistance rendered to the Shah
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by outside powers to re-capture the throne and his
continued amicable relations with the West. This
"positive nationalism" was, however, devoid of fundamental
elements of an integrative ideology. At the same time the
symbolic propagation of a remote past was clearly not
sufficient to create identification and loyalty to the
state among the Persians and the Azaris let alone other
ethnic groups.
During this period, Iranian population experienced
drastic change in many aspects of their lives. Rapid
economic growth and industrialization were pursued by the
regime as significant steps that would guarantee Iran's
place among the world's great nations. Concentration of
political power and other resources in the center meant
that the process of development in Iran, as in many other
countries, was extremely uneven and this involved
backwardness and lagging behind of many "peripheral"
communities vis-a-vis the center. It is, however,
interesting to note that modernization, or even uneven
development, per se, seem not to have played a significant
role in creaing communal conflict.
None of the groups under study here engaged in a
serious communal uprising with nationalist overtones after
1946. This is indeed one of the most interesting aspects
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of those inherent contradictions that predominated the
Shah's rule. In point of fact, his policies in relation
to the periphery, as long as his rule lasted, had proven
to be effective and beneficial to the state. He was able
to subdue tribal centrifugal elements in both Kurdish and
Baluch areas by depoliticizing and neutralizing the tribal
political elite either through co-optation or suppression.
Kurdish intellectual opposition was also suppressed and
mostly driven underground or into exile while such stratum
was not significant among the Baluch. Azaris, on the
other hand, as the most prosperous or "advanced" among
these groups, were accommodated, i.e., Azari political
elite was treated on a par with the Persian political
elite and the rank and file, except cultural restrictions,
suffered no economic or administrative discriminations.
Without a doubt, an historical continuity can be observed
in the relations of the modern state of Mohammad Reza Shah
with the three groups under study here. Azaris, who were
a privileged group during the Qajar period were able to
re-strengthen their ties to the Iranian state and thus
keep their status and position intact while the policy of
"carrot and stick" was used for the Kurds and the Baluch
as the Qajars did use such policies as well. Of more
interest is the fact that neither economic deprivation
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[Baluch, Kurds] nor cultural repression such as language
and educational policies [Baluch, Kurds, Azaris] were
sufficient reasons to create group conflict. Although
restrictions in the use of indigenous languages created
grievances particularly among the urban strata, such
policies were not inherently significant enough to
threaten political stability. Cultural or economic
grievances were indeed the most tangible means for the
politicized members of these groups to express their
dismay when they found themselves in the same socio-
political enviornment with the Persians. Within such
environment the real problem was one of political
exclusion. The Shah's regime, however, depending on the
group, attempted to mitigate the problem. Since it was
realized that as a sophisticated and politically conscious
group Azaris cannot be excluded from the political domain
the historical ties of the Azaris to the Iranian state
were reaffirmed. Azarbaijan was also too strategically
important to be ignored. On the other hand, some
community leaders among both the Kurds and the Baluch were
coopted while other potentially instabilizing forces were
neutralized by intimidation and suppression. Indeed the
omnipotence of the modern state and the variety of options
at its disposal enabled it to control the process of
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conflict generation or conflict resolution. Thus,
although Mohammad Reza Shah's regime was not able to
formulate an over-arching national ideology that could
unify various groups of the population and integrate them
willingly into the Iranian society, the state was able to,
temporarily, put a cap on the population's communal
demands and aspirations until the revolution of 1978-79
opened the Pandora's box.
The revolution of 1978-79 was not based on communal
loyalties and mostly signalled the emergence of a
pervasive socio-political consciousness that, in many
cases, cut across ethnic and class boundaries.
Nevertheless, the revolution also demonstrated that ethnic
and communal loyalties were well and alive and only needed
the right opportunity to reappear.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
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THE ADVENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC:
AZARIS. KURDS, BALUCH
The revolution of 1978-79 that replaced the
modernizing monarchy of the Pahlavis with an Islamic
Republic, was a clear demonstration of the Pahlavis'
failure to create loyalty and identification toward the
state.
Various theories and hypotheses have been offered to
explain the causes of the revolution and the ease with
which the Shah's regime was toppled. This chapter will
begin by enumerating some of these explanations and will
proceed to examine the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini's
Islamic state. The new political environment elicited
different reactions from Azaris, Kurds and the Baluch.
Each group's particular response to the new political
situation will be elaborated. It will also be explained
that although the political structure and the state's
ideology were dramatically changed, the approach that the
dominant group adopted toward the ethno-linguistically
distinct groups remained essentially the same.
General Observations:
Much has been written about the causes of the Islamic
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Revolution in Iran. Economic "boom and bust," moral
outrage and a quest to "return to Islamic purity," impact
of modernization, authoritarianism and foreign
intervention or conspiracy have all been suggested as
possible causes of the Revolution.1 All these might have
been contributing factors but none by itself is sufficient
enough to explain the fall of the Shah's regime.
Afsaneh Najmabadi who offers a combination of
economic and political reasons for the fall of the regime
contends that the depoliticization of the elite and other
classes who had habitually been involved in Iranian
politics was probably one of the most devastating aspects
of the Pahlavi rule in terms of its own survival.
Najmabadi explains that the huge increase in the oil
revenues caused the autonomy of the state from the civil
society. A rentier state that does not have to
effectively tax the population to generate revenues will
not feel an urge to be representative. She further
elaborates:
This autonomy of the state from a taxation
base...resulted in a progressive narrowing of the
politically relevant body of decision-makers, which
ultimately was reduced to the person of the Shah...2
Najmabadi's accounts are not only illuminating in
respect to the prevalent cynicism and lack of support
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among the elite and those classes who had benefited from
the Pahlavi rule, they demonstrate the attitudes of many
Iranians toward oil revenues after their increase in 1973;
a wealth that they had done nothing to generate. During
those years everyone seemed to be on a relentless and
urgent pursuit of wealth; a "gold-rush" mentality was
predominant.
The "rentier state" theory, however, does not
effectively explain the politicization of the rank and
file of the population that led to the downfall of the
regime. We noted that maldistribution of resources was
one of the outcomes of the Pahlavi policies. Najmabadi
seems to imply this was one of the main reasons for the
Pahlavis' demise.3 However, this does not explain why
many well-to-do Iranians participated in the Revolution or
why the most deprived and rural regions did not.
The "moral" issue is of less significance and it has
mostly to do with the vested interests of the religious
classes in Iran. This class who had been treated with
contempt and sometimes violence by Reza Shah, regained
some of its power and status during the rule of his son.
There is no doubt that modernization/Westernization of
Iran meant the decline of the power of the religious
strata. The objections of the clergy to the unveiling of
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women and their enfranchisement, their outrage by what
they saw as a growing laxity of sexual morals, etc., were
mostly maifestations of their indignation over their
declining power. In today's Iran prostitution is said to
be one of the basic means of survival for those women who
have lost their husbands in the ran-Iraq War. One does
not witness much moral outrage over this problem or the
candid pronouncements of Mr. Rafsanjani on the issue of
"temporary marriage."
Modernization, however, did create a "culture shock"
for many who were caught in the transitional process. It
is interesting to note that the Revolution was an urban
phenomenon that mostly occurred in Tehran, and other
Persian speaking urban centers as well as the important
cities of Azarbaijan and Kurdish inhabited areas. The
more remote and "backward" regions of the country, for
example, Baluchistan, although aware of the upheaval did
not take part in the Revolution. The most visible of
those groups who participated in the Revolution were the
"ulama, the young intelligentsia (mainly students and
teachers), and the Bazaaris."4 The modern middle class
and the workers as well as the urban poor joined the
Revolution at later stages.5 This particular aspect of
the Revolution, i.e., the fact that it was limited to
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those segments of the population who had been effected by
the process of change demonstrates that modernization
probably was one of the important contributing factors.
In the interviews conducted for this study, during a
two year stay in Iran after the Revolution, when asked why
they participated in the Revolution, most of the
interviewees did not have a clear answer. Most responses
were vague and emotionally charged. The intellectuals and
some members of the intelligentsia and students, among my
interviewees, were more specific and articulate. Those
who had leftist orientations mostly talked about
"imperialism" while those with religious leanings
elaborated on cultural decadence and immoral behavior. A
few people complained about "inflation." One thing,
however, ran constant in almost all of the reponses.
Almost everyone complained, vaguely or explicitly, of a
feeling of "alienation," and "discomfort." None of these
feelings could be explained by reference to political
repression or economic deterioration. This, of course,
does not mean that those factors and many others did not
contribute to the dissatisfactions and disappointemtns.
However, "identity crisis" was an all-encompassing
phenomenon.
Undoubtedly, the population caught in the process of
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change was under severe stress. However, the new kind of
awareness was not totally compatible with the prevailing
values and norms of the society. An identity crisis could
not but help push Shii Iranians [Persians and Azaris] into
the soothing arms of religion. Indeed the Pahlavi regime
not only had been incapable of mitigating the polarization
of tradition and modernity by reconciling the two, it had
failed to present an ideological synthesis that could help
accommodate different aspects of modern state and modern
economy and bring together the diverse population by
creating a comprehensive cultural-ideological consensus.
The Shah, himself, not unlike Khomeini, considered the
people as a flock whose guidance was bestowed upon him.
The following passage is a perfect example of such
attitude as the Shah himself wrote:
Proverbially to get things done in Persia one must
both reward and punish. My father relied more on
punishment than he did on reward or
encouragement...Oriental psychology in these matters
differs from that of the West and my father's methods
for getting things done showed no little realism in
the light of our authoritarian tradition...6
In the same light, the population of the periphery
was considered as inconsequential and deterring to
development. Selig Harrison quotes the late Prime
Minister Hoveida about the Baluch:
...There are not very many of them, are there? But
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they happen to live in a strategic part of the
country. Should we let them use this accident of
geography and history to provoke us into devoting
precious resources to develop that wtretched part of
the country? Why not move them elsewhere, where
development is more rational?7
These condescending attitudes expressed by the Shah
and his elite may, to some extent, also explain why the
political system was not opened to mass participation and
why eventually such participation took a revolutionary
form.
Islam Versus Secularism:
As was pointed out, the Shah's regime claimed
legitimacy on the basis of 2,500 years of Iranian
monarchical history. The monarchy, however, had to deal
with other important political forces such as Islam and
secular Iranian nationalism. At the outset, Iranian
nationalism and monarchy, both secular forces, were
closely identified. Yet, after a short period, there was
schism and the goals of the monarchy and those of the
Iranian nationalists did not coincide any longer.
Islam, on the other hand, presented a political force
that drew its legitimacy from a completely different
source and as change created much discomfort, this force
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grew stronger. Iranian political culture, thus, became
polarized during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.
Each segment of this polarized political culture developed
independently of the other and the real conflict regarding
the appropriate forms of authority arose between Islam and
the monarchy.
The only way that the Pahlavis could counterbalance
the force of religion was through secularization which
entailed implementation of legal and educational reforms.
Iranian secularization, however, bypassed the masses while
embraced by modern educated elite.8
The Iranian masses had embraced Shiism since the
Safavid period [16th century]. The Safavid Shahs of Iran
who are said to have established Shiism to differentiate
themselves from their rivals, the Ottoman Turks,9 helped
the promotion of the Shii clergy. Throughout the
Safavids' rule the Shii high clergy enjoyed power, status
and prestige as well as wealth.
The Safavid Shahs claimed legitimate rights to
political leadership based on their descent from a Shii
saint. As soon as the consolidation and
institutionalization of their power, however, the Safavid
rulers moved to separate religion from state functions
although they were careful not to alienate the ulama by
reducing their wealth and prestige. And the ulama, in
return, helped validate and strengthen the rulers' claims
to legitimate authority. Spiritual realm was nevertheless
subordinated to the temporal rule.10
The Qajar rulers of Iran due to convergence of
different factors, were not as fortunate as the Safavids.
The weak and decentralized Qajar state did not have the
means and the power to control the ulama who had an
independent financial base by collecting religious taxes
or holding large tracts of lands as well as controlling
the religious courts.11 The religious elite of Qajar Iran
as marja'-e taqlids or Sources of Imitation, were among
the wealthiest members of society and controlled complex
channels of social groups. Indeed independent financial
status and the social prestige allowed the ulama to
control an important network of patronage and followings.
The Qajar ulama were thus able to function independently
of the state and resist state policies that they did not
consider advantageous to themesvles and harmful to the
community. There are various examples of successful
resistance of the ulama, the most noteworthy of which was
the Tobacco Rebellion which led to the boycott of tobacco
products following the fatva [religious decree] of a grand
ayatollah in Najaf, Iraq.1 2 This and other events,
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particularly the Consitutional Revolution of 1905-1911,
demonstrate that in Qajar Iran religion was detached and
autonomous from the institution of the state. The
interesting point to be stressed is that until the Islamic
Republic and the revolutionary ideology of Khomeini, the
Shii ulama did not actively question the legitimacy of the
temporal rule. Even during the Consitutional Revolution
the ulama who participated in the revolt did not intend to
change the structure of power in Iran.13 The Revolution
only restored the so-called "just rule" and that is the
reason the Qajar dynasty survived this revolt until it was
toppled by Reza Khan in 1925.
The Pahlavi state, as we noted, set out to eradicate
all potential sources of power and in many ways it
succeeded. With secularization and other policies,
religious sector also lost many of its privileges. Even
though, Reza Shah did launch an attack on the prerogatives
of the ulama, by the time his rule had ended, the Shii
ulama still steadfastly held the sources of wealth and
prestige. The following table is an example of such
wealth.
Important Landholders in Isfahan, 1946
Category Number
Aristocracy 4
Merchants 6
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Ulama 15
Writers 5
Physicians 2 14
The autonomous basis of the Shii clergy, however, was
not lost and the Iranian clergy did, at times, flex some
muscles in order to gain the attention of both the
population and the state.15 In the meantime, the
religious schools [madrassas], mosques, and endowments
survived and at times prospered depending on who had the
upper hand; the state or the ulama.1 6 Micheal Fischer
estimates that in 1975 there were 6,500 religious students
in Qumm, 1,800 in Mashhad, 1,000 in Isfahan, 500 in
Tabriz, 250 in Shiraz and 300 in Yazd. 17 Through such
religious taxes as zakat and khoms, religious schools were
saved from dependence on the state. The autonomy of the
Iranian clergy thus endowed this stratum with the
capability of efficient organization and mass mobilization
through its sophisticated networks of patronage and
followings which proved vital in facilitating their
leading role in the Revolution.
Khomeini and the Islamic Republic:
Before Khomeini, an important characteristic of the
Iranian Shii ulama was political quietism. Indeed the
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issue of the legitimacy of the temporal rule was not dealt
with beyond the requirements of a Shii political ruler or
leadership. One scholar who has studied the Shii
doctrines closely contends:
Compared to the Imam, both the Twelver Shi'i ruler
and the mujtahid are equally fallible, equally
lacking in divine qualities and equally entitled to
none of the Imams prerogatives. There is nothing in
Twelver Shi'i doctrines that hinders a Twelver Shi'i
political ruler from filling the office of a mujtahid
provided he possesses the necessary qualifications
which may be acquired by any capable person.
Implicitly the opposite is equally applicable.18
The argument is if the temporal rulers or leadership
are Shii Muslims and do not impose non-Islamic rules or
laws on the faithful community their rule should be
sanctioned and indeed it was until 1979.
A detailed exposition of Khomeini's ideas is, of
course, beyond the scope of this study. But a brief
account of some of the more important features of his
thought can provide us with some explanations regarding
the posture he adopted vis-a-vis the demands of such
groups as Azaris, Kurds and the Baluch.
It is important to note that before the Revolution of
1978-79 and the exposition of Khomeini's ideas there is no
evidence that besides him any of the Iranian clergy had
ever advocated the rule or guardianship of the faqih
[Islamic jurisconsult]. Most of Khomeini's ideology was
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formulated when he was in Najaf, Iraq, exiled by the Shah
after 1963 disturbances.
The initial exposition of Khomeini's thought can be
found in the book kashf al-Asrar [1943-44] in which the
young Khomeini attacked Reza Shah and his secularization
policies such as unveiling of women and the reduction of
the ulama's power and called on the ulama to help save
Iran's Shii cultural identity and its integrity. He
emphasized the fact that the ulama must be able to oversee
the legislative and executive functions of the government.
Here he stressed that he did not mean for the jurisconsult
to become the Shah or the prime minister, etc.19
Khomeini, however, appeared actively on the Iranian
political scene between 1962-1964 when several riots broke
out in Iran by mostly religious groups who opposed
government acts regarding land reform, women's
enfranchisement and bestowing of legal immunity to
American personnel in Iran. Khomeini's outspoken
opposition entailed his detainment, house arrest and
eventual exile to Najaf in Iraq. During this episode
Khomeini had not yet formulated his ideas about the
illegitimacy of the monarchy and that the ruelrship of the
Muslim community belonged to the jurisconsult.
It was in Najaf that most of Khomeini's ideas about
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velayat-e facih [the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult]
were formulated in a series of lectures. In these
lectures Khomeini vehemently rejected the idea of the
separation of church and state and rationalized his
advocation of the guardianship of the just jurisconsult by
theoretically equating, in terms of government functions,
the role of the faqih with that of the Prophet and the
Imams. The Prophets and the Imams are the true rulers of
the community but who will guide the Muslims in their
absence? He writes:
Perhaps the Imam of Times, may peace be upon him,
will not appear for another 200 years. What do we
know? We are unaware of the facts. Perhaps, God
willing, he might even appear tomorrow. But if he
does not appear until the end of time, as the Hadith
[tradition] has it, then should not the Islamic
principles be implemented until the Day of
Judgment?,,2 0
Khomeini thus uses different hadiths [traditions]
from the Prophet and the Imams to substantiate and confirm
the role he advocates for the jurisconsult. Since there
is a necessity for enactment of the law, i.e., for
government which continues after the death of the Prophet,
Islam must include a governmental system. But who is the
best suited to rule? The Islamic ruler must have a
thorough knowledge of divine law and be just.21 The Imams
had these qualities but in the Great Occultation the best
411
candidate is the facih [jurisconsult].
Khomeini also elaborated on the incompatibility of
Shiism with monarchy and chastised the ulama for their
quietism.2 2 Khomeini's most important contribution that
was indeed a departure from tradition and an innovation
was his insistence on the direct rule of the fagih
[jurisconsult]. Many of the Shii theologists had
considered the jurisconsult as the representative of the
Imam but Khomeini moved this proposition one step further
by contending that the faaih would not just be one high
official among many but the supreme overseer and the
guardian.23
Khomeini's ideas regarding the legitimate form of
government, however, do not solve the "problem" of
diversity in a Muslim country such as Iran. To start
with, he vehemently opposes the idea of nationalism.
Nationalism to Khomeini, is an imperialist plot to sow
discord among Muslims:
Nationalism that results in the creation of enmity
between Muslims and splits the ranks of the believers
is against Islam and interests of the Muslims. It is
a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are
disturbed by the spread of Islam.24
In his declarations, lectures, sermons and teachings
Khomeini seems to see the Muslim world as one unit. He
also emphasizes the dangers of Sunni-Shii split2 5 and
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propagates the exportation of the Islamic Revolution to
liberate the Islamic lands. Indeed the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic incorporates such stipulations as:
From the viewpoint of Islam, the government does not
arise from the notion of classes and mediation among
persons or groups but is a crystallization of
political idealism based on religious
community ......In regard to the Islamic contents of
the Iranian Revolution, the Constitution provides the
basis for trying to perpetuate the revolution both at
home and abroad.26
Principle 9 of the Constitution stipulates:
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, freedom,
independence, unity and the territorial integrity of
the country are inseparable from each other .... No
individual, or group or authority has the right to
harm even slightly the political, cultural, economic,
military and territorial independence of Iran by
exploiting the name of freedom..27
This article can be interpreted as denying the rights
of ethno-linguistic groups to self-determination. At the
same time Principles 12 and 15 recognize Shii Islam and
Persian language as the official religion and language of
Iran. Principle 15, however, allows for the use of local
languages in the local media and schools along with
Persian.28
In 1979 the Ayatollah, himself, in an interview said:
Sometimes, the word minorities is used to refer to
people such as the Kurds, Lors, Turks, Persians,
Baluchis and such likes. These people should not be
called minorities, because this term assumes that
there is a difference between these brothers. In
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Islam such a difference has no place at all. There
is no difference between Muslims who speak different
languages, for instance, the Arabs or the Persians.
It is very probable that such problems have been
created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries
to be united....They create the issues of
nationalism, of pan-Iranism, pan Turkish and such
isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines.
Their plan is to destroy Islam and the Islamic
philosophy.29
The above passage is a clear indication of the
Ayatollah's political posture vis-a-vis various ethno-
linguistic elements. Muslim community embraces one people
only, the community of faithful. Thus, the Kurds, the
Baluch, as well as other Sunni ethno-linguistic groups
fall in the category of the "faithful" and are not
distinguishable from the rest of the Iranian Muslims,
i.e., Shii Persians and Azaris.
This view seems to be in keeping with the idea that
for Khomeini territorial and/or ethno-linguistic aspects
of a polity are not significant and it is ideology that is
the building block of a society. One scholar writes:
...If political society, according to Khomeyni, is
based on ideology and not on territory or politics,
Khomeyni's understanding of the international system
must be cast in terms of ideology as well.30
Although various pronouncements by Khomeini and the
foregoing do support such suggestion, in practice
Khomeini's reactions to different situations have
demonstrated that not only his understanding of politics
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is based upon a modern nation-state framework, but he,
himself, sometimes has behaved in a nationalistic manner
which is in absolute contrast to his advocation of the
Muslim unity and solidarity. David Menashri provides
another interesting example:
He Khomeini] disregarded the demands of the United
Arab Emirates for the return of the three islands
captured by the Shah in 1971, insisted on the
continued use of the name, the "Persian Gulf" ( and
even rejected Ayatollah Khalkhali's proposal to name
it the 'Muslim Gulf'), and disqualified Jalal al-Din
Farsi's candidacy for the presidency on the ground
that his father had held an Afghan nationality, and
that he was not of 'Iranian origin'..31
There is no doubt that the ideal-typical Islamic
state has been and is very different from the Islamic
state that Khomeini envisioned and was established in
Iran. Khomeinism, like other ideologies, had to come to
terms with realities of power. Undoubtedly, as a Shii
jurisconsult the spirit of his messages about an Islamic
government is universalist. All those authors who point
out his emphasis on Islamic Umma [Islamic community)
indeed are referring to this spirit. But like other
utopian political leaders the Ayatollah too had to
compromise with reality and its imperatives. As a leader
of a nation-state he soon proved to be a representative of
the implicit, unspoken but inevitable ideology inherent in
the nation-state; i.e., he was transformed into a
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nationalist, albeit Muslim, leader, thereby identifying
more and more with those aspects of Islamic Revolution
which were strongly "Iranian" and moving away from his
previously stated all-inclusive, universalist Islamic
umima.
In this light, Khomeini's reactions to the autonomy
demands of various ethno-linguistic groups are more
explicable. There is indeed little difference between the
violent way which the Ayatollah and his regime dealt with
communal demands and Reza Shah's methods of confrontation
with centrifugal forces in Iran. What makes the Ayatollah
resemble his secular military predecessor is the necessity
of holding the nation-state together even through the use
of violent force.
The Revolution was undoubtedly a long-awaited
opportunity for ethno-linguistically diverse groups to
demand autonomy. The reaction of the clerical regime was
swift. The regime made it clear that it would not
tolerate any autonomy movement. Indeed it was the
rebellion of such groups as the Kurds and the Baluch that
demonstrated the difference between theory and practice in
Khomeini's approach.
416
AZARIS :
Not unlike the Consitutional Revolution of 1905-11,
the Iranian Azaris, participated in the Revolution of
1978-79 in great numbers. Indeed the first and main
revolt, in February of 1978, occurred in Tabriz and
subsequently sparked other revolts in many Iranian
cities. 3 2
The objectives of the Iranian Azaris were basically
identical to those of the Persian-speaking population,
i.e., the overthrow of the Shah's regime. Throughout the
revolt, not one word about autonomy or communal sentiments
was heard from Azarbaijan. The Azaris, as Shii Muslims,
readily embraced the Shii symbols that predominated the
revolt. Indeed such important leaders of the Revolution
as Mehdi Bazargan were Azari themselves and many Azari
religious students and the clergy participated in the
Revolution. Bazargan was appointed as the first Prime
Minister of the Islamic Republic by Khomeini himself.
Throughout the revolt any Azarbaijanis identified
with Ayatollah Sharia'tmadari, an Azari jurisconsult, who
was considered one of the most learned and important
marja'-e taglids [source of imitation] during the Shah and
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who never actively opposed the regime. Sharia'tmadari,
although joined the voice of the revolutionaries, kept his
moderate and conciliatory posture throughout. Subsequent
power struggle, however, between Khomeini and
Sharia'tmadari and their respective followers led to
Sharia'tmadari's eventual humiliation on the National
Iranian Radio and Television.33 It should be pointed out
that the differences between Khomeini and Sharia'tmadari
were not of ethno-linguistic or communal nature. It was a
struggle for power that created the schism.
Sharia'tmadari, in the tradition of many Shii
jurisconsults, had tacitly approved of the Shah's regime
and in return was tacitly recognized as the Ayatollah al-
Ozma The Grand Ayatollah] and the marja'-e taglid [source
of imitation]. While many anti-regime activists supported
Khomeini and considered him as the marja'-e taglid, many
others, particularly many Azaris, followed Sharia'tmadari.
This was never a communal issue and there is no doubt that
among the supporters of Khomeini one could find a great
many Azaris.
Sharia'tmadari's approach to politics was much more
modern than Khomeini's. Although Sharia'tmadari approved
of the concept of an Islamic state, he believed that Islam
should be adapted to the "requirements of modern
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society." 34 There were also differences in the two men's
understanding of such concepts as democracy and republic.
While Sharia'tmadari's worldview was much more in tune
with Western concepts, Khomeini's disdain for such
concepts as democracy is well known.35
More important, of course, was Khomeini's rhetorical
pan-Islamism which contrasted the moderate views of
Shatia'tmadari who regarded "Islam as the cohesive element
of Iranian nationalism and the main instrument in the
strengthening of Iran's national unity, as well as
safeguarding its national sovereignty."36 In the same
light Shari'tmadari defended the rights of ethno-
linguistic minorities to self-rule. He, however,
vehemently stressed the territorial integrity of Iran and
even asked his Azari co-ethnics in 1979 to postpone their
communal demands "until the government is fully
stabilized.,,3 7
The power struggle between the two factions
eventually culminated in the Tabriz uprisings of December
1979.38 These demonstrations and their eventual outcome
proved the Islamic regime's capabilities in dealing with
political instability. First and foremost the regime's
use of force in Azarbaijan proved effective. Second,
through propaganda, the regime was able to convince the
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Azari masses, many of whom believed in Khomeini as their
spiritual leader, that the discord is an imperialist and
Zionist plot. And thirdly, the regime was able to arouse
the historical and inherent inter-ethnic hostility between
the Kurds and the Azaris to its advantage.
Although no explicit demands for local autonomy were
put forward by these demonstrations, almost all of the
groups who participated in the Revolution, opposed the
upheaval in Azarbaijan. Even Qassemlu, the Secretary
General of the KDPI (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran) who
was in the process of negotiation with the government on
the issue of Kurdish autonomy, did not support the
insurrection. The Kurds were apparently apprehensive that
the fall of Khomeini's regime could bring to power a
strong, nationalist faction who would prove detrimental to
Kurdish aspirations. Of course, all these groups later
regretted their naivete in initially supporting the
regime.
The issue of Kurdish-Azari hostilities can best be
illustrated by referring to an interview conducted by Fred
Halliday with a group of Azari students in Iran. Their
response to the question about regional autonomy was that
while they liked the idea, "they could do without it -
because if we get it then the Kurds will have to get it
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too. "39
Sharia'tmadari and his followers were eventually
silenced mainly because many Azaris supported the regime
and more important than that a number of the clergy in the
political leadership have been Azaris themselves.
Ayatollah Khalkhali, the hangman of the regime, Sayyed
Hassan Mousavi, the non-clerical former Prime Minister,
Hojjat al-Islam Khamenei40 who has now replaced Khomeini
and occupies the position of the grand jurisconsult and
many other important religious personalities are from
Azarbaijan. The Revolution, suprisingly, demonstrated
that a great number of religious students [tullab] and
high clergy of Iran were indeed from Azarbaijan.4 1 The
important Azari merchants of the Tabriz and Tehran Bazaars
also wholeheartedly assisted and supported the regime.
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND A FORWARD LOOK:
One important factor in the Azari politics at this
period was the conspicuous lack of leftist tendencies
among Azaris. This, of course, does not mean that such
propensities were non-existent. Many Azarbaijani students
and modern intellectuals and intelligentsia, like their
Persian counterparts, demonstrated such tendencies.
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However, the non-pervasive aspects of leftist proclivities
are particularly important. One of the reasons for such
phenomenon may have been the prevalent crisis situation in
the Soviet Union at the time. The Russians who usually
had taken advantage of the weakness of the central
government to occupy Azarbaijan and somehow meddle in
Iranian affairs, had more important things such as
Afghanistan and their own deterioriating economic
conditions to worry about.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran, without a doubt, left
a great impression on the Muslims of the Soviet Union.
This impact was particularly strong on the Soviet Azaris
who like their co-ethnics in Iran are Shiis.4 2 The
feeling of solidarity, although strong among the Russian
Azari intellectuals, was prevalent among the Azari rank
and file as well. It was, however, the Soviet Azari
intellectuals who began a campaign of communicating
nationalistic messages to the "South."
Nissman writes that through radio, telephone4 3, the
mail and personal contacts "the message" was transmitted
until 1982 when the government restricted such exchange.
Of particular importance was the poetry exchange between
Azari nationalist poets of the north and some Azari poets
in the south, the most noteworthy of whom was Shahriar,
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through Radio Baku Poetry Program.44 It is interesting to
note, that Shahriar, at the same time, was writing praise
poetry for Imam Khomeini and the greatness and glory of
the Islamic Republic!
The expression of unity and solidarity that was
extended to the south by the Soviet Azaris was part of the
larger process of consolidation of national identity in
the Soviet Azarbaijan. By the time Islamic Revolution
happened in Iran Soviet Azaris possessed a solid Azari
Identity. The Soviet policies of encouragement of a
national language and culture as well as the promotion of
a national leadership had helped solidify national
identity in every republic. One of the manifestations of
this national consciousness was the desire to extend
ethnic/national rights and privileges to the co-ethnics
outside the home republics.45 In the case of the Soviet
Azaris this desire was expressed by emphasizing linguistic
and cultural and thus national solidarity with the South,
i.e., Iranian Azarbaijan. The extension of this feeling
of nationhood to Iranian Azarbaijan entailed intense
cultural and literary activity regarding the south on the
part of the Soviet Azaris. The history of the South since
its separation in 1828 was studied and the art and culture
of Iranian Azarbaijan was regarded as one and the same
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with that of the Russian Azarbaijan. Indeed interesting
irredentist overtones in the expressions of nationalist
aspirations by the Soviet Azaris -particularly the
intellectuals- could be observed. Saroyan quotes the
Director of the Nizami Institute of Azarbaijani
Literature, Garaiev, contending:
Throughout history Azerbaijan has been parceled up
many times. Three-fifth of its territory and its
population have remained on that bank of Araz [Aras
River that divides the two Azarbaijans]. This is a
historical injustice..46
To facilitate communication and exchange of literary
activity between the two Azarbaijans, all students in the
humanities and social science at Azarbaijan State
University and Azarbaijani Knowledge Society are required
to learn Azari in the Arabic script that is used in
Iranian Azarbaijan47 in order to eliminate the problem of
access.
In the first few years after the Iranian Revolution
there was a noticeable upsurge of fundamentalism with pan-
Azarbaijani overtones in the Russian Azarbaijan that were
also manifested in the riots over Nagorno-Karabakh, an
Armenian enclave within the Azarbaijani territory that
sought to be annexed to Armenia. The inter-ethnic
hostilities and disturbances have continued and so far
have had violent and tragic outcome that threatens the
424
political stability in the region. Tha nationalist
aspects of the conflict are loud and clear enough to be
heard in Iran and everywhere else.
Iranian authorities were initially quite
uncomfortable with cries of nationalist aspirations and
proclaimed that they would not interfere in the "Soviet
internal affairs." They, however, agreed to facilitate
travel across the border between the two Azarbaijans since
one of the loudest grievances of the Soviet Azaris was the
demand for opening the borders and easing of travel to
Iranian Azarbaijan.4 8 The dispatch of the Soviet army to
Azarbaijan and the brutal pacification of the Soviet
Azaris calmed the Republic temporarily until the demise of
Communism in the Soviet Union.
The former Soviet Azaris now possess an independent
state of their own. The Communist Party structures,
however, are still well and alive in Azarbaijan with the
old Communist leaders as reborn "democrats," waging anti-
Communist campaigns! As the old party apparatus was
restructured and reconsolidated, other forces -
particularly Azari nationalists who organized Azarbaijan
Popular Front- failed to attract mass support. The
Armenian-Azari conflict, however, seems to be weakening
the power of the old Communist functionaries and in the
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long run might strengthen the Azari nationalist forces.
As for Iran, the leaders of the Islamic Republic
initially did not show much enthusiasm in having new,
independent states on Iran's northern borders. Although
the crumbling of an "atheist empire" was a reason to
rejoice, the consequences of the disintegration of the
Russian empire indeed made things more complicated.
Firstly Iran has a lot more to fear from an independent
Azarbaijan. Northern Azaris with their implicit
irredentism and frequent outbursts of nationalism may
create instability in Iranian Azarbaijan. Secondly, Iran
now has to compete with such states as Turkey and Saudi
Arabia, not to mention the United States, for influence
among the newly independent states on its northern
borders. The competition with Turkey is particularly
intense in Azarbaijan since Turkish influence in
Azarbaijan will imply the strength of secular forces in
that new state. The consequence of this competition has
been a thaw in the relations between the two countries.
The leaders of the Islamic Republic, however, have been
quite pragmatic about the new situation and have gone out
of their way to accommodate the state of Azarbaijan with
offers of economic cooperation and cultural exchange.
They have even proposed to help change the Cyrillic
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alphabet used presently in Azarbaijan to Arabic in order
to counter the Turkish proposal to help change the
alphabet to Latin!
The Iranian Azaris, nonetheless, have been
surprisingly calm. Their integration in the Iranian
socio-political, economic and cultural structures and
absence of discrimination in different institutions have
given them high stakes in the future of Iran. The Shii
character of the regime also has intensified the common
denominators shared by Persian and Azari population and
thus has helped narrow ethnic boundaries. At present, the
Iranian Azaris are not even vocal about linguistic and
cultural restrictions since there is more freedom in print
and broadcasting in local languages. For example, the
publications of an Azari version of an official newspaper
in Tehran provoked the Kurdish demand for the same
privilege that was not granted.49 Indeed according to one
anthropologist, Azari integration into the Iranian society
has prompted some scholars "not to consider them a
national minority."5 0 This is probably not a very
realistic view of the situation of the Azaris. It would
be a mistake to allow Azari political and socio-economic
integration obscure the fact that they have a separate and
distinct identity. Ethnic identities are fluid and
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flexible. As identities contract or expand depending on
many external and internal forces, it is always possible
to see the Iranian Azaris reclaim their national identity.
However now that the Northern Azaris possess an
independent state of their own, all developments in
Northern Azarbaijanthey will, undoubtedly, have a greater
impact on the Southern Azaris. In the meantime, the
Iranian state has to play a more active role to guarantee
Azaris' continued loyalty to the state.
THE KURDS:
The Iranian Kurds actively participated in the
Revolution of 1978-79 and for the duration of the
Revolution the basic demand, like that of the Persians and
Azaris, was the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime. The
Kurdish revolt was organized and directed by indigenous
groups and parties who had been underground during a
greater part of the Pahlavi period. Among these the most
important was KDPI [Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran]
whose origins could be traced to the Committee of Kurdish
Youth established in 1943. This committee was transformed
into a political party in 1945 and it played a major role
in the ill-fated Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1945-46.
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After the fall of the Republic KDP with a membership of
mostly Kurdish intellectuals and middle class nationalists
had to go underground. During this period KDP of Iran
began close ties with the Tudeh Communist] Party and
demonstrated a leftist orientation. The onslaught of the
Pahlavi regime on the left took its toll on the Party and
the surviving leaders eventually ended up in the Eastern
Europe.
In the 1960s when Mulla Mostafa Barzani was engaged
in violent clashes with the Iraqi regime many members of
the KDP of Iran extended assistance. However, when the
Shah began supporting Barzani, he returned the favor by
helping the regime deal with the dissident Kurds of Iran.
His betrayal of the Iranian Kurdish dissidents who were
mostly leftist intellectuals made cooperation between
different Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish factions difficult to
this day.
KDPI became one of the most active political groups
in Iran during the Revolution. With the return of its
leadership from exile and the assistance of other elements
within the country it was able to create an efficient
organizational structure and attract grass roots support
among the Kurds. The Secretary General of KDPI was Abdul
Rahman Qassemlu, a Kurdish intllectual from feudal
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background with Socialist tendencies whose return from
exile was made possible after the Revolution. Another
noteworthy group Party) in Iranian Kurdistan was Komala
[The Revolutionary Organization of Toiler of Kurdistan], a
radical leftist group that was founded clandestinely in
late 1960s or early 1970s. Komala's political orientation
was initially Maoist but apparently after a revision its
ideological orientation is described as "pure Marxism of
the Albanian type."5 1 Also a charismatic Sunni cleric,
Shaikh Ezzuddin Hosseini who has been sympathetic to
Komala became a national figure among the Kurds. Hosseini
due to his status as a religious man enjoyed the support
of the rank and file of the Kurdish peasantry while his
radicalism attracted many young, more educated and modern
members of the Kurdish society.5 2
Although the Kurds during the Revolution did not
raise the autonomy demand, the weakening and eventual fall
of the monarchy did create a de facto autonomy in the
Kurdish inhabited areas of Iran.53
With the fall of the regime, a new phenomenon
appeared on the Kurdish political scene: class conflict.
Many Kurdish landlords and tribal chiefs who had lost
their lands to non-tribal Kurdish peasants due to the land
reform program, returned to seize their lost lands by
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force. The Kurdish non-tribal peasants with the help of
the modern strata of the Kurdish society such as the
intelligentsia as well as military assistance of Komala
were able to defend themselves. Peasants unions were
organized which in turn joined the Komala.54 The KDPI
that enjoyed mass support and also attracted tribal
leadership, in many instances, had to play a mediatory
role between the landlords and the peasantry. The
landlords, on the other hand, were assisted and supported
by the central government, revolutionary guards, etc.
Also, the KDPI and the Komala both helped some peasants
with land seizurs.55 The result was that "the Kurdish
national cause and the cause of the peasantry against
their oppressors became closely associated."5 6
Soon both KDPI and Komala and other groups began
voicing autonomy demands. The clerical regime,
particularly in the beginning when it was still weak and
not consolidated, tried to stall by negotiations. Among
the spokesmen for the Kurds Qassemlu, KDPI Secretary
General and Shaikh Ezzudin Hosseini were the most
prominent. The autonomy demands while stressing
indivisibility of Kurdish areas from Iran, claimed that
Kurdish inhabited areas include four provinces of Western
Azarbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshahan [now Bakhtaran] and
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Ilam. Autonomy was meant to imply self-rule within an
undivided and sovereign Iranian state. Such matters as
foreign policy, national defence, foreign trade and long-
run economic planning would be the prerogatives of the
central government. There were also other stipulations
such as the employment of Kurds in the administration and
military installations of Kurdish areas as well as the
establishment of a Kurdish National Assembly that would be
a legislative body elected by the Kurdish people through
free elections that would entail secret balloting and
universal suffrage. There were also stipulations
regarding the use of Kurdish in educational and
administrative institutions.5 7
These demands, of course, were rejected by the
government which led to a series of violent and bloody
confrontations that lasted until 1983 when the government
eventually was able to pacify most of Iranian Kurdistan.
It is obvious that the notion of self-rule was opposed to
the ideological and political perceptions of Khomeini and
his followers. The regime was not only apprehensive that
such autonomy would be a first step to total independence
or secession, it was aware of the demonstration effects of
such event. Thus parallel to the use of the revolutionary
guards and the regular army, the regime attempted to take
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advantage of the latent Kurdish-Turkish hostility. In
Western Azarbaijan, Azaris attacked a meeting of KDPI and
soon the conflict was transformed into a full-fledged
warfare in which both groups suffered immensely.58 In the
meantime, the government tried to sow discord among the
Kurds by promoting a Kurdish cleric, Ahmad Moftizadeh, who
did not enjoy much legitimacy, as the Kurdish leader
recognized by the center. Such organizations as KDPI and
Komala were outlawed and figures such as Shaikh Ezzudin
Hosseini were proclaimed as the enemies of the Revolution
by the Ayatollah. 59
The breakout of the Iran-Iraq War injected another
element into the conflict. The Kurds who occupy border
regions of the Western Iran were called upon by the
government to cease hostility and assist the government to
resist the "imperialist" onslaught. It was hoped by
placating some Sunni clerics from Kurdistan and promises
of resource allocation, Kurdish insurrection could be
checked. None of these measures succeeded since most of
these religious figures were not representaive of the
Kurdish masses and there was no spicific plan in the
development projects for the Kurdish areas.60
The War complicated an already complex political
conflict. We have mentioned that the Kurdish movement in
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Iraq led by Mulla Mostafa Barzani came to an end with the
signing of the Algiers Agreement between the Shah and
Saddam Hossein. The War prompted Khomeini's regime to
employ Barzani's sons, Idris and Mas'ud and their KDP
[Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq] in military
confrontations with Iraq. The Iraqis, in turn, used
different Kurdish [and non-Kurdish] dissident groups,
particularly KDPI and Komala against Iran. The Barzanis
together with Iran's revolutionary guards eventually
pacified most of Iranian Kurdistan by 1983.61
These alliances, undoubtedly, have left great
impressions on the Kurdish psyche. The fratricidal
warfare was not limited to conflict between the Kurds in
different countries. Tragically different Kurdish groups
within one country have engaged in military
confrontations. In Iraq, for example, the bloody clashes
between KDP of Iraq headed by Mas'ud Barzani and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan headed by Jalal Talebani, a
more intellectual and ideologically leftist oriented
individual, as well as clashes between other smaller
groups, have made the idea of a united and coherent
Kurdish national movement seem absurd.
In Iran the ideological differences between the KDPI
and the Komala and the fact that each group represents
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different social strata have made their cooperation, at
times, difficult. While KDPI mostly represents middle and
upper strata of the Kurdish society, the Komala has
attempted to focus on the peasantry and particularly the
workers. Komala's emphasis on class consciousness, not
only in Kurdistan but in the rest of Iran, has made its
cooperation with other leftist organizations possible. In
1983-84, Komala merged with the Communist Party of Iran
thus becoming its military wing in Kurdistan.6 2 The KDPI
also has had to deal with ideological differences within
the Party. Indeed since 1979 the party has gone through
differnt crises that have led to schism, the lastest of
which is the emergence of a new group, the Kurdish
Democratic Party of Iran -Revolutionary Leadership- with a
purely Marxist outlook.63 Among all these grounps the
KDPI itself seems to have been the strongest and the most
popular. However, the most severe setback to the KDPI
came in June 1989 when Qassemlu, its leader, was
assassinated as he was negotiating with the Islamic
Republic's representatives. Qassemlu, a shrewd and highly
educated intellectual with leadership capabilities will be
difficult to replace.
In an interview with an Iranian Kurdish scholar who
had just returned from Iran, he maintained that the
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Kurdish inhabited areas of Iran are under strict military
control by the government. As an example of the lack of
legitimacy of the clerical regime, he mentioned that in
one town he visited, the local cleric appointed by the
center could not even attend the Friday prayers unless he
was accompanied by at least a dozen revolutionary guards
to protect him. He also mentioned that to a visitor it
would seem as if the revolutionary guards and the military
personnel outnumber the Kurds themselves in these areas!
The government, he maintained, out of necessity and due to
the strategic significance of these areas [border areas
adjacent to Iraq and Turkey] has had to build a
communication and transportation infra-structure that was
non-existent during the Pahlavi period. For the same
political reasons broadcasting and print in Kurdish are
allowed. Kurdish publications have, particularly,
flourished and are growing. Amir Hassanpour, in his
excellent study of the standardization of Kurdish
language, maintains that the main objective of the Islamic
regime in its "rather relaxed" policy regarding Kurdish
"print" and "broadcasting" has been to attract the Kurdish
secular nationalists who were audiences to the media
output of the autonomist organizations based in the
"liberated areas."6 4 Hassanpour also contends that the
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officialization of the Persian script that did not exist
during the Pahlavi period is meant to prevent any attempt
by the Kurds or other ethno-linguistically distinct groups
to alter their alphabets to enable themselves to have
cultural discourse with their kin in other countries.65
In the meantime, although in the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic freedom of education in native languages
[along with Persian, of course] is stipulated, the Islamic
regime has yet to allow such freedom. Thus educational
institutions and bureaucracy are restricted to utilize
only Persian and the use of other languages in such
institutions are forbidden.
My Kurdish source also informed me that urbanization
has dramatically increased in Iranian Kurdish areas. The
dislocation of the Pahlavi agricultural policies and
particularly the misery of the War have simply emptied and
wiped out many villages. The follwoing statistical data
certainly demonstrate the damage inflicted by the War:
Province Existing Villages Damaged %Damaged
Bakhtaran 2764 341 12.3
1929 1244Kurdestan 64.5
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W. Azarbaijan 3179 1705 53.6 66
Urbanization has accelerated the pace of
detribalization. However, there is no reason to believe
that loyalty to the state has replaced previous and more
parochial loyalties. My Kurdish source stressed the fact
that a consciousness of being a "Kurd" is without a doubt
replacing tribal loyalties.
The Kurds are indeed the most politicized of all
groups in Iran today. However, internal strife and
fragmentation has systematically prevented a coherent
movement to appear among them. This is not just a
predicament of the Iranian Kurds. In fact in Iraq, the
Kurdish political leaders, particularly the tribal elite,
are partly responsible for the plight of the Iraqi Kurds.
The details of the Iraqi Kurdish dilemma are beyond of
scope of our discussion. Suffice it to say that the Iraqi
Kurdish elite -both tribal and intellectual- have at times
deliberately torpedoed historical opportunities that could
have led to at least Kurdish self-rule in Iraq. It is
believed that Mulla Mostafa Barzani and after him many
other Kurdish tribal leaders have been opposed to the
social restructuring of the Kurdish society.67 Such
policies as land reform and more egalitarian social
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structures would be destroying the foundations of the
power and status of the tribal leaders. This has been one
of the fundamental reasons for the conflict between the
Kurdish intellectuals and the tribal elite.
In Iran the situation has been more or less the same
with one exception, that the Kurdish intellectuals as
political leaders have had more success attracting grass
roots support. There is no doubt that the Pahlavi
policies created social change among the Iranian Kurds;
however, such political organizations as the KDPI and the
Komala have been instrumental in raising Kurdish ethnic
and class consciousness particularly after the Revolution
and the onset of clashes with the Islamic regime. At the
same time, the state has directly been responsible for the
emergence of the conflict. By continuing the Pahlavi
repressive policies as well as non-recognition of Kurdish
legitimate leaders and by unleashing brutal military force
on the community, the regime has destroyed any possibility
of reconciliation. Thus at the moment military control is
the only means of keeping Iranian Kurdish inhabited areas
in check.
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External Influences and a Forward Look:
It seems that the Kurds are not only easily
manipulated by external forces, they readily lend
themselves to such manipulation. Since the Kurds are
divided among more than four countries, complex situations
can emerge, some examples of which have already been
reffered to.
As we have noted the propensity to play the role of a
buffer or mercenaries for stronger paymasters has been
part of the political culture among the Kurdish tribal
elite. Considering the perpetual conflicts, jealousies,
rivalries and betrayals between Kurdish traditional
leaders, it is not surprising that tribal warlords have
been willing to sell their services to the highest bidders
in the name of Kurdish nationalism. The interesting point
is that even Kurdish intellectual leaders when caught in
such dangerous games, behave exactly in the same way as
their tribal counterparts.
The sixteenth century when the Kurds played the
Safavids and the Ottomans against each other was perhaps a
less complicated period. During the 20th century the
Iranian Kurds have allied with the Iraqis against the
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Iranian central governments while Iraqi Kurds have sought
Iranian support against various Iragi regimes. The Soviet
Union and the United States as well as the Israelis all
have become involved in Kurdish affairs once or twice.
The Iraqi Kurdish dissidents live in Tehran while Iranian
Kurdish nationalists have had their headquarters in Iraq.
Turkey uses air raids agianst northern Kurds of Iraq6 8
with the tacit agreement of Iran while the Iraqi Kurds
also depend on Iran for sustenance! Amidst all this, the
internecine hostility between different Kurdish factions
continues to take its toll among the innocent Kurdish
civilians. In such circumstances even consciousness of a
common Kurdish identity is not going to help an
ideologically and socially fragmented people.
In the meantime, the Gulf War in which Iraqi forces
were driven out of Kuwait brought more misery to the
Kurds. The dramatic weakening of the central authority in
Iraq, as usual, prompted the Kurds to rise and attempt to
realize their dream of autonomy or independence hoping
that the United States will assist them. However, as such
assistance was not forthcoming, millions of Kurds under
heavy artillery and fearful of chemical and biological
weapons had to flee to the mountains of Turkey and Iran.
Again, the Kurds had to face the bitter realities of
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international politics. The creation of an independent
Kurdish entity and the interests of the states who
dominate the region are mutually exclusive. Indeed none
of the three states of Iran, Iraq and Turkey will ever
acquiesce in the idependence of their Kurdish subjects.
Such mortal enemies as Iran and Iraq would easily unite to
quell the danger of the emergence of an independent
political entity in their Kurdish inhabited areas. The
only superpower actively involved in the region at present
is the United States and the most the U.S. would do is to
protect the Kurds from the deadly onslaught of the Iraqi
forces and even that is not guaranteed. As a consequence
the Kurdish leaders seem to have come to terms with the
realities of power politics and more and more they
emphasize Kurdish autonomy within undivided states of
Iran, Iraq or Turkey. Considering the nature of the
regimes in power in these countries it is doubtful whether
such autonomy would ever be granted.
As to the Iranian Kurds the future is not very
bright. As long as the Iranian central authority -whether
Islamic or secular- is determined to monopolize power, the
state will have to resort to force to control Iranian
Kurdish areas as it has done for the past decade.
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Throughout the Revolution the Iranian Baluch were in
a wait and see state of mind. The Sardars and those
political leaders who had supported the Shah's regime were
apprehensive and mostly fled for their lives. The small
Baluch middle class and other urbanized Baluch had
legitimate concerns over the overwhelmingly sectarian
orientation of the emerging state in Iran. The rank and
file of the agriculturalists and the nomads continued as
before, oblivious to the cultural and socio-political
transformation around them.
The Revolution had devastating effects on the economy
of Baluchistan. Many Baluch who worked in a few
government and/or privately owned or sponsored companies,
established in the late 70s in Baluchistan, lost their
jobs and joined the ranks of the already unemployed. By
the time the Islamic regime was in place there was not a
"single production center" in Baluchistan. This rampant
unemployment had given rise to a sweeping smuggling
activity and highway robbery among the Baluch. The Baluch
who, as nomads, used to engage in robbery to supplement
their subsistence, did not consider this stealing. The
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insecurity of roads also affected many Baluch shopkeepers
who could not restock or find customers. It is estimated
that at the time some 70% of the Baluch engaged in
smuggling "weapons, beverages, narcotics, foreign made
consumer and luxury items, etc."69 It is interesting that
the slogan most used among the Baluch during the
Revolution was "Job, House, Freedom."7 0
As we noted in the previous chapter, the Pahlavi
period had the important effect of increasing the power
and prestige of Baluch religious leaders. The Shii
character of the new regime helped enhance this aspect of
Baluch political scene. Now, the Baluch Sunni religious
leaders became the power brokers and the intermediary
between the Baluch and the central government. They were
able to readily assume their new role partly due to the
political vacuum left by the fleeing Baluch elite who had
supported the ancien regime.
On the other hand, the emphasis of the new regime on
the Shii character of Iran and its recognition in the
Constitution helped foster communal demands in Iranian
Baluchistan. The Iranian Baluch who for a few decades had
been quiescent and complied with the Shah's regime,
suddenly rose up and demanded autonomy. It is interesting
to note that the Baluch unleashed their anger and
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frustrations against their Sistani neighbours. The
Sistanis are a Persian-speaking, Shii group who live in
the province and are socio-economically more prosperous
than the Baluch. This episode was indeed a remakable
manifestation of "relative deprivation." There is no
doubt that the Baluch's perception of their worth as a
group was determined by reference to the group closest to
them, i.e., the Sistanis.7 1 The clashes between the two
groups eventually resulted in the intervention by the
central government on the side of the Sistanis.72
As a result of these upheavals a number of Baluch
religious leaders emerged among whom Maulavi Abdol Aziz
should be mentioned. Maulavi Abdol Aziz with the support
of the local aristocratic elite as well as the lesser
clergy founded the Islamic Unity Party [hezb-e ittehad-e
Muslemin]. Under the banner of this party, Maulavi Abdul
Aziz and his group declared their demands. In an
interview, the Baluch religious leader proclaimed: "we are
not secessionists. And it is not in our interests to be
independent in all fields. Our goal is to see that the
Baluchis make their own decisions in cultural and
political fields, instead of being forced to accept
decisions made in Tehran. We want to choose our own
Governors General, Governors, and administrators [although
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not our military officials]. That is what the Baluchis
mean by autonomy."7 3
This was probably the most clearly articulated Baluch
demands for self-rule. As Khomeini sent emissaries back
and forth, it soon became clear that the Islamic regime
was essentially following the footsteps of the Pahlavi
Shahs. The appointed Governors of the province have been
Persian and, as the case has been with other groups, the
Constitutional stipulations regarding teaching of local
languages alongside Persian were disregarded. Broadcast
and print in Baluchi are allowed. However, the Baluchi
language needs a suitable environment to be developed and
standardized and such environment is unfortunately absent
in Iran.
The Islamic regime, eventually, through coercion and
recognition of a new group of local leaders suceeded to
calm Iranian Baluchistan. Like Kurdish inhabited areas
Iranian Baluchistan is also under tight military control.
Although most smugglers are now executed there is no
reason to believe this has affected the rampant smuggling
activities among the Baluch rank and file who are probably
living in as miserable a condition as they ever did.
Kamal al-Din Qorab, whose book [in Persian] on Baluchistan
was published in 1985, contends that Iranian Baluchistan
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is the opium and heroin paradise of Iran and that 90% of
the population earn their livings by smuggling. He adds
that the number of doctors in the rual areas of the
province is 54 and 94% of the villages lack health
facilities.74
While most of the middle and entrepreneurial class in
Zahedan [capital of Iranian Baluchistan] is non-Baluch,
the very small urban-based middle class who emerged in the
1970s, spearheaded the revolt of 1979-80. This class who
is quite conscious of its distinct identity and aspires
for self-rule is in proximity and contact with its Persian
neighbours and undoubtedly feel the humiliation of an
inferior status in both bureaucratic and educational
institutions. Also the small number of Baluch civil
administrators do not enjoy the same benefits, privileges
and status as their Persian counterparts while almost all
of the military and para-military personnel installed in
Baluchistan are non-Baluch.7 5
The situation of the nomadic and agriculturalists of
Baluchistan is somehow different. This segment of the
population is so remote and insulated that it is truly a
separate world by itself. They live in the most primitive
and poor conditions and, it is believed, resort to
smuggling in order to survive. Almost all sources on
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Baluchistan contend that the reasons for rampant smuggling
is abject poverty. Qorab who talked to many peasants
writes that almost everyone in the remote areas lack an
"identification card" which is a vitally important piece
of paper in the Islamic Republic. His conversations with
a number of peasants is revealing:
- "Q: What is your staple food?
- A: Dry Bread.
- I thought they are exaggerating. I asked: let's say we
would be your guests. What kind of food would you offer
us, dry bread?
- Somebody said: yogurt. Rich people eat yogurt.
- I asked I mean something cooked. What do you cook to
eat?
- They answered: pepper broth!
- Q: what is that?
- A: water, pepper, salt, oil, cumin seeds, all mixed.
Qorab continues that "everyone around us was illiterate
except an eleven year old boy who said he has finished the
4th grade. My friend asked him do you know there has been
a revolution? Do you know our country is at war? Do you
know with whom our country is fighting?
- A: Yes. We Know. With America.
- Q: What/who is America?
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- A: Well, I have not met him yet. I don't know him."
The above conversations are not only indicative of
the rampant poverty and backwardness in Iranian
Baluchistan, they explain why consciousness of
ethnic/national identity among the Baluch has been mostly
a middle class phenomenon. Hungry people have more
important things to worry about than the idea of national
solidarity.
Even the Baluch middle class has not been able to
establish political organizations of the kind existing in
Iranian Kurdistan. Most nationalist Baluch usually aspire
to membership in the Pakistani Baluch organizations.
The Islamic regime, however, has been successful in
placing a cap on the political turmoil in Baluchistan both
by recognition of its religious leadership as the new
interlocutors and by sheer military presence. For the
dominant group, the Baluch are nothing but a nuisance; a
group who potentially can offer nothing to the central
government but be a burden. The notion of power-sharing
is absolutely absurd in a situation where there is such a
great imbalance between the center and the preiphery.
The Baluch although have moved further ahead in the
direction of ethnic consciousness are still lacking
sufficient solidarity to be able to confront the Persians.
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Moreover the Persian-Azari dominated state is stronger and
more omnipotent than ever. Modern technology which
enables the state to fend off external agression, enables
it to easily crush the internal disturbances. The Baluch
with their relatively smaller population, their nascent
middle class and intelligentsia and their isolated and
marginal mass of peasantry and nomadic population are no
match for the sophisticated civil and military
organizations of the modern state.
The consequences of such backwardness and neglect in
Baluchistan has been the Baluch unequal status vis-a-vis
the Persians. Nothing indicates more sharply the extent
of differential treatment than the behavior by the so-
called law-enforcement agents in Baluchistan. During the
Pahlavi era the gendarmes and at present the revolutionary
guards have the legitimate right to the use of violence.
Naser Askari writes that during the Pahlavi period the
gendarmes were so hated and feared that whenever a mother
needed to punish her mischivous child she would say "I am
going to call the gendarme."7 6
All this has created a segregated situation. The
Baluch have been a distant minority who have been and may
permanently stay in a segregated minority position. The
Shii stress of the Islamic regime has made the Baluch
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emphasize their Sunni insitutions much to the chagrin of
the regime who actively seeks conversion. They have also
persisted on retaining their language and been endogamous.
The emerging Baluch middle class and educated youth,
however, are aspiring a better life. The demand for
autonomy will not go away. Thus the military presence of
the state will be continued.
External Influences and a Forward Look:
Some external factors have acted as elements of
change in Iranian Baluchistan. Since 1970s many Iranian
Baluch have found their way into the Persian Gulf city-
states in search of employment. They usually come back to
Baluchistan with money, some luxury items to sell and new
ideas. The Gulf connection, however, has been more
influential for Baluch of Pakistani origins who have been
active in Oman playing mercenaries for Sultan Qabus77 and
advocating support for Baluch national movement in
Pakistan.7 8
The Arab, particularly Iraqi, enthusiasm for the
cause of the Iranian Baluch increased after the success of
the Revolution in Iran and the Ayatollah's attempts to
export the Revolution. There is no evidence the Arab or
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Iraqi connection which is being supported by a businessman
of Baluch origin in Bahrain7 9 has had any real effects in
Iranian Baluchistan. At present with the demise of Iraq
and the Soviet Union and a more moderate foreign policy in
Iran, the Baluch of Iran cannot depend on the Arab support
for their national cause. The Gulf connection, however,
will be a dynamic factor that will help enhance Baluch
consciousness.
Another factor is, of course, the existence of co-
ethnics in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although many
Iranian Baluch freely travel to Pakistani and Afghan
Baluch inhabited areas and it is said that some actually
carry passports belonging to these countreis,8 0 this
interaction has failed to create a significant national
organization in both Iran and Afghanistan. In Iran, the
small Baluch nationalists look toward the Pakistani Baluch
national movement which at times have been united with the
national movement of the Pakistani Pathans [Pushtuns].81
The Baluch national movement in Pakistan has gone through
ebs and flows and is relatively dormant at present. The
Pakistani Baluch, however, with their larger numbers,
their much larger middle class and their leftist-oriented
tribal leaders have presented themselves as a formidable
force. The impacts, however, on the Iranian Baluch have
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not been remarkable.
Much has been said about the Soviet designs for
Baluchistan. The Soviets did indeed consider Baluchistan
as a way station to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.
But now that there is no more a Soviet Union and the
possibility of such aggression is nil, the Baluch leaders,
particularly those of Pakistani Baluchistan, will have to
come to terms with the new political realities. The
Soviet Union was once considered a potential threat to the
political stability of the region. Now that such threat
is eliminated and the hopes of radical Baluch nationalists
for Soviet assistance can not be realized, the Baluch
leaders have more reasons for a conciliatory posture vis-
a-vis the state either in Pakistan or Iran. At the same
time the Gulf War made the United States the uncontested
superpower with a visible presence in the area. The
United States, however, supports the status quo and the
political stability of most of the states in the region.
It is thus highly unlikely that the United States would
support a Baluch nationalist uprising unless such support
could weaken a potentially adversarial state. There is
thus no indication that the situation of the Baluch, both
in Iran and Pakistan, will drastically change in near
future.
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This chapter examined the emergence of the Islamic
Republic and its impact on the relations between the state
and the three groups under study. The advent of the
Islamic Republic entailed dramatic change in the socio-
political and cultural structures of Iran. Indeed as all
facets of life were affected by the integration of
political and religious institutions, a new state ideology
was forged that claimed legitimacy from a completely
different source. This new ideology that rejected
secularism, Westernism, and other such concepts as
democracy, was based on an Islamic/Shii worldview, a view
that considered all Muslims as members of a universal
community, the community of faithful.
Ayatollah Khomeini, as the ideologue and the leader
of the Revolution, had very specific and clear ideas about
"political integration" in an Islamic society such as
Iran. As the Muslim World is one unit and all Muslims,
despite their sectarian divisions, are one people, such
approaches to politics as nationalism is nothing but an
imperialist plot to divide the Muslims. In this context
the communal and parochial aspirations and demands of
Muslim but ethno-linguistically distinct groups become
irrelevant. Thus in a Shii dominated Iran, Sunni Muslims
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cannot be considered "minorities" because they are an
integral part of the larger Islamic community.
The practical application of this view, however, has
proven to be less than perfect. The Islamic state as soon
as its inception acquired the trappings of a modern
nation-state form and the Ayatollah, himself, behaved as
an Iranian/Persian nationalist. Indeed it soon became
clear that the universalist aspects of the state ideology
was mostly summed up in the idea of exporting the
Revolution and within the boundaries of Iran a centralized
and authoritarian system based on the hegemony of one
group was in place.
The state, thus, vehemently resisted any attempt by
various ethnic groups to win autonomy or self-rule. In
this light, one can, again, observe a clear continuity
between the policies adopted by the Islamic state and its
predecessor, the monarchical Pahlavi state. Like the
Shah, the Islamic regime also utilized a "carrot and
stick" policy but, the Islamic state has shown a much
stronger proclivity to use the "stick" as the case of the
Kurds clearly demonstrates. In the meantime, it is not
known to what extent the Islamic regime has tried to
recruit the local political leaders. The Shii Persian and
Azari religious/political elite seem to have been
455
reluctant to share power both at the local and national
levels.
It is thus clear that the Islamic or religious nature
of the state did not weaken the "nation-state" form in
Iran since the universalist Islamic state failed to
emerge. At the same time, the nature of the relations
between the state and different ethnic groups remained the
same although the state experienced drastic changes in
ideology and different structures.
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CONCLUSION
This study has been an attempt to examine the
relations between the Iranian state and three ethnic
groups -Azaris, Kurds and Baluch- over three periods of
Iranian history. The Qajar period represented the
traditional political structure while that of the
Pahlavis' a modernizing/modern one. The period since the
emergence of the Islamic Republic was also analyzed in
order to understand whether the drastic change in the
socio-political structures and in the state ideology
helped change the relationship between these groups and
the state.
an important aspect of this study has been the
examination of this relationship at several critical
periods in the political history of the country, periods
during which the central government had been weakened or
was otherwise undergoing significant changes. These
critical periods are the Constitutional Revolution of
1905-1911, the two World War periods, the oil
nationalization crisis of early 1950s, the collapse of the
Pahlavi regime and the triumph of the Revolution and the
advent of the Islamic Republic.
For each period, the general political background was
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described while subsequently each group's particular
relationship with the state and its response to the
state's policies was examined. Since all the three groups
are trans-border groups, the impact of the inter-state
power politics and the demonstration effects of the
political activities of the co-ethnics on the other side
of the borders could not be overlooked. Thus, in addition
to internal dynamics, external influences such as
intervention by foreign powers as well as trans-border
influences have been analyzed.
Of particular interest to this study was the
difference that could be observed in the relations between
the Iranian state and the above-mentioned groups since
19th century. This study has thus attempted to find
plausible explanations for such a difference. A
comparison of the relationship between the traditional
state and these groups with that of the modern state
demonstrated a relative historical continuity. The
Azaris, within both traditional and modern political
structures, have been a privileged group while the
history of such relationship with the Kurds and the Baluch
is one of conquest, confrontation and sometimes
appeasement and compromise. Why have Azaris, while being
culturally restricted by the modern state, been
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accommodated while the relationship of the state with the
Kurds and the Baluch has been one of "carrot and stick?"
The answer may be found in the historical context in which
the Iranian state and these three groups have interacted.
An examination of the history of these relationships will
reveal the reasons and causes for the ways in which these
relationships have evolved through time.
The traditional state of the Qajars was a sort of
segmented political organization that embraced a ruling
dynasty who did not have the ability to rule directly but
was able to extend its authority over its territory either
through military expeditions or by making alliances with
local political elite such as the tribal chiefs,
landlords, and religious leaders and sometimes by playing
these local leaders against each other.
In such a state the sense of identity and solidarity
to a great extent was derived from the population's
religious identity. Thus all Muslims were theoretically
part of the community of the state and the body politic.
In Iran the Shii character of the ruling dynasty made
a Shii identity more relevant. Other groups such as the
Kurds, the Baluch , the Turkomans, all Sunnis, were
peripheral, closed communities, marginal to the power
structure at the center and usually inhabiting the
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intermittent zones of the influence of the central power.
For the masses of the Shii population as well as the
more marginal Sunni groups, ethnic or linguistic
identities and solidarity based on such identities were of
little significance. Although ethnic and linguistic
distinctiveness was maintained, the emphasis was on other
aspects of group solidarity such as religious loyalty,
tribal affiliations, etc.
The traditional Iranian state, however, had a
particular relationship with the Azaris. As Turkish-
speaking, Shii Muslims, not only could they identify with
the Turkish-speaking Qajar rulers, their homeland, i.e.,
Azarbaijan was a natural extension of the Qajar politico-
territorial realm. This was not a territory that was
ruled intermittently but one considered a vital part of
the Shah's realm, i.e., an extension of the "core."
On the other hand, the relationship between the state
and such groups as the Kurds or the Baluch was a very
limited one restricted to collection of taxes and
conscription of men for the army. This relationship was,
at times, based on conquest and coercion, i.e., when the
state was weak these groups were practically independent
and when it was stronger they were subdued. Thus in
contrast to the Azari community, the Qajar state remained
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external to these communities and their social and
political structures.
The transformation brought about by the advent of the
modern state in Iran began only in the 1920s and reached
its peak in 1970s. This transformation entailed, among
other things, the breakdown of traditional socio-political
structures, increased urbanization, universal education
and higher rates of literacy, the improvement of
transportation and communication infra-structures and the
formation of new ideologies with regard to politics and
the state. The most significant aspect of this process
was the imposition of a secular "nation-state" model, in
the Western sense, on the heterogeneous Iranian society.
There is no doubt that, initially, the concept of the
secular "nation-state," individualized citizenship and
secular law were alien even to many Persians who could
potentially identify with such a state. The question of
legitimacy was thus a salient problem for the modern state
in Iran. Therefore, an ideological framework was forgerd
on the basis of which this secular "nation-state" was
validated and at the same time Persian politico-cultural
hegemony justified.
Thus, the relations that the state initiated with
diverse groups inhabiting Iranian territory was based on a
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political framework in which the "nation-state" was a
dominant concept. However, the secular orientation of the
modernizing state made nationalist mobilization at the
mass level difficult, if not almost impossible. The fact
that the state, although aspiring to be a modern nation-
state, still remained a patrimonial and personal
rulership, impeded the appearance and consolidation of
rational-legal aspects of government. Thus even though
the traditional legitimacy had faded away, certain basic
modes of traditional government still remained in
existence. At the same time it was believed that through
coercive assimilationist policies the centrifugal elements
would cease to be a source of political instability. The
peripheral groups, particularly the tribal ones, were
perceived with contempt by the ruling elite. Among all of
the ethno-linguistically diverse groups of Iran Azaris
were the only group accommodated and accepted as players
in the political arena. Even in the case of Azaris, an
initial short-term "break" with the past can be observed
that affected Azaris' perceptions and expectations.
However, with the rule of the second Pahlavi Shah, the
modern state, like its traditional predecessor, proved to
be more than willing to incorporate Azaris into the
national political structures with beneficial results both
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for the stability of the state and Azaris themselves.
The modern period is also important because of the
impacts of the trans-border contacts on Azari political
consciousness. The Kurds experienced these influences
relatively later while the backwardness of the Iranian
Baluchistan was only matched by that of the Pakistani
Baluchistan and thus trans-border influences were minimal.
Trans-border influences seem to be particularly important
in the creation of political consciousness.
The effects of modernization seem to have been
similar to those of trans-border influences.
Modernization was an important factor in the emergence of
political consciousness among those segments of the
population affected by change, but the process cannot be
directly linked to endemic ethnic conflict within the
country. As industrialization, urbanization, improvement
in communication and expansion of literacy and education
all enhanced the organizational and cultural penetration
of the state, various groups became more aware that they
were different. At the same time, modernization created
drastic transformation in the economic and socio-political
structures of these diverse communities. In its initial
phase [Reza Shah's period] modernization entailed policies
that transformed tribal chiefs into private proprietors
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and landlords. Subsequent policies [Mohammad Reza Shah's
period) attempted to break the power of landlords and in
the process deruralized some of the peasantry. All these
structural and institutional transformations went hand in
hand with the widened inequalities between the dominant
group and the rest. As modernization was creating more
awareness of distinct identity among various groups it
impeded the movement from "tribe" to "nation." However,
such awareness did not lead to group confrontation either.
Thus at the same time that the modern state and its
intellectuals promoted the notion of the nation-state for
Iran based on an ideological pursuit of Persian/Iranian
nationalism, other Western concepts and ideologies such as
democracy, freedom, equality, secularism, etc., were being
introduced, not necessarily by the state itself but
through communication and interaction with the outside
world. This is best illustrated by the fact that it has
been only a few decades that such concepts as "ethnic
groups" and "nationalities" have become popular and
utilized with regard to Iran and is indeed a reflection of
the emergence of modern strata among these groups who
could appropriate such concepts in the interest of group
solidarity. Thus coercive measures, although succeeded to
subdue different groups and integrate them within the
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state structures, did not succeed to create loyalty and
identification towards the state. What was important was
the issue of political inclusion and exclusion and the
modern state, in the second phase of its consolidation
(Mohammad Reza Shah period], tried to deal with that
problem as well. Indeed the state did not solely relied
on coercion. Like the traditional state, the modern state
devised less violent policies. In Baluchistan, the tribal
chiefs were co-opted and kept under the thumb of the
state. As the area remained utterly backward and
undeveloped, the state did not have to worry about the
intelligentsia and intellectual dissidents. Some Kurdish
local leaders were also placated while the dissidents were
dealt with by force. Both among the Kurdish and Baluch
political elite the state carried out a policy of "carrot
and stick" which was to a large extent successful.
However, Azaris, as the most advanced and modernized among
these groups, had to be accommodated so that the
experience of the "Republic of Azarbaijan" would not be
repeated.
These measures, although temporarily kept the
periphery calm, only worked as long as the state remained
strong and was able to manipulate the local leaders and
control the dissidents. Modernization had helped the
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emergence of new social forces in these communities. Had
the Pahlavi state not been toppled, it probably would have
been forced to adopt new strategies to deal with emerging
community leaders.
Another interesting phenomenon is that the community
leaders and the politically conscious strata had to play
the game of politics in the "national" arena. The nation-
state concept had provided these leaders with a model that
they could copy and utilize for their own use and their
own communities. The logic has been if the central power
refuses to allow various communities to have a stake in
the collective future of a state, why shouldn't these
community leaders attempt to erect a state of their own?
This, indeed, provides a clue as to why these groups
usually resort to violent uprisings when the central
government seems week. It also explains the demand for
autonomy. Autonomy is usually the first step toward
independence and both the communal leaders and the
"national" leaders are aware of this fact and the
underplaying of the real intentions does not alleviate the
fears of the politicians at the center. Autonomy is
indeed sine ua non for the future statehood. The very
existence of autonomy promotes the genesis of a new state.
A system of common education that incorporates the
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national symbols strengthens the feeling of solidarity and
unity. An indigenous administrative system also
facilitates the conception of a new nation-state in the
minds of the people. The indigenous elite takes the model
from the state and aspires to make a replica for
themselves. Autonomy accelerates the making of a nation;
the nation needs a state to validate itself.
The central government, on the other hand, is quite
aware of such aspirations whose realization means a
truncated territory for the state. That is how and why
the goals and aspirations of communal leaders and those of
the national leaders become mutually exclusive.
The modern state in Iran, for various reasons, so far
has not been able to develop institutional means to deal
with centrifugal forces. The emergence of an Islamic
regime in Iran did not necessarily change the basic
characteristics of such modern state. The Islamic regime
is undoubtedly traditional in its approach to issues such
as women and their role in the family and society, or
other cultural norms and values. But the state is quite
similar to the Pahlavi regime in terms of political forms
and processes all of which are again based on a nation-
state framework. The Islamic regime, contrary to its
theoretical and lofty ideals regarding the universality of
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Islam and oneness of the Islamic community, has
practically advocated a Shii/Persian chauvinism. Its
policies regarding the rights of ethno-linguistic
communities are mostly a continuation of the policies of
the ancien regime. The Azaris are accommodated and
allowed to share in the political power even more so than
before- while both the Kurds and the Baluch are controlled
militarily with attempts to placate some community
leaders. Although there has been a relative easing in the
use of local languages in printing and broadcasting, the
official and instructional use of them are not allowed.
One thing is, after all, clear; that Islam as such has not
been an integrative force after 1979. Once again the
ruling group has had to resort to the coercive means of
modern state to control centrifugal forces and supplement
its use of military and bureaucratic power with overtures
of compromise and reconciliation.
There has thus been a dual process taking place in
Iran with regard to the modern state and its integrative
attempts. On the one hand, the process of change has
caused drastic transformation in the traditional socio-
political structures such as tribes. This process has
increased consciousness of belonging to a distinct ethno-
linguistic community since the state has not attempted to
promote the development of a civil society; one that is
based on consent, fair play and justice, freedom and
equality. The loyalty to the tribe is thus being replaced
with the loyalty to the larger ethnic community and not
the state.
The process of modernization, on the other hand, has
strengthened and expanded the reaches of the state and has
allowed the bureaucratic and military authority of the
state to try to forcefully integrate various communities.
It is indeed the state itself that through various
policies generates/resolves conflict or promotes/delays
identity formation. The language policy, for example,
adopted by both Pahlavi and Islamic regimes care a case in
point. By outlawing a language and banning its use the
state effectively delays its literary development. The
problem is that the state does not provide any form of
incentive or encouragement for most of these groups
particularly the educated urban strata to begin to develop
loyalty to the state. The case of the Azaris clearly
demonstrates that an ethnic group can be quite conscious
of its identity and yet identify with the state. This
case further indicates that none of the policies
implemented by the state is as significant as the
incorporation of the group into the body politic. Of
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course, in an authoritarian political system such as that
of Iran's this literally means the incorporation of the
local political elite into the national political process.
As the Azari rank and file encounter no discrimination in
Iran and enjoy equal rights with the Persians, the power
sharing of their political elite with the Persians endow
the group as a whole with a large share in the "allocation
of prestige" which is a vitally important aspect of ethnic
group relations. Indeed it is what the state offers to
the group and its elite that in the last analysis will
determine conflict or accomodation. As long as the state
offers nothing substantial to these groups, coercion will
continue to be used to maintain the hegemony of the ruling
group.
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